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ABSTRACT 
This doctoral thesis examines the works of Theodore Abū Qurra (d.c.829), Abū Rā’iṭa 
(d. c.835), and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī (d.c.850); three of the earliest known Christian 
theologians to explain and defend their beliefs in Arabic, under Islamic rule. In 
particular, it focuses on their respective explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity: 
assessing each individual author’s writings; investigating the tools and arguments 
they employ; and considering the extent to which they engaged with Islamic 
theological thought (kalām), primarily through their borrowing of concepts and 
structures from an internal Islamic debate concerning the divine attributes of God. 
This study asks to what extent these Christians were essentially translating their 
traditional doctrine into Arabic, and to what extent they developed a new expression 
of the Trinity, conceptually influenced by Islamic thinking. 
 
The key conclusion of this thesis is that Christian explanations of the Trinity in Arabic, 
whilst they show a deep awareness of Islamic thought and make use of 
contemporary Muslim debates surrounding the nature and unity of God, cannot be 
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said to represent a development in Christian theology. Rather, such works should be 
viewed as an informed and creative response to the pressures and challenges of 
their Islamic surroundings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This doctoral thesis examines the works of three of the earliest known Christian 
theologians to explain and defend their beliefs in Arabic. In particular, it deals with 
their writings on the doctrine of the Trinity, which has proven to be a fundamental 
theological stumbling block throughout the history of Christian-Muslim interaction. 
The Christian authors in question lived at the heart of the Islamic empire in the early 
ninth century C.E. and during that period composed a number of writings expounding 
their beliefs in a language which, following the Arab-Islamic conquests of the mid to 
late seventh century, had become the primary language of the newly established 
Islamic Empire. 
  
Coincidentally, the three authors who are most familiar to scholars of this period, and 
who will form the subject of this thesis, also happen to represent the three major 
Christian denominations of the time. Theodore Abū Qurra (d.c.829), the subject of 
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Chapter Two, was the Melkite Bishop of Harran at some point during his life. Abū 
Rā’iṭa (d. c.835), whose writings are investigated in the third chapter, was a Syrian 
Orthdodox (Jacobite) cleric from the modern day Iraqi town of Takrit. The last of our 
scholars, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī (d.c.850), represented the East Syrian (Nestorian) Church, 
and is thought to have come from Basra, one of the major intellectual centres of the 
‘Abbāsid empire at that time. This coincidence however, has put the three authors at 
risk of being treated as examples of a homogeneous entity in terms of their works, 
their aims and their engagement with Islamic thought. The intentions of this study, 
therefore, are twofold: firstly, to analyse and compare the writings of the three 
authors on the Trinity, highlighting the subtle yet significant differences in their 
presentations of the doctrine; and secondly to examine their explanations of the 
Trinity in terms of their engagement with Muslim modes of thought, in order to assess 
their place and function in Islamic society. 
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Despite an increase in interest and availability of texts from this period, rather little is 
concretely known about their contents, authors and contexts, especially in the West. 
Progress has been made in recent years to improve this situation, both in terms of 
making works accessible and interpreting their contents, with the aim of exploring 
more deeply the development of Eastern Christianity and its expression in an Arabic 
Islamic context. Many of Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa’s works have been published in 
Arabic and translated into English among other modern languages: Dr. John 
Lamoreaux’s recent English translation of many of Theodore Abu Qurra’s writings in 
2005 and Dr. Sandra Keating’s translation of and commentary on a number of Abū 
Rā’iṭa’s works in 2006 have been most welcome in this respect. ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s 
works unfortunately still lack a full translation, although the modern editor, Michel 
Hayek, has provided an introduction and summary in French.1 A body of secondary 
literature continues to grow around these texts, as efforts are made to ascertain what 
the works of these authors can tell us about the context in which these Christian 
                                                          
1
 Hayek, M. (ed) `Ammar al-Baṣrī: kitāb al-burhān. wa-kitāb al-masā’il wa-al-ajwiba. (Beirut : Dar al-
Mashriq: al-Maktabah al-Sharqiyah, 1977)   
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theologians lived and wrote, of their place within Islamic society, and the expression 
and development of their faith in that context.2  
There is general agreement in the academic community as to the challenges and 
circumstances that these Christian authors faced in the early ninth century and, to a 
certain extent, how they responded. In his most recent book entitled The church in 
the shadow of the mosque, Prof. Sidney Griffith summarises the situation succinctly: 
‘The use of the Arabic language…provided the opportunity for the 
development of Christian theology in a new key, within a new frame of 
reference and with new challenges for Christian apologists.3 
                                                          
2 See for example: Griffith, S.H.The church in the shadow of the mosque: Christians and Muslims in 
the world of Islam (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008); ________. The 
Beginnings of Christian Theology in Arabic: Muslim-Christian Encounters in the Early Islamic Period 
(Aldershot; Vermont: Ashgate Variorum, 2002); Keating, S. Defending the “people of truth” in the early 
Islamic period: the Christian apologies of Abū Ra   iṭah, History of Christian-Muslim relations, vol. 4 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006); Swanson, M. ‘Apologetics, catechesis, and the question of audience in 
“On the Triune Nature of God” (Sinai Arabic 154) and three treatises of Theodore Abu Qurrah’, in 
Tamcke, M. (ed) Christians and Muslims in dialogue in the Islamic Orient of the middle ages (Beirut: 
Ergon Verlag Wurzburg, 2007); ________‘Beyond Prooftexting (2): The use of the Bible in some early 
Arabic Christian apologies', The Bible in Arab Christianity, D. Thomas (ed.) (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
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He also observes elsewhere: 
‘As a result, the discourse of the Christian apologists in Arabic presents a 
conceptual profile that cannot easily be mistaken for Christian theology in any 
other community of Christian discourse.’4 
 
Similarly, Keating notes:  
‘…it is clear the Christian community at the turn of the ninth century living 
under Islamic rule was confronted with a new situation that necessitated a 
creative response.’5  
 
And, speaking of Abū Rā’iṭa concludes: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Griffith, The church in the shadow of the mosque,156 
4 ibid., 75 
5  Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 32 
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‘Unlike many of his predecessors, he did not simply translate the Syriac 
tradition into the new language of Arabic. Rather, he began the attempt to 
communicate Christian faith clearly and coherently in a new idiom already 
heavily influenced by a religion hostile to it.’6 
 
This new ‘situation’ or ‘frame of reference’ clearly prompted Christian authors of this 
period to compose apologetic treatises which were consciously moulded to reflect 
Islamic concerns and which explained Christian doctrines using Islamic language and 
concepts borrowed from a concurrent Muslim debate concerning the divine attributes 
of God. 
 
The issues that current scholarship does not appear to have come to a conclusion 
about, and therefore require further exploration, are: how far each of these Christians 
utilised Muslim concepts; what they were trying to accomplish with their respective 
                                                          
6 ibid., 65 
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writings; and how far Christian theology took on a new distinctive form in the Islamic 
milieu. These questions will form the main focus of the present study. 
Whilst some scholars have tended to focus on Christian authors of this period, others 
have been more interested in the Islamic side, in the individuals and groups with 
whom these Christians and their peers most likely engaged. Prof. Richard Frank and 
Prof. Josef van Ess have published numerous works concerning the development of 
Islamic thought in the early period,7 with specific focus on kalām (broadly understood 
as ‘Islamic theological thought’) and those who advocated this system of thought, 
most famously the Mu‘tazilī school.  Prof. David Thomas also works closely with early 
Islamic and Christian theological texts, particularly Muslim writings on Christianity.8 
Whilst Muslim theological texts of the early ninth century are unfortunately lacking for 
                                                          
7 See for example: Ess, Josef van. The flowering of Muslim theology , J.M. Todd (trans), (Cambridge, 
M.A.: London: Harvard University Press, 2006); and _______.  Theologie und Gesellschaft im. 2. und 
3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens in frühen Islam, 6 vols (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1991-1997); Frank, Richard M. Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the 
Basrian School of the Mu‘tazila in the Classical Period (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1978); ________. ‘The kalām, an art of contradition-making or theological science? Some remarks on 
the question’ in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 88 (1968); and ________. ‘The science of 
Kalām’ in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 2 (1992) 7-37 
8 See for example: Thomas, David Richard (ed.) Christian doctrines in Islamic theology. History of 
Christian-Muslim relations, vol. 10, (Leiden: Brill, 2008); ________. ‘A Mu’tazili Response to 
Christianity: Abu ‘Ali al-Jubba’I’s Attack on the Trinity and Incarnation’, Studies on the Christian Arabic 
Heritage, R. Ebied and H. Teule (Leuven; Paris; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004) 
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the most part, there are a few sources which add to the picture of Christian-Muslim 
interaction in the early ninth century. These primarily include Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s 
Radd ‘alā al-tathlīth (Refutation of the Trinity)9 and Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī’s Radd ‘alā al-
Naṣāra (Refutation of the Christians)10, along with a number of slightly later 
sources.11  
 
This study goes beyond current literature by focusing specifically on explanations of 
the Trinity within an Islamic theological context while paying close attention to the 
differing emphases and priorities of the respective authors in their presentations of 
the doctrine; and by drawing conclusions concerning the fascinating question of how 
far Christian theologians engaged with Islamic modes of thought, and thus how far 
Christian Arabic expressions of the doctrine of the Trinity represent a new form of 
                                                          
9 Thomas, David Richard. (ed. and trans.) Anti-Christian polemic in early Islam: Abū Īsā al-Warrāq's 
'Against the Trinity' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
10 Périer, Augustin. (ed. and trans.) ‘Un traité de Yahyā ben ‘Adī: défense du dogme de la trinité contre 
les objections d’al-Kindī’, in R. Graffin (ed) Revue de l’orient Chrétien, vol. 2, no. 22 (1920-21) 
11 In particular Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Ash’arī’s Maqālāt al Islāmiyyīn, H. Ritter (ed.),  Die Dogmatischen 
Lehren der Anhänger des Islam, 3rd edition (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1930); Abū Bakr 
al-Bāqillānī’s (d. 1013) Kitāb al-Tamḥīd and ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamdhānī’s (d.1025) al-Mughnī fī Adwāb 
al-Tawḥīd wa-al-‘Adl, both in Thomas, D. (ed.) Christian doctrines in Islamic theology. History of 
Christian-Muslim relations, vol. 10, (Leiden: Brill, 2008) 
9 
 
Christian theology.  To this end, the focus is primarily on the contents of these works: 
that is to say the arguments, proofs, and tools Christians use in order to clarify their 
doctrine, as opposed to the linguistic style of their writing, their knowledge of Arabic 
and the use of Islamic nuances and Qur’anic allusions. Similarly, the question of 
audience for these works, although it is naturally linked to the aims and purposes of 
the authors, is not a central concern of this study and will therefore only be referred 
to as and where it relates directly to the main focus of the thesis, and will be 
discussed briefly in chapter six. Very broadly speaking, it seems that Christians 
writing theological works in Arabic had a dual audience in mind, though the balance 
of that audience varies across authors and across individual works, and will be 
referred to where relevant. 
 
For the purposes of clarification, the central question of the thesis may be presented, 
somewhat simplistically, as two alternatives. From available sources, it would appear 
that Christian theologians who wrote in Arabic, such as Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and 
‘Ammār, felt pressure from their Muslim neighbours and rulers to account for their 
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faith. Having both the ability and need to express their doctrines into Arabic, it could 
be suggested that for the most part they did exactly that, by translating their 
traditional doctrines into a new language which, despite having looked linguistically 
different to previous expositions, remained fundamentally the same in conceptual 
terms. 
 
On the other hand, one might take a slightly different view, that Christians would 
have been immersed in their ‘new’ Islamic context by this time to the point that, rather 
than purely translating doctrines and moulding their explanations in order to act as 
apologists in a new context, they would have been asking and attempting to answer 
similar questions to the Muslims about the nature of God.  
 
It is evident that these two views are not mutually exclusive positions. The extent to 
which Christians were being traditional or original, responding or asking their own 
questions, being apologists or creative theologians is very much a question of 
11 
 
degree. What we do know is that all three authors used Muslim concepts to clarify 
the doctrine of the Trinity in Arabic. One must therefore examine how far each author 
engaged with Islamic thought: whether as Christian apologists they saw it primarily 
as a method of explication and made use of it without seeking to re-evaluate their 
own doctrines within a Muslim conceptual framework, or how far they should be seen 
as actually considering Christian doctrines in a new light as a consequence of their 
Islamic surroundings and thus engaging in a sort of parallel exercise to their Muslim 
counterparts. 
 
One final and related question which is raised as a result of this study, concerns the 
label ‘Christian mutakallimūn’. The term mutakallim, meaning one who engaged in 
kalām, (Islamic theological thought), is very much an Islamic term. The Muslim 
mutakallimūn are often primarily considered as apologists or defenders of faith, but 
were also very much truth seekers, searching to supplement revelation using God 
given reason. As a result of their apologetic writings and their use of Muslim concepts 
and the style of argumentation common to kalām, the three authors who form the 
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focus of this study are often referred to as Christian mutakallimūn. The issue which 
naturally arises from the central research question of this thesis is whether this is 
truly an appropriate label for all, if indeed any, of the three authors. As such, it is one 
which will be explored briefly in the second part of this study, with a view to raising 
the matter for further investigation. 
 
Methodologically speaking, Part One of this thesis will set the context in which 
Christian authors of the early ninth century were writing, before looking at the three 
individual authors and their writings on the Trinity in the following chapters. Each text 
will be described and analysed closely on its own merits and within its particular 
historical and intellectual context, allowing for conclusions to be drawn about each 
author and his works separately. Part Two will then deal with the three authors 
comparatively, once again through close textual analysis, identifying the tools used to 
explain and defend the doctrine of the Trinity in Arabic and demonstrating how they 
are employed by the three authors. The final chapter will provide an evaluative 
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discussion concerning the aims and place of these Christian theologians in the 
Islamic Empire.  
In terms of content, Chapter One will explore the historical, political, social and 
intellectual contexts in which these Christian authors were composing their works, in 
order to give the reader some background information and outline key issues to 
consider when reading works on the Trinity. Section One will briefly address the 
historical, social and linguistic context of Christians living in the Islamic empire. 
Section Two will look at the Christian intellectual heritage before and during the early 
Islamic period, through two prominent Christian theologians from the Syriac and 
Greek traditions respectively: Philoxenus of Mabbug and John of Damascus. Section 
Three will investigate the Islamic context in a similar manner, through two 
theologians of different schools of thought: Abū al-Hudhayl and Ibn Kullāb, as well as 
introducing the concept of kalām, which has an important bearing on the question of 
how far these Christian authors engaged with Islamic thinking and what they were 
trying to achieve. The final section of this chapter will look at Muslim criticisms of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, through the ninth century example of Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, in 
14 
 
order to set the backdrop against which to read the works of the Christian authors at 
the heart of this study. 
Chapters Two to Four will look at three of the main representatives of Christian 
Arabic theological writings in the early ninth century, by way of close textual analysis 
of writings pertaining to the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity has 
been selected as motif both as one of the primary issues of concern for Muslims who, 
based on passages in the Qur’an, accused Christians of being polytheists, and in 
order to focus on selected texts in a more detailed manner.  Each of these chapters 
will deal with the three authors individually, offering a detailed exposition and analysis 
of their writings concerning the unity of God. Although subsections within each of the 
three chapters vary, in order to faithfully represent each author on his own terms, 
there are a number of themes which have been borne in mind when examining each 
of the authors’ works, which will enable a meaningful comparison of their works in 
Part Two. These themes are as follows: 
1. Premises and start point of each author 
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2. Explanation of the Oneness of God  
3. Status of the hypostases in each author's thinking  
4. Awareness and use of Islamic thought and debate 
 
Part Two will then take a more comparative approach, looking at the three authors 
and their writings on the Trinity side by side, in order to assess how they are 
explaining the doctrine to their Muslim counterparts and therefore to what extent they 
are engaging with Islamic thinking in order to present their Christian beliefs. To this 
end, Chapter Five will look at the various tools i.e. the methods of argumentation and 
content of arguments that these authors are using, investigating the origins of such 
arguments and the interactions with their Muslim opponents. A detailed discussion of 
the central research questions posed above in relation to each author individually 
and comparatively, and the consideration of whether these Christian theologians can 
properly be called mutakallimūn, will occupy Chapter Six, with the aim of shedding 
further light on the expression of Christian faith in the Islamic milieu and the place of 
16 
 
Arabic-speaking Christian theologians in the fabric of early ninth century Islamic 
society. 
 
The transliteration system which will be employed throughout this thesis is the 
system approved by the Library of Congress and the American Library Association. 
Biblical quotations are taken from the English Standard Version unless otherwise 
stated, as available from: http://www.biblegateway.com/. Qur’anic quotations are 
taken from ‘Abdullah Yūsuf ‘Alī’s translation, but always checked against the Arabic, 
as accessed in the online version available from: http://al-quran.info.   
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PART ONE: THREE ARABIC-SPEAKING CHRISTIAN 
THEOLOGIANS AND THEIR WRITINGS ON THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY (C.800-850) 
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
The Christian authors who form the subject of this thesis are products of a fascinating 
period in medieval Middle Eastern history. The birth of Islam in the seventh century 
C.E. and its spread over the subsequent two centuries shaped the context in which 
Christians such as Theodore Abū Qurra, Ḥabīb ibn Khidma Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār 
al-Baṣrī found themselves, not only ruled by an Arab Islamic dynasty and therefore 
immersed in a new language and culture, but also theologically challenged by a 
religion still very much in its formative period and one whose scripture openly 
criticised Christian beliefs and practises. This rather particular context, in which the 
meeting of languages, cultures and religions took place under rulers who promoted 
the transmission of foreign learning into Arabic and who appear to have allowed a fair 
degree of intellectual freedom, provided a unique opportunity for Arabic-speaking 
Christian authors to defend their traditional beliefs in a creative and novel way. This 
chapter aims to sketch out the context in which these authors lived and wrote in order 
to aid one’s understanding and appreciation of their works, which will be examined in 
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the following chapters. It will include a brief outline of the historical, social and 
linguistic context of Christians in the Islamic empire; the Christian intellectual heritage 
of the authors studied in this thesis; the Islamic intellectual context during this period; 
and an insight into the sorts of criticisms Muslims were making of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in the ninth century. 
 
 
1.1 Christians in the Islamic Empire: Historical, Social and Linguistic contexts 
1.1.1 Historical context 
It is difficult to imagine that anyone living at the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
would have been able to foresee the success of Islam; or the spread of an Islamic 
empire which, by the mid-eighth century C.E., would stretch from the westernmost 
border of China to the southern border of modern-day France. One of the most 
striking features is undoubtedly the pace at which Arab conquerors managed to 
overcome lands and subjugate their populations to Muslim control.12 Historians have 
                                                          
12 Glubb, J. B. The empire of the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963)  
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attributde the military success of the Arab conquests to a number of factors, the most 
pertinent being that of the exhaustion of both the Byzantine and Sassanid armies, 
who had been engaged in warfare with one another for almost thirty years prior to the 
Arab invasions.13 At the time, however, it appears that some saw the surprising 
success of the Muslims as proof of God’s assistance in their campaign and 
punishment of the Byzantine rulers, and therefore converted to Islam.14  
 
To the east of the Arabian Peninsula, lands which fell to the Arab forces had formerly 
been a part of the Sassanid Empire (226-651) with modern-day Iran at its heart. To 
the north and west it was the Christian Byzantines who were met by Arab Islamic 
forces. Damascus was one of the first cities to surrender to Muslim rule in 635, with 
Jerusalem falling three years later. By the time Caesarea was successfully 
conquered in 640, the whole of Syria/Palestine had been incorporated into the Arab 
Islamic Empire. Egypt soon followed. Meanwhile in the East, Arab armies also began 
                                                          
13 Foss, C. ‘The Persians in Asia Minor and the end of antiquity’ in M. Bonner (ed.) Arab-Byzantine 
relations in early Islamic times, The formation of the classical Islamic world, vol. 8 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004), 3-30  
14 Cragg, K. The Arab Christian: a history in the Middle East (London: Mowbray, 1992), 60 
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to take cities including the border town of Hira in around 633 and later Mosul in 641, 
before crossing the mountains into Iran, reaching what would become the 
easternmost point of their empire in around the middle of the seventh century.15  
 
 
1.1.2. Social context 
For the non-Muslim populations of cities and regions which came under Muslim 
control there were two choices: conversion to Islam; or the acceptance of a treaty in 
the spirit of the Constitution of Medina, which Muhammad had drafted with non-
Muslims on his arrival in the city in 622.  Converts would, in theory, enjoy the same 
status as any other Muslim.16 Those who chose not to convert, in return for their 
surrender and the payment of a type of poll tax (jizya), would receive protection and 
the right to worship their own faith. It seems that for some, Arab Islamic forces were 
                                                          
15 Donner, F. M. ‘The Islamic Conquests’ in Yousef M.Choueri (ed.) A companion to the history of the 
Middle East (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005), 31 
16 al-Tabarī, Abū Jāfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. The crisis of the early caliphate, R. Stephen Humphreys 
(trans.) History of al-Tabari 15 (New York : State University of New York Press, 1990), 103-104 
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welcomed as preferable to Byzantine rule,17 renowned for high taxes18 and constant 
wars with Sassanid neighbours. Moreover, for the Jews, who had been subjected to 
harsh laws under Christian rule, their elevation alongside Christians as ‘People of the 
Book’ actually appears to have improved their situation.19 By the same token, non-
orthodox Christian denominations found themselves in an equal position to those 
who professed the orthodox line of the Byzantine Emperor according to the Fourth 
Ecumenical Council of 451.20 It was for this reason that the Coptic Church in Egypt 
were instructed by the Bishop of Alexandria not to resist Arab conquest, as he 
foresaw the end to their persecution by those who professed Byzantine orthodoxy.21   
 
                                                          
17 Esposito, J. L. Islam: The straight path, expanded edition, (New York; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 39 
18 Bogle, E. C. Islam: origin and belief. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 49  
19 Wagner, W. ‘Christianity, Islamic shariah, and civil rights’ available from: 
http://www.samford.edu/lillyhumanrights/papers/Wagner_Christianity.pdf; accessed 16/05/08 
20 See: Schick, R. The Christian communities of Palestine: from Byzantine to Islamic rule. (New 
Jersey: The Darwin Press. Inc., 1995), 178; and also: Atiyah, A. S. A history of Eastern Christianity 
(London: Methuen and Co Ltd and University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, reprint Kraus Reprint, 
1980),184   
21 Hitti, P. K. A history of the Arabs, revised 10th edition (first published 1937) (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 165 
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Christians and Jews who refused to convert thus became ahl al-dhimma, literally 
meaning ‘people of protection’ or ‘protected people’. The status and treatment of the 
dhimmīs remains a matter of debate. Some sources have led scholars to believe that 
those who became the ahl al-dhimma were discriminated against and very much 
treated as second class citizens, whereas others suggest that the policies and rules 
pertaining to the dhimmi communities, as seen in the Pact of ‘Umar, were not strictly 
enforced.22 Indeed, it is likely that the situation varied from place to place, and under 
the authority of different rulers over the course of time.23  
  
Initially, the new Muslim rulers kept the well-established administration system of the 
former Byzantine Empire, a decision which has been described as ‘part of the secret 
of the success of the Arab expansion’.24  Christians formed an indispensable element 
of this system, therefore many retained their positions as civil servants, 
administrators, doctors and other prominent offices in Islamic society. In 706, on the 
                                                          
22 Thomas, D. ‘The doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Abbasid era’ in Lloyd Ridgeon (ed.) Islamic 
interpretations of Christianity (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), 79  
23 Esposito, Islam: the straight path. 
24 Louth, Andrew. St John of Damascus: tradition and originality in Byzantine theology  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 5 
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order of Caliph Walīd (r.705-715), the official language of civil administration began to 
be transferred from Greek to Arabic. Although this transformation would not take 
place overnight, Christians were quickly becoming aware that to retain or secure a 
position within the newly Arabicised society, they would need to learn the language of 
their rulers. Hence Arabic not only became the lingua franca of the newly conquered 
lands, but also the key to social mobility for Christians and Jews.  
 
Towards the end of the Umayyad period, Christians began to be employed as 
translators, rendering Greek medical works into Arabic, often through the medium of 
Syriac. As Muslim interest in Greek thought grew, works from almost all Greek 
disciplines such as philosophy, astronomy, natural sciences, and geography, were 
translated into Arabic. The ability to carry out these translations seems to have been 
a skill which was both respected and admired by the Muslim elite. By the period in 
which the first Arabic-speaking Christians were active, the translation movement was 
at its height under the Caliph al-Ma’mūn, who oversaw the foundation of the so called 
‘House of Wisdom’ (bayt al-hikma) in 830 C.E. Based in Baghdad, the organisation 
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employed Christians and Muslims from various parts of the empire, in order to 
translate philosophical and scientific works from Greek into Arabic.25 
 
One of the earliest translations of Aristotle’s Topics was completed by the Nestorian 
patriarch Timothy I (c. 740-823), as requested by the Caliph al-Mahdī (r. 775-785). 
Timothy I is said to have consulted the Christian bureaucrat Abu Nūḥ for help in 
doing this, which suggests that translation was not yet a professional enterprise. 
Indeed it seems that most translations came about as a result of wealthy individuals 
sponsoring those with knowledge of Greek and Arabic to make translations of works 
concerning not only philosophy but also medicine, astronomy, mathematics and 
more.   The most famous patrons were caliphs; the likes of al-Mahdī (r.775-785), al-
Ma’mūn (r.813-833), al-Mu‘tasim (r. 833-842) and al-Wāthiq (r. 842-847) are all noted 
as having sponsored translations. Other patrons included family members of various 
                                                          
25 For more on the transmission of Greek thought into Arabic see-Gutas, Dimitri. Greek thought, Arabic 
culture: The Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baghdad and early ‘Abbasid society (2nd-4th/ 8th-
10th centuries) (London: Routledge, 1998); and: Endress, G. and Remke, K. The ancient tradition in 
Christian and Islamic Hellenism : studies on the transmission of Greek philosophy and sciences: 
dedicated to H. J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday. (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1997) 
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caliphs, secretaries, courtiers and other officials, all interested in aspects of Greek 
learning.26  
 
During the first quarter of the ninth century, the translation process continued and 
developed, becoming more of a profession, in the sense that prominent individuals 
began to be associated with it. These individuals were mainly Syriac speaking 
Christians with the exception of a few such as ‘Abdullah Ibn al-Muqaffa‘(d.757), a 
Persian Zoroastrian convert to Islam. The Nestorian Ḥunayn ibn Isḥaq (809-873) and 
his son Isḥaq ibn Ḥunayn (830-910) are two of the most famous names associated 
with the translation movement, along with the Melkite physician Qusta ibn Lūqā (820-
912), and the Jacobite philosopher Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (893-974), to name but a few.27  
Ḥunayn, together with his son and nephew are said to have translated most of 
Aristotle’s works between them, albeit slightly later than our Christian authors are 
thought to have been writing. Most often translating through the medium of their 
                                                          
26
 Gutas, Greek thought, Arabic culture, 121-135 
27 Ḥunayn and his family are often associated with the bayt al-ḥikma, (‘House of Wisdom’), which, 
according to Gutas, was actually a library where translation activity from Persian into Arabic took 
place, and ‘not a center for the translation of Greek works into Arabic’. Gutas, Greek thought, Arabic 
culture, 53-60 
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native Syriac, it appears that these translators were forced to go back to the Greek 
and improve their language skills in order to convey technical and often difficult 
concepts in Arabic; terminology which would be used by Christians and Muslims 
alike.28   
 
Although the translation of Aristotle’s Topics by Timothy I appears to have been one 
of the earliest, it was by no means the only one. ‘Abdullah ibn al-Muqaffa undertook 
the Categories amongst his other translations, and his son is also said to have 
translated it among other pieces for the Caliph al-Manṣūr (754-775).29 The Muslim 
philosopher Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (d. c. 870), whose criticisms of the Trinity will be 
examined below, made a summary of the Organon, whilst some of his companions 
are said to have produced a summary and commentary relating to the Categories; 
and an overview of On Interpretation, among other works of Aristotle.30 
                                                          
28 Gutas, D. Greek thought, 138 
29 Fakhry, Majid. A history of Islamic philosophy (New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1970) 
30 ‘Arabic and Islamic philosophy of language and logic’, The Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
website available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-
language/?&$NMW_TRANS$=ext#EarTra; last accessed on 25/02/11 
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Through the numerous translations into Arabic, carried out mainly by Christian 
scholars, Aristotle was to become an important figure in Islamic thinking, who came 
to be referred to as al-hakīm or al-faylasūf . As Endress puts it: 
‘… the undisputed master of philosophy, for the Christian schools of late 
Hellenism as well as for the Muslim transmitters of this tradition, was Aristotle: 
founder of the paradigms of rational discourse and of a coherent system of the 
world.’31  
 
As a result of the translation movement, demanded by Muslim rulers and officials, the 
ready availability of Aristotelian and other philosophical works, combined with the 
accusation of taḥrīf (the falsification or corruption) levelled at Christians by Muslim 
thinkers, would push Christians to renew their study of Aristotle for the purposes of 
defending their doctrines according to reason and logic. 
 
                                                          
31 Endress, G. ‘The circle of al-Kindī: Early Arabic translations from the Greek and the rise of Islamic 
philosophy’, in G. Endress and K.Remke (eds), The ancient tradition in Christian and Islamic 
Hellenism : studies on the transmission of Greek philosophy and sciences : dedicated to H. J. 
Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday. (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1997), 52 
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1.1.3. Linguistic environment 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the expansion of the Islamic empire 
during the seventh century led to the incorporation of a number of indigenous 
populations including Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and others. The Christians, who 
remained a majority in these newly conquered lands well into the late ninth century, 
appear to have spoken and worshipped in a number of different languages, 
depending mainly on geographic location and ancestry.  
 
Prior to the Islamic conquest, from the patriarchate of Jerusalem out through 
Palestine and the Transjordan area the dominant language of the intellectual elite 
and of most of the urban populations of Palestine seems to have been Greek. Greek 
was certainly the liturgical language of the Melkite church. As one would expect 
therefore, Greek would also have been the official liturgical language of the monastic 
communities in Palestine, although Sidney Griffith also presents evidence that where 
30 
 
there were enough monks from other areas who spoke a different language sermons 
were often provided in their own vernacular.32 
 
To the East in Mesopotamia, another form of Aramaic, Syriac, remained the 
language of the majority. As F. M. Donner puts it: 
‘Even after nearly ten centuries of Greco-Roman culture, the great mass of the Syrian 
populace remained thoroughly Semitic. Syrians never embraced the Greek tongue or 
Greek culture to the extent that some other groups…certainly had.’ 33  
 
Following the Council of Chalcedon in 451, which formally set out and ratified the 
Byzantine expression of the nature of Jesus Christ and the Incarnation, the cultural 
                                                          
32 Griffith, S. H. ‘From Aramaic to Arabic: The languages of the monasteries of Palestine in the 
Byzantine and early Islamic periods’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 51, (1997), 13. Irfan Shahid 
similarly says that:  ‘Each community celebrated the Mass in its own language from the beginning until 
the reading of the Gospel, then they all gathered in the Great Church of the Greek-speaking monks 
and participated in the Sacred Mysteries.’ Shahid, Irfan. Arabs and the Byzantine world in the fifth 
century (Washington D.C., 1989), 197 
Griffith and others have identified the major vernacular of this region, spoken alongside or instead of 
Greek, as Christian Palestinian Aramaic (CPA). Whilst CPA used the same script as Syriac, Griffith is 
careful to point out that it was a distinct language which ‘flourished’ between the fourth and eighth 
centuries before being relegated to ‘merely a liturgical language’. See also: Balicka-Witakowski, E., 
Brock, S. and Taylor, D.T.K. (eds) The hidden pearl: the Syrian Orthodox church and its ancient 
Aramaic heritage, (Rome: Transworld film, 2001) 
33 Donner, F.M. The early Islamic conquests (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 94 
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and political divide between the Greek and Syrian churches was deepened by adding 
a theological dimension.  In the west of the Mesopotamian region, it was the Syrian 
Orthodox Church which became predominant, also often referred to as the ‘Jacobite 
Church’ following its structural reorganisation by Jacob Baradaeus in the mid-sixth 
century. The Church of the East, or ‘Nestorian Church’ is often misleadingly 
associated with the teachings of Nestorius. Although it is often recognised and 
characterised by its split from the western churches in accepting the teachings of 
Nestorius, which were otherwise condemned by the Council of Ephesus in 431, the 
Church of the East was actually officially constituted following a synod held at 
Seleucia-Ctesiphon (modern day central Iraq) in 410.34 Syriac remained the liturgical 
language of both churches, although missionary efforts, particularly on the part of the 
Church of the East, led to Christian populations with a varied range of vernaculars 
becoming a part of these communities. 
 
                                                          
34 Hage, W. Syriac Christianity in the East. (Kerala, India: SEERI, 1988), 8 
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Consequently, spoken languages varied from area to area. Most in the 
Mesopotamian region would probably have spoken a form of Aramaic, with those 
living further south and in old territories of the Sassanid Empire also speaking 
Persian. Some communities in the Euphrates valley, which borders the Arabian 
Peninsula, would have been native Arabic speakers, such as the Christian poet ‘Adī 
ibn Zayd.35 Indeed there is evidence for Christian Arab tribes from as early as the 
beginning of the fourth century. An Arab bishop, Pamphilus, attended the Council of 
Nicea in 325 and another, Theotimus, was present at the Synod of Antioch in 363.36 
Irfan Shahid refers to the three centuries prior to the birth of Islam as ‘the golden 
period of Arab Christianity’.37 The city of al-Hira, a Christian centre throughout the 
Byzantine period, sent missionaries to the Arabian Peninsular.38 Slightly further north, 
in Baghdad, one finds Christian churches and communities, the majority being East 
Syrian, some being West Syrian and a small percentage belonging to the Melkite 
community, who are presumed to have been originally brought to Baghdad as 
                                                          
35 Swanson, M. ‘Arabic as a Christian language?’  Available from: 
http://www.luthersem.edu/mswanson/papers/Indonesia%20Arabic.pdf; accessed 28/04/08, 1 
36 Shahid, I. Byzantium and the Arabs in the fourth century, (Washington D.C., 1984), 330 
37 Ibid., 24 
38 Ibid., 94 n.74 
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prisoners and slaves.39 Certainly then, we find a pre-Islamic Christian Arab presence 
in areas which, under ‘Abbasid rule, would become the heart of the Islamic Empire.  
 
By the time the ‘Abbāsid caliphate became established, moving the central seat of 
authority from Damascus, via Harran under the first ‘Abbāsid caliph Abū al-‘Abbās al-
Saffāḥ (750-754), to Baghdad in 762, Arabic had already begun to replace local 
languages as the language of trade, government and bureaucracy. Termed the new 
lingua franca in this period, this meant that any Christian who wanted to retain or gain 
a position within the newly Arabicised society, needed to learn the language of their 
rulers. 
 
In summary, it is evident that there were a number of languages being written and 
spoken in the Islamic Empire in the early ninth century. It is likely that Arabic had 
taken over as the language of trade and administration. In terms of liturgical 
languages, it would seem that different Christian communities retained their own 
                                                          
39 Allard, M. ‘Les chrétiens à Baghdad’, Arabica 9, no. 3 (1962) 
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languages to some extent, but these were beginning to give way to Arabic,40 
depending on the geographic location of a given community, as well as its cultural, 
ethnic and denominational roots. Regarding spoken languages and dialects, it is 
almost impossible to be certain and it should not be assumed that official, written, or 
liturgical languages of a given area necessarily dictate or correspond to spoken 
dialects. Thus, it is entirely possible that someone like ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, living close to 
the region of al-Hira, a cultural centre for Arab Christians in pre-Islamic times, and 
                                                          
40 Mark Swanson gives examples such as Palestine, where Aramaic gave way to Arabic as early as 
the eighth century and later Egypt, where Arabic replaced the native Coptic language to such an 
extent that by 1200 Coptic is described as being ‘practically dead’. (Swanson, M. ‘Arabic as a 
Christian language’, 5.) Gerhard Endress points to the same two cases, saying that at the turn of the 
millennium, these two languages were only spoken by a few minorities and learned theologians. 
(Endress, G. Islam: an historical introduction, Carole Hillenbrand (trans.), (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), 132.) Sidney Griffith takes up the question of language in the monasteries of 
Palestine  where he tells us that in the eighth and ninth centuries ‘Arabic came to challenge even 
Greek.’ (Griffith, S. H. ‘From Aramaic to Arabic: the languages of the monasteries of Palestine in the 
Byzantine and early Islamic periods’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 51, (1997), 24) He argues that 
there is enough evidence to suggest that Palestinian monks were both translating from Greek into 
Arabic and creating original compositions in Arabic from the latter half of eighth century, while there is 
little or no evidence of significant Greek compositions in the ninth century (28). Griffith also talks of a 
literary Arabic koine that seems to have been a variety of Arabic used by Melkites in the area, 
consisting of Arabic text in Greek script (29). Joshua Blau also deals with this issue, explaining that 
this variation of Arabic, which was once thought to be a Palestinian dialect, seems to be better defined 
as a Melkite dialect, as there is evidence of works written in Melkite communities to the east of 
Palestine. (Blau, Joshua. ‘A Melkite Arabic literary “lingua franca” from the second half of the first 
millenium’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 57, No. 1, 
in honour of J. E. Wansbrough. (1994), 14-16) 
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being in one of the foremost intellectual centres of Arab Islamic thinking during 
‘Abbasid times, would have spoken Arabic as a native language, even if he read or 
wrote Syriac as a liturgical language. Meanwhile, Abū Qurra, being a bishop of the 
Melkite Church in Harran, would have likely had a very different linguistic 
background. The same would also be true of Abū Rā’iṭa, who found himself in the 
central Mesopotamian city of Takrit around the same time. What is clear, however, is 
that not long after 800, Christians in various parts of the Islamic empire were writing 
theology in Arabic. These theological works could and would be read by both 
Christians seeking to defend their faith and Muslims who were challenging the 
doctrines and practices of their Christian neighbours.41 
 
 
1.2. Christian theologising on the Trinity 
                                                          
41 A word might be said here about the Bible in Arabic. The earliest extant translations of the gospel 
come from the Palestinian Melkite tradition, such as Sinai Arabic MS 151, translated by a man named 
Bišr al-Sirrī in 867 C.E. (Griffith, S. H. "The Gospel in Arabic: an inquiry into its appearance in the first 
Abbasid century", Oriens Christianus 69, (1985), 131), though there are references to Arabic 
translations of biblical passages from as early as the mid seventh century, when the Patriarch John I is 
said to have arranged for a translation of the gospel, at the request of a Muslim official named ‘Amr. 41 
ibid., 135 
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This section looks at the nature of Christian theologising before and shortly after the 
Islamic conquests specifically in relation to the unity of God, through the use of two 
individual examples as potential points of reference for later Christian thinkers: one 
from the Greek tradition, the other from the Syriac. 
 
By the time Muḥammad received his first revelation in 610, Christianity had 
effectively had a six hundred year “head start” over the youngest of the Abrahamic 
faiths. As will also be seen in terms of early Islamic thought, theological questions 
presented themselves as Christians sought to understand their holy scriptures in the 
context of the world in which they lived. The development of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, which forms the central motif of this study, arose from the need to synthesise 
a simple, monotheistic, Jewish-inherited understanding of God with New Testament 
passages referring to God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The tools, in order to 
achieve such a feat, would be those borrowed from ancient Greek philosophers and 
then drawn upon and developed by generations of Church Fathers. Credit is most 
often given to the Cappadocian Fathers, St. Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus 
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and Gregory of Nyssa, for refining and settling the doctrine of the Trinity at the 
Council of Constantinople in 381, although the doctrine remains a highly complicated 
area of Christian theology to this day.  
 
Although the Trinity came to form a major part of Christian-Muslim debate in the early 
ninth century, it is important that two points be borne in mind. Firstly, the Trinity would 
not necessarily have been a central concern in itself for Christians shortly before the 
rise of Islam. As mentioned previously, the doctrine had been largely settled within 
the tradition by the end of the fourth century, and the expression of God as Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit as ‘one ousia and three hypostases’, would have been accepted 
in most Christian circles. However, the second point to be noted is that the doctrine 
of the Trinity cannot be truly separated from the question regarding the status of 
Jesus as the ‘Son of God’, although an artificial separation has to be made for the 
purposes of this study. Questions surrounding the Incarnation of Jesus, that is the 
38 
 
manner and mode of his becoming human, dominated the pre-Islamic period and 
shaped the Eastern churches into the three denominations mentioned above.42  
 
Briefly exploring two Christian scholars before and during the very early Islamic 
period will allow an insight into the nature of Christian theologising before Islam and 
perhaps something of the intellectual roots of our three Arabic-speaking Christian 
authors of the early ninth century. The two individuals to be examined are 
Philoxenus, Bishop of Mabbug (c. 440-523), and John of Damascus (c.675-c.754). 
The former represents the Syriac Christian tradition and the latter the Greek Christian 
tradition.  
 
 
                                                          
42 Griffith, S. H. The church in the shadow of the mosque: Christians and Muslims in the world of Islam 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 130. With Christology being the theological 
matter which separated the various Christian denominations in the Middle East, the coming of Islam 
saw Christian churches increasingly define themselves against one another, leading them to write 
polemical intrafaith works in Arabic such as Abū Rā’iṭa’s ‘Refutation of the Melkites’. Graf, G. (ed.) Die 
Schriften des Jacobiten Ḥabīb ibn Khidma Abū Rā‘iṭa, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 
Vol. 130 (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste L. Durbeq, 1951) 
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1.2.1. Philoxenus of Mabbug (d. 523)  
Philoxenus of Mabbug was born of Persian parents around the middle of the fifth 
century and educated in Edessa, before being consecrated in 485. During his time at 
Edessa, it would seem that Philoxenus experienced many of the ramifications of the 
Councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451) in terms of divisions between those 
advocating dyophysite teachings, incidentally shared by both Nestorius and the 
councils mentioned above, and those opposing them.43 At some point Philoxenus 
became a staunch monophysite. He has been described as ‘un écrivain d’une grande 
fécondité’44 who is credited with representing ‘the finest synthesis of the Greek and 
Syriac intellectual tradition’.45 Among his extant works we find a treatise on the Trinity 
                                                          
43 De Halleux, A. Philoxène de Mabbog : sa Vie, ses Écrits, sa Theologie. (Louvain : Imprimerie 
Orientaliste, 1963), 25-30. ‘Monophysite’ and ‘dyophysite’ are labels most often used by those in 
opposition to either position. Simply put, ‘dyophysite’ refers to those who held that Christ has both a 
divine and human nature, which included those who upheld Chalcedonian orthodoxy such as the 
Melkites, and also the ‘Nestorians’, or more properly, those of the Church of the East, although the two 
churches differed sharply over the relationship of the two natures and the Incarnation. The 
‘monophysites’ included the Syrian Orthodox or West Syrian Church (also commonly known as the 
Jacobites), who held that Christ has only one nature, that is the divine nature.  
44 Philoxenus. ‘Textes inédits de Philoxène de Mabboug’, Le Muséon, vol.43 (1930), 2  
45 Ferguson, E. (ed.) Encyclopedia of early Christianity, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, (New York; London: Garland 
Publishing Ltd., 1997), 1918 
Sebastian Brock describes Philoxenus as ‘a particularly useful yardstick’ in terms of the transmission 
of Greek learning into Syriac, referring to him as ‘an outstanding representative of the native Syriac 
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and Incarnation46 and a confession of faith concerning the Trinity47, both of which 
may provide an insight into the sorts of ideas upon which those such as Abū Rā’iṭa 
and ‘Ammār may have been drawing, and also more generally into Christian thought 
in the East before the birth of Islam.  
 
Whilst his Christological writings came to very much distinguish him as a 
monophysite thinker, Philoxenus’ doctrine of the Trinity remained in line with the 
confessions of the Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople. Indeed, by the period in 
which Philoxenus was writing, the Trinity seems to have been viewed almost as a 
preliminary doctrine to the explanation of the Incarnation, which had become the 
primary concern for Eastern Christian thinkers. For Philoxenus, his task seems to 
have been explaining the Trinity in such a way that the second hypostasis, ‘God the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cultural tradition…who, later in life, openly proclaimed the superiorit of the Greek Bible over the 
Syriac…’ Brock, S. ‘From antagonism to assimilation: Syriac attitudes to Greek learning’ in S. Brock 
Syriac perspectives on late antiquity, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), chap. V, 20. 
46 Cf. Vaschalde, A.A. ‘Three letters of Philoxenus, Bishop of Mabbôgh’ (485-519), Rome, 1902; 
available from: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/pearse/morefathers/files/philoxenus_three_02_part1.htm; 
accessed 28/1/11 
47 Wallis Budge, E.A. The discourses of Philoxenus, Bishop of Mabbôgh, A.D. 485-519, vol. II, 
London, (Asher and Co., 1894), xxxi-xxxiii 
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Word’ as he refers to it, could become incarnated without undergoing change and 
without effecting change on the other two hypostases. He therefore, like many 
Christian thinkers of various denominations, stresses the relative distinction between 
the hypostases, namely that God begets, the Son is begotten and the Spirit 
proceeds. 
 
In his treatise on the Trinity and Incarnation, Philoxenus most commonly speaks of 
‘one nature’ and ‘three hypostases’, the hypostases being the Father, the Son (who 
he often refers to as ‘God the Word’) and the Holy Spirit.  According to De Halleux, in 
Philoxenus’ works the names ‘Son’ and ‘Word’ both designate the hypostases and 
not the nature directly. ‘Son’ refers to the action of eternal generation, whilst ‘Word’ 
indicates the spiritual and mysterious mode of the generation.  The phrase ‘God the 
Word’ is used repeatedly by Philoxenus, ‘God’ referring to the nature and ‘Word’ to 
the hypostasis, as distinct from the other two hypostases. His focus always more 
directed towards the Incarnation, the question of Trinity only really seems to be 
raised by the accusation of tritheism. The Son is identical to the Father in every 
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respect, not only in nature but in power, ability to create, will and so on, except that 
he does not beget. Presumably the same is true of the Spirit. For Philoxenus, the 
relationship of the hypostases to the nature is that of the particular to the general. 
The Trinity, as well as an essence, is a single nature, with not only one hypostasis, 
which amounts to Sabellianism, but with three hypostases that are included in the 
nature and have names which indicate their respective particular properties, and 
through whose names the common nature is also indicated.48  The unity of God is not 
a numerical unity, it transcends number; a position which would be upheld and 
emphasised by Christian authors faced with Muslim accusations of tritheism in later 
centuries. 
 
In Philoxenus’ short confession of faith pertaining to the Trinity, 49  the same 
emphasis on the nature of the Son can be clearly seen. Philoxenus very briefly states 
that he believes in a Trinity which can neither be added to nor subtracted from, that 
everything outside it is created, and whatever is within it is eternal. There is no other 
                                                          
48 De Halleux, Philoxène de Mabbog, 356 n. 22 
49 Wallis Budge The discourses of Philoxenus, xxx1-xxxiii 
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god outside of the Trinity and no created man within it. This then leads onto the rest 
of his statement concerning the Incarnation. The Holy Spirit is not mentioned in this 
brief confession, but elsewhere, as A.A. Vaschalde explains, there are a few 
statements Philoxenus makes concerning the third member of the Trinity, which point 
to the equality and consubstantiality of the three hypostases as ratified by the Council 
of Constantinople.50  
 
What this brief insight into a sixth century Syriac approach to the Trinity shows is that 
long before the coming of Islam, a fairly standard Christian understanding of the 
doctrine of the Trinity had been established, as basis for development of varying 
Christologies, which seems to have been the primary concern of Syriac speaking 
Christians, both Monophysites and Dyophysites alike. These Christological 
differences would remain well into the Islamic period and would, in fact, define and 
distinguish the various churches within the empire, and be used in an effort to 
                                                          
50 Vaschalde,‘Three letters of Philoxenus’, sect. 31 
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commend each particular denomination to Islamic rulers, as noted above.51 This 
would suggest that although the Trinity became a central doctrine in Christian 
thought, it was actually the challenge of Islam which once again brought it to the 
forefront of discussion as a mystery in itself, almost unconnected with the doctrine of 
the Incarnation. The likes of Abū Qurra, Abū Ra’iṭa and ‘Ammār, would therefore be 
required to face the challenges of a renewed discussion on the nature and unity of 
God. 
 
1.2.2. John of Damascus (c.675-c.754) 
Whilst Philoxenus is a good example of the Syriac Christian tradition, John of 
Damascus (c. 676-754) is an even more natural choice as a representative of the 
Greek tradition. Often labelled the ‘last of the church fathers’, John lived in Damascus 
under Islamic rule which had been established little more than thirty years before his 
birth. John spent the early part of his life working as a member of the financial 
administration in Damascus, before most likely retreating to the monastery of Mar 
                                                          
51 Cf. n. 32 
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Sabas in southern Palestine.52 As a Melkite, he adhered to the decisions of the 
Council of Chalcedon, and wrote primarily in Greek. His major work, the so called 
Fount of Knowledge gives not only a presentation of Christian doctrine at that time, 
drawn from various theologians who preceded him, but also shows his attitude 
towards Islam. As such, it forms an ideal basis from which to explore the Arabic 
speaking Christians of the following generation.  
 
The Fount of Knowledge is comprised of three major parts: the Dialectica (an 
introduction to logic),53 De haeresibus (On heresies),54 and the De fide orthodoxa 
(Exposition of the orthodox faith).55 The first part is intended to equip the reader with 
the necessary philosophical tools with which to appreciate the rest of the work and is 
essentially a summary of Aristotle’s Categories and the Isagoge of Porphyry; the 
                                                          
52 Whether John of Damascus was a monk at Mar Sabas is not definitively known. Cf. Griffith, The 
church in the shadow of the mosque, 40 n. 50 
53 John of Damascus, Dialectica, trans. R. Grosseteste and Owen A. Colligan (New York: Franciscan 
Institute, 1953) 
54 John of Damascus, De Haeresibus, trans. F.H. Chase, Saint John of Damascus, Writings, The 
Fathers of the Church 37, (Catholic University Press: Washington DC, 1958) 
55 John of Damascus, Exposition of the orthodox faith, trans. S.D.F. Salmond, A select library of 
Nicene and post-Nicene fathers of the Christian church, second series ; v. 9, (Oxford: J. Parker, 1899) 
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second concerns various heresies from Platonism to Islam; and the third is a 
compilation of patristic teachings elucidating the true faith, which is Christianity. 
 
John of Damascus begins the first book of this third part by reminding the reader of 
the truly transcendent nature of God, and warning that it is dangerous to attempt to 
dabble in things that are beyond human grasp. He then moves onto proofs of God’s 
existence, that He is one and not many, and that He has a Son (who is his Word) and 
a Spirit, whom together form the Trinity. For John the doctrine of the Trinity is clearly 
a key topic in itself, more so than it appeared to be for Philoxenus, as it forms the 
majority of the first book of John’s Exposition. In the final chapter of his first book, 
John rather interestingly discusses the characteristics of the divine nature, as will be 
seen later on in the present study. 
 
Although God is ultimately unknowable, He did not leave human beings in complete 
ignorance, John explains. We can gain some knowledge of His nature from His 
creation and the workings of the natural world, as well as from the scriptures, 
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prophets and finally through His Son, Jesus Christ. Many things can be faintly 
perceived by the human mind, but not expressed in appropriate terms, and so must 
be expressed within the limits of human capability, which is why anthropomorphic 
terms are often used of God, even though they do not mean the same as when used 
of humans. He then gives a list of attributes of God, not unlike lists which would have 
been given by contemporary Muslim thinkers, as will be seen in the following section. 
At the end of this list he stresses that God is one, that is to say one substance (ousia) 
and three hypostases and gives a concise summary of the doctrines of the Trinity 
and Incarnation in line with the Nicene Creed. After setting out a logical proof for the 
existence of God and once again stressing His utter transcendence, John gives 
proofs for the Word and Spirit of God.  
 
The next chapter is a longer one on the Holy Trinity, which John begins with a 
statement of belief in one God, followed by another list of qualities and attributes and 
ending with a passage which again echoes the language of the Nicene Creed.56 Like 
                                                          
56 John of Damascus, Exposition, 6 
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Philoxenus, John’s conception is of a God who has a Word and Spirit which are 
equivalent to the Son and Holy Spirit, and who, as one godhead have attributes or 
qualities such as living, knowing and wise which are ‘common to whole godhead’.57 
 
John uses the analogy of the sun in reference to God to show that together the Son 
and the Holy Spirit come from the Father and not that the Spirit comes from the 
Son.58 He likens this to the ‘ray and the radiance’59 which come from the sun. The 
radiance is imparted through the ray, and it is that which illuminates us. John, like his 
predecessors, presents the relationship of the three hypostases as begetter, 
begotten and one who proceeds. In order to illustrate this he employs the analogy of 
                                                          
57 Ibid., 14 
58 Here, John is expressing his stance on what would come to be known as the ‘filioque controversy’, 
which would become increasingly important during the ninth century and would come to be a 
separating factor between the Greek and Latin churches. Photius of Constantinople (c.810-893), who 
followed in the tradition as those such as John of Damascus and earlier Greek fathers, is often 
associated with defending the Greek or Eastern conception of the Holy Trinity, which held that the 
Father alone is the cause of the Holy Spirit, not the Father and Son, as the Latin fathers began to 
suggest. For the Greek fathers, if the Holy Spirit proceeded from both the Father and the Son, then it 
would suggest a diarchy in the godhead and, if common to both the Father and Son then causing the 
Holy Spirit to proceed must also be common to the Holy Spirit, meaning that the Holy Spirit would be 
playing a part in his own mode of existence, which is illogical. For more see: Orphanos, M.A. ‘The 
procession of the Holy Spirit according to certain later Greek Fathers’ in L. Vischer (ed.) Spirit of God, 
spirit of Christ (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981), 21-45 
59 John of Damascus, Exposition, 11 
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Adam, Eve and Seth, whereby Adam is the begetter, Seth the begotten, and Eve the 
one who proceeds from Adam’s rib. Towards the end of the first book, John once 
again discusses anthropomorphic terms, claiming that they are symbolic and not to 
be taken to mean that God has a body, but to be understood metaphorically; for 
example, His mouth and speech represent His divine Will. John of Damascus’ final 
topic of this first part is that of the divine names and properties of God, which will be 
further investigated in relation to the Arabic-speaking Christian authors examined in 
this study. 
 
It would seem then, that in structure, John’s work is laid out much like traditional 
compilations or systematic expositions of earlier church fathers, and yet, one cannot 
help but notice certain emphases and likely allusions to Islam, which are not found in 
earlier Christian expositions.  To begin with, the organisation of his material in the 
Exposition of the Orthodox Faith reflects the concerns of the Muslim mutakallimūn. 
The doctrine of the Trinity is clarified in Book One over the course of fourteen 
chapters. The second book deals with the created world and mankind, the third with 
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the Incarnation, and the final book covers other topics, mostly concerning Christian 
practices which would have been criticised by his Muslim contemporaries. 
 
Throughout the work, John discusses standard Christian doctrines and topics, but 
appears to linger over certain concepts, stress certain points or make specific 
mention of things relevant to a Muslim audience as seen above in relation to what 
can be known about God. This includes descriptions of God, often pointing to what 
God is not, and referring to His names and attributes following the line of reasoning 
that God gave us the faculty of knowledge and therefore man should have a vague 
notion of Him. At one point John refers to God as both noun and adjective, for 
example reason and rational, life and living, thus touching ever so slightly upon the 
grammatical aspect of God’s attributes, which was of particular concern to some of 
his Muslim contemporaries, as will be seen in the following section.  
 
The influence of Muslim concerns on John’s writings, however, should not be 
overemphasised. Many of the issues he treats are traditional Christian ones as well 
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as Muslim ones, and the evidence, particularly from his De Haeresibus, points to his 
not taking Islam very seriously. Indeed, from his treatment of Islam in the second part 
of the Fount of Knowledge as the most recent in a series of heresies, it is clear that 
John of Damascus regarded Islam as an aberrant form of Christianity rather than a 
separate faith.  
 
In John of Damascus, one sees a man of his time and context, who sets out an 
essentially traditional Christian exposition but with a clear awareness of Islam, shown 
both through his direct reference to it in the De haeresibus, and through subtle 
allusions to the concerns of his Muslim neighbours in terms of the way he presents 
his Exposition; particularly in the ordering of his material and the emphasis of certain 
points as noted above.  Moreover, as Griffith notes, John was to have a ‘powerful 
influence on subsequent presentations of Christian theology in Arabic’,60 as will be 
seen in the following chapters of this study.   
 
                                                          
60 Griffith, The church in the shadow of the mosque, 41   
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1.3. Muslim theologising on the nature and unity of God 
The establishment and development of Islam, as not only a religious faith but also a 
comprehensive world view set alongside older religions with competing claims, 
brought with it a number of questions for the believing people (al-mu’minīn). One of 
the earliest questions concerned the succession of the Caliphs, which became a 
matter of dispute immediately following the death of the Prophet Muḥammad in 632, 
requiring later caliphs and dynasties to find ways of legitimising their authority. From 
the very outset then, religious questions became intricately interwoven with political 
affairs.61  
 
On a spiritual level, political divisions, turmoil and conflict led some to question the 
reasons for this dissension and God’s role in it, triggering some of the earliest 
debates on free will.62 A number of sects and schools of thought began to emerge as 
                                                          
61 Majid Fakhry refers to theology as ‘the handmaid of politics’, whilst Franz Rosenthal notes that 
political questions prompted ‘deep theological discussions’. Fakhry, Majid. History of Islamic 
philosophy; and Rosenthal, F. The Classical Heritage in Islam (Emile and Jenny Marmorstein trans) 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) 
62 For a useful introduction to the question of free will in Islam, see: Watt, W.M. Free will and 
predestination in early Islam, (London: Luzac, 1948) 
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a result of varying positions on such questions, the most famous of whom would 
come to be known as the Mu‘tazila, who, for a good part of the ninth century, would 
not only enjoy theological dominance but also political prominence, particularly during 
the reign of al-Ma’mūn (r. 813-833).  
 
Characterised by the seemingly contradictory attitudes of the promotion of intellectual 
freedom and a love of foreign learning in contrast to an almost tyrannical demand of 
allegiance to a particular doctrine, al-Ma’mūn forms a fascinating figure.  Amongst 
other things, the ‘Abbāsid caliph is known for hosting debates between Muslims and 
representatives of other faiths at his court and for strongly supporting the translation 
of Greek works into Arabic. Yet what he is known most particularly for is the so-called 
miḥna (inquisition), which he initiated in 833.63 The mihna was carried out to ensure 
that all Muslim scholars profess the doctrine of the created, as opposed to uncreated 
and eternal, nature of the Qur’an, a Mu‘tazilī doctrine which arose from the desire to 
                                                          
63 For more on the miḥna, see: Watt, W.M. The formative period of Islamic thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 
1998); Gutas, Greek thought, Arabic culture; and the theological context: Nader, A. Le système 
philosophique des Mu‘tazila: Premiers penseurs de l’Islam, (Beirut: Les Lettres Orientales, 1956), 106-
113 
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protect God as the only divine and eternal being. Those who refused to comply were 
either imprisoned or exiled, most famously Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (780-855), a respected 
hadith scholar and founder of the Ḥanbalī legal school, who actively opposed 
Mu‘tazilite doctrine. 
 
The reasons for, and aims of, the miḥna remain an issue of debate.64 Whatever the 
definitive motivation, it is probable that al-Ma’mūn was looking to establish himself 
firmly as the unchallenged authority on spiritual affairs as well as secular ones. What 
is particularly noteworthy for the purposes of this study, however, is that the favour 
bestowed upon the Mu‘tazila and the policy which required all Muslims to accept their 
notion of a ‘created Qur’an’, meant that for a short time at least, the Mu‘tazila enjoyed 
a ‘golden period’ of theological and political dominance, which would most likely have 
had implications on the nature of Christian-Muslim debate during this period. The 
                                                          
64  For more see: Hurvitz, Nimrod. ‘Miḥna as self-defense’ Studia Islamica, no. 92 (2001), 93-111; 
Nawas, John A. ‘The miḥna of 218 A.H./833 A.D. revisited: An empirical study’, Journal of the 
American Oriental society, vol. 116, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1996), 698-708; and _______. A reexamination of 
three current explanations for al-Ma’mūn’s introduction of the miḥna’, International journal of Middle 
East studies, vol. 26, no. 4, (Nov., 1994), 615-629 
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implications of the various contexts acknowledged thus far will be brought together at 
the end of the present chapter. 
 
For Muslims striving to know something about the nature of God, early questions 
emerged as a result of the apparent contradiction of a God who is transcendent and 
incomparable,65 whilst at the same time one who is described in the Qur’an by a 
number of positive names (‘asmaa) or attributes (sifāt) suggesting something about 
His divine nature. These names are given as a list of adjective epithets, such as ‘The 
Compassionate’, ‘The Merciful’, ‘The Wise’ and so on.66 The ensuing debate 
concerned the ontological and semantic status of these attributes and was a debate 
with which Christian authors defending the Trinity in Arabic would come to engage. 
 
Of the Muslims, those who confirmed the divine attributes to be real, incorporeal and 
eternal entities alongside God came to be known as ‘Attributists’, and those who 
                                                          
65 Cf. sura 112:4 
66 For a list of the names of Allah see for e.g. al-Bayhaqi, Allah’s names and attributes (al asma’ wa al-
sifat): Excerpts (G.F. Haddad trans.), Islamic doctrines and beliefs, vol. 4, (Michigan: As-Sunna 
Foundation of America, 1999) 
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opposed this view, suggesting that God’s attributes were identical with His essence 
were ‘Antiattributists’.  Each faced a different problem.  For the former mostly 
traditionalist group, such as followers of Ibn Ḥanbal, reading the Qur’an literally gave 
rise to the question of how the attributes could be eternal alongside God when the 
Qur’an clearly states that:  ‘nothing can be compared with Him [God].’67 For the latter 
group, of which the Mu‘tazilites were at the forefront, the supreme uniqueness of God 
led to the inability to ‘know’ anything real about Him and subsequently to the question 
of what these terms or attributes actually meant.68 
 
As with the Christian representatives of the previous subsection, it is worth looking at 
two key figures involved in the attributes debate and their various, and by no means 
homogenous, ideas concerning the nature and unity of God, because it appears to 
have been such thinking with which our Christian authors were engaging. The first is 
the great leader of the Basra school of the Mu‘tazila, Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf 
                                                          
67 The Qur’an, 42:11 
68 The beginning of Al-Ash‘arī’s account of the Mu‘tazila in his ‘Maqalat’ gives a useful summary of 
their beliefs in God’s transcendence: al-Ash‘arī, Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī. Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, H. Ritter 
(ed.),  Die Dogmatischen Lehren der Anhänger des Islam, 3rd edition (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 
Verlag GMBH, 1930), 155-156 
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(d.c.840) and the second is the rather more elusive theologian, Abū Muḥammad 
‘Abdallah Ibn Kullāb (d.c.855).  
 
 
1.3.1. Abū al-Hudhayl (c. 750-c. 840) 
Born in around 750 C.E., Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf is classed as one of the earliest 
and most influential Mu‘tazilite scholars, whose teachings formed the basis for much 
of the school. He succeeded Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr as chair of the Basrian School, before 
settling in Baghdad towards the end of his life.  Unfortunately, none of Abū al-
Hudhayl’s works have survived, although there exists a record of titles of many works 
written by him, which, along with contemporary works, both of his opponents and 
students, offer an insight into his teachings and beliefs.  From the titles of his works, 
and works written about him, it can be seen that he acted also as an early apologist 
for Islam, debating or writing against groups including Dualists, Jews and Christians, 
including, most significantly for this study, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. 
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Although Abū al-Hudhayl wrote on many interrelated subjects, it is his conception of 
God which is the most pertinent to this study, and indeed one of his major concerns, 
being perhaps the first person to carry out a systematic analysis of the Qur'anic 
passages relating to God’s attributes.69  In his thinking, we are told, ‘the unity, the 
spirituality and transcendence of God…are carried to the highest degree of 
abstraction.  God is one; he does not resemble his creatures in any respect...’.70  For 
Abū al-Hudhayl these qualities of God were absolute and irrefutable, and formed the 
starting point from which he strived to ‘know’ God.   
 
Abū al-Hudhayl set out to explain how God’s attributes could be identical to His 
essence, and therefore eternal, whilst remaining ‘one’.  The formulation he 
constructed ran as follows:  
‘He [God] is knowing by a knowledge that is He and He is powerful by a power that is 
He and He is living by a life that is He, and similarly he [Abū al-Hudhayl] speaks of 
His hearing, His sight, His eternity and His forgiveness and His might and his 
                                                          
69 Van Ess, Josef.  Theologie und Gesellschaft im. 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, eine Geschichte 
des religiösen Denkens in frühen Islam,  vol. 3, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,1997), 441 
70 Abu’l Hudhayl al- ‘Allaf, Encyclopaedia of Islam, CD-ROM Edition v.1.0  
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exaltedness and his greatness and of the rest of the attributes of his essence, and he 
used to say: If I said that God is knowing I affirm of Him a knowledge which is God 
and I deny of God ignorance and I indicate [an object] which is, was, or will be known, 
and if I said powerful I deny weakness of God and affirm of him a power which is God 
be he praised and I indicate [an object] which is decreed, and if I said God is living, I 
affirm of Him life, which is God and deny of God death.’71  
 
One could not, therefore, talk of a ‘knowledge’ which was a distinct entity separate 
from God yet found within Him, one must instead say that ‘knowledge’ is His 
essence; or as van Ess puts it, ‘…daβ Gott ein Wissen hat, aufgrund dessen er 
wissend ist; nur ist dieses Wissen nichts Separates, sondern mit ihm identisch.’72  
 
Thus in Abū al-Hudhayl’s conception, the phrase ‘God is knowing’ came to imply the 
following: Firstly, that God has a ‘knowledge’ which is He; secondly that ‘ignorance’ is 
implicitly and equally denied of God; and finally that there exists or has existed an 
                                                          
71 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 165.5-165.11 
72 Van Ess, Josef.  Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. 1,  272 (‘…that God has a knowledge from which 
he is knowing, only this knowledge is not something separate, but something that is identical to Him’) 
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object which is ‘known’.  Ontologically speaking, Abū al-Hudhayl seems to have felt 
that, in order for humans to be able to say something positive about God, they must 
be able to distinguish between attributes, though the reality was that each attribute 
was God himself and could not be separated or distinguished from him.  
 
Meanwhile, it is clear that his younger contemporary, Abū Isḥāq Ibrahīm ibn Sayyār 
al-Naẓẓām (d.c.836-845), does not use the noun form ‘knowledge’, ‘power’ or ‘life’ at 
all. He expresses God’s attributes as follows: 
‘…the meaning of my saying knowing is the affirmation of His essence and the 
negation of ignorance of Him and the meaning of my saying powerful is the 
confirmation of His essence and the negation of weakness of Him and the meaning of 
my saying living is the confirmation of His essence and the negation death of Him…’73 
 
Contemporaries were quick to point out the obvious paradox such formulae caused.  
If the attributes were identical to God, then how was it possible to distinguish 
between them, or why would they need different names, such as ‘knowledge’ and 
                                                          
73 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 166.16-167.2 
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‘life’, if they were identical to Him and presumably therefore to each other as well?74 
Abū al-Hudhayl’s answer was that they could be distinguished by the various objects 
of the attributes, i.e. what is ‘known’, what is ‘willed’ and so on.  However, this answer 
was still not sufficient for his critics, as to begin with, the objects of Godly 
omnipotence and Godly knowledge, to give just one example, are the same, and 
secondly, not all of the attributes discussed could take an object. This was true for 
attributes such as ‘Life’ and ‘Eternity’.75 
 
There is no doubt that Abū al-Hudhayl’s conception of the divine attributes posed as 
many questions as it answered.  Nevertheless, his teaching certainly formed the 
basis for those who followed him, whether their reaction to him was positive or 
                                                          
74 There is an interesting parallel to be found here as regards Plotinus’ thinking. John Bussanich 
writes: ‘…But how can the doctrine of simplicity and aseity be consistent with the attribution of many 
properties to the One? Granted that the properties of goodness and formlessness, say, are predicated 
of the One without introducing complexity into its nature, should we conclude that as a property 
simplicity is identical with goodness, or with infinity, or, generally, that the One’s attributes are all the 
same or are mutually entailing?’ Bussanich, John. ‘Plotinus’ metaphysics of the One’ in Lloyd P. 
Gerson, ed., The Cambridge companion to Plotinus (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
43-44 
75 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, III, 272-273 
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negative.  His ideas would be reformulated and refined by those who followed him 
and rejected or actively refuted by others, both Muslim and Christian. 
 
 
1.3.2. Ibn Kullāb (d.c.855) 
Somewhere between the staunch scriptural loyalty of traditional thinkers and the 
abstract philosophical reasoning of more ‘rational’ minds, another strand of thought 
can be identified, one most often attributed to Ibn Kullāb. Like his Mut‘azilī 
contemporaries, little is known about him, though it is thought he was educated in 
Basra and followed theologically in the tradition of the Mu‘tazilite al-Ḥusayn ibn  
Muḥammad al-Najjār.76 However, it would appear that Ibn Kullāb pulled further and 
further away from Mu‘tazili thinking as his thinking developed, and came to play an 
important role in shaping the course of Islamic thinking, by using reason-based 
arguments and logical principles in order to defend his conservative beliefs.77 This 
                                                          
76 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, IV, 180-181 
77 Ibn Kullāb was particularly involved in the debate over the created nature of the Qur’an, which was 
the doctrine on which the Caliph al-Ma‘mūn based his ‘inquisition’ or mihna. The tenth century 
Ash’arite theologian, al- Baqillānī (d. 1013) says that Ibn Kullāb refused to go to al-Ma’mūn’s court as 
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adoption of the ‘rationalist’ methodology of those such as the Mu‘tazila, in order to 
defend more tradition or orthodox beliefs, is a point often made in connection with the 
later Ash‘arites, named after the former Mu‘tazilite Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl al 
Ash‘arī, who, at the end of the ninth century, is said to have renounced his Mu‘tazilī 
beliefs in order to champion Sunni orthodox. The roots of Ash‘arite thinking, however, 
can be found in the teachings of the followers of Ibn Kullāb, the Kullābiya or 
‘mutakallimūn min al-salaf’, 78 as they were also known. The eleventh century 
historiographer, al-Shahrastānī, wrote in his Nihayat al-aqdam fī 'ilm al-kalām, that 
some of his school considered Ibn Kullāb a spiritual father.79 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
he considered the caliph a sinner, whilst al-Baghdādī (d. 1037) claims that he defeated the Mu‘tazilites 
in front of the Caliph. Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, IV, 180. See also: Ess, J. van ‘Ibn Kullāb’ und 
die Mihna, Oriens, vol. 18. (1965-66) 92-142. Ibn Kullāb is also credited with building upon the concept 
of ‘kasb’, that is to say the ‘acquisition’ of actions by men from God, in terms of discussions concerning 
free will.  
78 Ess, ‘Ibn Kullāb’ und die Mihna, 97 
79 Tritton, A.S. ‘Review of A. Guillaume (ed.) Al-Shahrastani, Summa Philosophae’.  Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental Studies, University of London, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1932), 1021 
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Whilst Abū al-Hudhayl taught that God’s attributes are identical to His Essence, Ibn 
Kullāb’s view was that God’s attributes subsisted in His Essence, but that they were 
neither God nor other than God.  
And he used to say: the meaning of God is knowing is that He has a knowledge and 
the meaning of He is powerful is that He has a power and the meaning of He is living 
is that He has a life and likewise is the teaching on the rest of His names and 
attributes. He [Ibn Kullāb] used to say that the names of God and his attributes of His 
essence were not God and not other than Him, and that they exist because of God, it 
is not conceivable that the attributes exist in by virtue of the attributes…  and he used 
to say that… His essence [it] is He, and His soul [it] is He and that He exists not by an 
[attribute] of existence… and that [the attribute of] knowledge is not [the attribute of] 
power and not other than it, and likewise each attribute of the essential attributes is 
not the other attribute, and not other than it.80  
 
Whereas for the Mu‘tazila, God is knowing by virtue of His Essence or Himself, for 
Ibn Kullāb he is knowing by virtue of knowledge which is not identical to Him nor 
                                                          
80 al-Ash‘ari. Maqālāt, 169.10-170.3 
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other than Him; but He still has a real attribute of knowledge.  These statements 
would lead later Mu‘tazilī thinkers, such as ‘Abd al-Jabbār, to accuse the Kullābiyya 
of saying that God has three eternal essences, which amounts to polytheism, and 
makes them guilty of a similar error to the Christians.81 Moreover, a reference in the 
‘Fihrist’ of the Muslim bibliographer Ibn al-Nadīm (d.c. 995) speaks of a Christian man 
named Pethion who lived in Baghdad, and claimed that he and Ibn Kullāb would 
often sit together and talk. Pethion is quoted as saying:  ‘God have mercy on 
‘Abdallah, he came to me and sat beside me in the cloister, pointed in the direction of 
the church, and took this saying from me. Had he lived we would have triumphed 
over the Muslims.’82 It is not surprising therefore, that Ibn Kullāb was accused of 
being a Christian by some of his Muslim opponents. What is potentially surprising 
however, is that it was much of Ibn Kullāb’s thinking and methodology that laid the 
groundwork for what would become Islamic orthodoxy in the hands of al-Ash‘arī and 
his followers in the tenth century. 
                                                          
81 Thomas, D. (ed.) Christian doctrines in Islamic theology. History of Christian-Muslim relations, vol. 
10, (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 240 
82 M. Rida-Tajaddud (ed.), Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist (Tehran: Maktabat al-AsadI, 1971), 230 
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1.3.3. Nature of kalām 
Both Abū al-Hudhayl and Ibn Kullāb, despite their different viewpoints, can be called 
mutakallimūn, that is to say those who engaged in the ‘ilm al-kalām (science of  
kalām). The word kalām literally means ‘speech’ or ‘discourse’, and referred from the 
very beginnings of Islam to discussion on theological matters, changing over time to 
denote a more organised system or science of speculative theology. The term kalām 
will be translated here as ‘Islamic theological thought’, though academic debate 
continues as to the origins, nature and definition of the concept. 
 
 The major problem in pinning down the nature of kalām, especially in the early ninth 
century when the development of Islamic thinking can be seen to be in its most 
formative and volatile stage, is precisely that its nature would have changed over 
time and from place to place, and it would have almost undoubtedly have been 
understood differently by different individuals or groups of thinkers. Indeed, even 
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amongst those who came to be known as Mu‘tazilites, some of the main proponents 
of kalām, one finds a number of different epistemologies and preoccupations.83  
 
 During a conference held in Boston, Massachusetts in 1973,84 Josef van Ess 
presented a paper entitled ‘The Beginnings of Islamic Theology’, which dealt with the 
‘ilm al-kalām and led to a fascinating discussion concerning its definition and origins, 
also published at the end of the paper.85 Van Ess himself explained that he was more 
concerned with the origins of the term,86 whereas others were interested to know 
more about what kalām actually was in terms of its nature. 
                                                          
83 See for example: Al-Ash’arī’s Maqālāt and Ess’ Theologie und Gesellschaft. 
84 Murdoch, J. E. and Sylla, E.D. (eds) The cultural context of medieval learning: Proceedings of the 
first international colloquium on philosophy, science and theology in the Middle Ages. (Boston, USA: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975) 
85 Ibid.,104-111 
86 The origins of kalām are not the central concern here and require a fuller treatment than this study 
will allow, however a brief overview may be given here. In his paper entitled, ‘Origins of kalām’, M.A. 
Cook points to Christian Syriac works to highlight examples of dialectical arguments which he feels 
Muslim theologians later borrowed. Cook, M.A. ‘The origins of “kalām”’, Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 43, No. 1.(1980), 32-43 
Wolfson, in his paper on ‘The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trinity’ sets out to show how this 
belief in the attributes of God came from contact with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, using mainly 
terminological evidence and the ruling out of other influences, at least initially (Wolfson, The 
philosophy of the kalam, 1976).  The extent of Wolfson’s view is contested, in part at least, by scholars 
such as Richard M. Frank, who claims that there was no equivalent term in Greek or Latin to the 
Arabic word ṣifa, which means ‘attribute’. (Frank, Beings and their attributes, 1978)   Josef van Ess 
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Three suggested definitions presented themselves during the course of the 
discussion: kalām as polemics, kalām as theology and kalām as a dialectical 
structure. Each was dismissed individually as not being encompassing enough, and 
that each can only be said to be an aspect of the discipline.  
 
Richard Frank has written widely on kalām and the Mu‘tazila in particular and 
defends the view that kalām is theological science. In a review of Michel Allard’s 
book on the divine attributes in Ash‘arite thinking,87 Frank criticises Allard for implying 
that kalām is little more than ‘an art of contradiction-making’.88 Elsewhere, he 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
makes the observation that ‘Die Muslime selber sagen von einem christlichen Einfluβ nichts…’ (Van 
Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, Band IV,1997, 431) but does recognise that Christian thinking did 
influence Islamic thought, though perhaps not to the degree that Wolfson suggests. Van Ess also 
offers evidence of the beginnings of kalām in the first Islamic century, that is to say before 750 C.E.86  
Similarly, Sidney Griffith accepts traces of Greek and Christian thought in the development of Islamic 
theology but refers to it as ‘recognizably and uniquely Islamic, and distinctly non-Christian in its 
thought, format and style.’ William Montgomery Watt sees the rise of kalām as a reaction to ‘tensions 
within the community of Muslims’ and sums up the stance of many scholars quite concisely: ‘Muslim 
theologians did not simply copy Christian ideas, but it is possible that a man might adopt a Christian 
idea if it fitted into his arguments against Muslim rivals.’ Watt. W. M. Islamic Philosophy and Theology: 
An Extended Survey, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), 50 
87 Allard, Michel. Le problème des attributes divins dans la doctrine d’al-Ash’ari et de ses premiers 
grands disciples. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965) 
88 Frank, R.M. ‘The kalām, an art of contradition-making or theological science? Some remarks on the 
question’ in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 88 (1968) 
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discusses kalām as metaphysics89, as a theology which dealt with a wide range of 
philosophical problems,90 as a particular kind of rational exposition or discourse,91 
and as a discipline having a number of topics which are ‘properly considered to be 
the subjects of kalām’.92 He describes the main function of kalām being: ‘… to 
rationalise the basic beliefs of the Muslims as they are given in the Koran and the 
Sunna and are present in the way these are read and understood by orthodox 
believers.’93 
 
Kalām, therefore, appears to be a fundamentally theological enterprise, but one 
which has distinct philosophical elements. Indeed, Frank suggests, kalām actually 
seems to have perceived itself to be a ‘strictly philosophical metaphysics’94 although 
in reality this was not the case.  
 
                                                          
89 Frank, Richard M. ‘The science of Kalām’ in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 2 (1992), 14 
90 Ibid, 16 
91 Ibid, 20 
92 Ibid., 12 
93 Ibid., 22 
94 Ibid., 36 
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David Thomas, from various Islamic theological works he has edited,95 sees the 
method of the mutakallimūn as being based on common sense logic rather than 
philosophical premises. Certainly the few extant ninth century Muslim works attacking 
the Trinity, among other doctrines, do so on the basis of the fundamental premise 
that one cannot be three and three cannot be one. 
 
In an examination of the development of Muslim theology during the early centuries, 
Thomas sums up concisely: 
‘It follows that kalām comprises a great deal more than apologetic. Even in the 
relatively restricted parts brought into discussions connected with anti-Christian 
                                                          
95 See, for example: Thomas, D. Christian doctrines in Islamic theology. History of Christian-Muslim 
relations, vol. 10, (Leiden: Brill, 2008); ‘A Mu’tazili Response to Christianity: Abu ‘Ali al-Jubba’I’s Attack 
on the Trinity and Incarnation’, Studies on the Christian Arabic Heritage, R. Ebied and H. Teule 
(Leuven; Paris; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004); Anti-Christian polemic in early Islam: Abū Īsā al-Warrāq's 
'Against the Trinity'  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and ‘The doctrine of the Trinity in 
the early Abbasid era’ in L. Ridgeon (ed.) Islamic interpretations of Christianity (Richmond: Curzon, 
2001) 
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attacks it can be seen to extend towards a comprehensive description of the 
distinctively Islamic teaching about the oneness of God…’96  
 
This common-sense logical approach is illustrated by the few extant Muslim works of 
the ninth century which deal with the Trinity. In particular, the Refutation of the Trinity 
by the Muslim philosopher Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (c.800- c.870) provides an excellent 
insight into the sort of challenge with which Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār might 
have been dealing, and adds a further dimension to the fabric of Islamic theological 
thought in the ninth century. 
  
 
1.4. Muslim criticisms of the doctrine of the Trinity: Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī 
Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, who is often hailed as the ‘philosopher of the Arabs’, was also 
active during the ninth century, though was perhaps a generation younger than Abū 
al-Hudhayl and Ibn Kullāb. Although considered a philosopher (faylasūf), he lived 
                                                          
96 Thomas, D. Anti-Christian polemic in early Muslim theology, unpublished thesis, (University of 
Lancaster, 1983), 351 
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during a period when the intellectual disciplines of kalām and falsafa were in their 
infancy and the lines between them very much blurred. As such, al-Kindī argued for 
the compatibility of philosophy and religion and shared some doctrines with those 
who were becoming known as representatives of Mu‘tazilī thinking. He distinguished 
‘theology’ and ‘the science of the unity of God’ as divisions of philosophy,97 and in 
many respects looked to support the truth of Qur’anic revelation in a similar way to 
the mutakallimūn. For him, both philosophy and religion dealt with the unity of God. 
The essential difference, whether conscious or subconscious, was one of emphasis 
and priority, whereby al-Kindī appears to have held philosophy in higher esteem than 
religion, as his search for truth is largely based on Aristotle. However, in terms of the 
treatment of the Trinity, it would appear that he attacks the doctrine largely from a 
basis of common sense logic as much as philosophical premise.  
 
                                                          
97 Atiyeh, G. N. Al-Kindi: the philosopher of the Arabs, (Islamabad: The Islamic Research Institute, 
1967) 20 
73 
 
 In his Refutation of the Christians,98 al-Kindī’s opening statement claims that, 
following the logic of Christian teachings, there is a manifest composition within the 
godhead. This is because, although Father Son and Holy Spirit are recognised as 
one substance, they are each said to have a property (khaṣṣa) which distinguishes or 
particularises them from each other.99 This basic notion, that the Christian description 
of God entails a necessary plurality in godhead, remains the cornerstone of all of his 
subsequent arguments. His refutation, like other Muslim works available to us,100 
gives what appears to be a typical description of Christian beliefs, saying that 
Christians recognise ‘three eternal hypostases (aqānīm) which do not cease to be 
one substance, and by hypostases they mean individuals (ashkhāṣṣ).’101  
 
                                                          
98 The treatise is preserved in a work by the Jacobite Christian Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (893-974) who refutes 
al-Kindī’s criticisms of the doctrine of the Trinity. See: Périer, A. (ed. and trans.) ‘Un traité de Yahyā 
ben ‘Adī: défense du dogme de la trinité contre les objections d’al-Kindī’, in R. Graffin (ed) Revue de 
l’orient Chrétien, vol. 2, no. 22 (1920) 
99 Périer, A. ‘Un traité de Yaḥyā ben ‘Adī’, 4 
100 See for example: Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq in Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” , 66-68; 
‘Abd al-Jabbār in Thomas, Christian doctrines in Islamic theology, 228-230 
101 Périer, A. ‘Un traité de Yaḥyā ben ‘Adī’, 4 
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In his second argument al-Kindī calls on the ‘rules of logic’ and the ‘incontrovertible 
notions’ as found in Greek philosophical works such as Porphyry’s Isagoge,102 which 
is an introduction to the Aristotelian Categories.  Here, he uses the Aristotelian 
categories to discuss whether the hypostases can be classified as genera (ajnās), 
species (anū/wā‘) or individuals (ashkhāṣṣ), noting that the genus is one genus 
[comprised] of species and the species is a species [comprised] of individulals.103 For 
al-Kindī, each of these categories implies composition as both genus and species 
include sub categories, and individuals are associated with accidents and can be 
counted. He later also refers to the same categories in the framework of Aristotle’s 
Topics in order to show how each involves multiplicity. Essentially, however one 
refers to the three hypostases, al-Kindī argues, one is forced to imply that there are 
three eternal beings which destroys the unity of God.  
 
                                                          
102 ibid., 6 
103 ibid., 6-7. A discussion of these classifications is also found in Abū Ra’iṭa, who argues that Muslims 
mistake Christian teachings of God’s oneness as a numerical oneness. Cf. Chapter 3 
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Al-Kindī’s refutation, therefore, makes reference to philosophical notions, particularly 
the Aristotelian categories which the Christians themselves use to describe the unity 
of God, and which al-Kindī argues cannot be applied to God. At the same time, all of 
his arguments also rest on common sense logic and the apparent impossibility of one 
being three and three being one, in a way not at all dissimilar from the earlier Muslim 
scholar, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq. 
 
A further interesting point to be made about Al-Kindī, which again can also be said of 
other Muslim polemicists of the ninth and tenth centuries, is that he appears to know 
a lot about Christian doctrine, but only discusses issues which are in direct 
contradiction with his own faith, namely the Trinity and Incarnation.104  
  
From this brief overview of al-Kindī’s criticisms of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is clear 
that Muslim polemicists were highly critical of doctrine of Trinity, and attacked it 
                                                          
104 Thomas, D. ‘The Bible and the kalām’, in D. Thomas (ed.) The Bible in Arab Christianity, (Leiden: 
Brill, 2007) 176-7. This treatment of Christian doctrine as an aberration of Muslim teaching, to be 
understood and rejected in terms of the logic of Islamic thinking as opposed to being treated within its 
own conceptual framework, had an important bearing on Christian Muslim engagement, which will be 
considered in the final discussion of the present study in Chapter 6. 
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primarily through the use of common sense logic, based on the fundamental notion 
that one cannot be three and three cannot be one. It would appear, from extant 
Muslim refutations such as al-Kindī’s, that Christians were being pressured to 
respond to such refutations of their doctrines. These were the sorts of criticisms, 
therefore, that Theodore Abū Qurra, Ḥabīb ibn Khidma Abū Rā’iṭa, and ‘Ammār al- 
Baṣrī would need to consider and address when writing their respective works 
concerning the Trinity. It is to these three authors that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEODORE ABŪ QURRA (c.750-c.820) 
 
2.1. Background 
2.1.1. Biography 
Of the three authors examined in this thesis, Theodore Abū Qurra is by far the most 
well known. Of a number of works written in Greek, Syriac and Arabic, there are 
twenty four which are relevant to Christian-Muslim relations and which are extant 
today.105 Although a relatively good amount of information concerning Abū Qurra’s 
thinking can be gleaned from primary and secondary sources, surprisingly little is 
actually known about his life. As such, his dates of birth and death can still only be 
imprecisely estimated from references to him in other sources. What is known almost 
certainly however, is that he was born in Edessa and was the Bishop of Harran for 
some part of his life. The latter of these two facts is attested to both in the titles of his 
own works and elsewhere. The Syrian Orthodox or ‘Jacobite’ theologian Abū Rā’iṭa 
                                                          
105 Thomas, D. and Roggema, B. (eds) Christian Muslim relations. A bibliographical history. Vol. 1 
(600-900). (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 440-491 
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al-Takrītī (c.755-835) names Abū Qurra, Bishop of Harran106 as his interlocutor in the 
‘Refutation of the Melkites’ which he wrote against the Melkite theologian.107 
Somewhere between 813 and 817, Abū Rā’iṭa sent his relative Nonnus of Nisibis to 
debate with Abū Qurra in the presence of the Armenian Prince Ashūt Msaker (d. 
826),108 a debate which Nonnus is reported to have won.109 He also appears to have 
been known in Muslim sources. In Ibn al-Nadīm’s Fihrist, Abū Qurra is referred to as 
the ‘the Melkite Bishop of Harran’110, and later on in the same work, he is mentioned 
in the title of a work attributed to the Baghdadī Mu‘tazilite Abū Mūsā ‘Īsā ibn Ṣubayḥ 
al Murdār, ‘The book against Abū Qurra the Christian’.111  In around the year 812-13 
it appears that Theodore was dismissed from his post as Bishop of Harran by 
Theodoret, the then Patriarch of Antioch, though this information is based on a single 
                                                          
106 Graf, G. (ed.) Die Schriften des Jacobiten Ḥabīb ibn Khidma Abū Rā‘iṭa, Corpus Scriptorum 
Christianorum Orientalium Vol. 130 (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste L. Durbeq, 1951), 65 
107 Ibid., 105-30 
108 Ibid., 66 
109 Griffith, S. ‘The apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis’, Aram, vol. 3, no. 1 and 2, (1991), 116 n. 6 
110 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 26.15. The  name Abū ‘izza (ةﺰﻋ ﻮﺑا) is generally accepted to be a scribal 
error which should read Abū Qurra (ةﺮﻗ ﻮﺑا), based on the consequent statement about him being the 
Melkite Bishop of Harran, which is attested to in other sources. 
111 Ibid.,  207.6 
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source.112 He is thought to have died in the 830s, as the last known reference to him 
concerns a debate with the Caliph al-Ma’mūn in Harran in the year 829.113 From the 
more secure dates available, it would be reasonable to estimate that Theodore Abū 
Qurra was born in or shortly after the middle of the eighth century, as he was of an 
age to be appointed Bishop in the early ninth century and took part in the 
aforementioned debate in 829. It would therefore also be logical to assume that he 
died soon after this date, as he would have been of a mature age by this point. 
 
Traditionally, Abū Qurra has been thought to have been a monk at Mar Sabas 
monastery in Palestine for some portion of his life, but a recent study by John 
Lamoreaux has suggested that there is not enough evidence to justify such a 
claim.114 He asserts that the evidence that does exist is questionable in terms of 
reliability, and he also points to the absence of sources that explicitly name him a 
                                                          
112 Chabot, J.B. (ed. and trans.) Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche, 1166-
1199, vol. 3 (Paris : Ernest Leroux, 1905), 32 
113 Griffith, Sidney Harrison. The church in the shadow of the mosque: Christians and Muslims in the 
world of Islam (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 61 
114 Lamoreaux, J. ‘The biography of Theodore Abū Qurrah revisited’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, vol. 56, 
(2002), 25-40. 
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monk at Mar Sabas, when many sources refer to him as the Bishop of Harran. 
Lamoreaux’s argument is a persuasive one. The major implication of this re-
evaluation is that Abū Qurra would not have been a direct pupil of John of 
Damascus, as is traditionally thought, though in any case this claim is troublesome 
chronologically, as John of Damascus is thought to have died in 749. Additionally, if 
Lamoreaux’s thesis is to be accepted, one has to root Abū Qurra more firmly in the 
historical and intellectual context of Harran than in Jerusalem. That is not to suggest, 
however, that our perceptions of Abū Qurra need change too dramatically. He was 
obviously acquainted with John of Damascus’ thought, and could well have been a 
student of John’s works and teachings, without being directly acquainted with him. 
Furthermore, in the introduction to a letter written to David the Monophysite, Abū 
Qurra himself explains that he spent some time in Jerusalem, where he met the 
aforementioned David.115 
 
 
                                                          
115 Lamoreaux, J. C. ‘The biography of Theodore Abū Qurrah revisited’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, vol. 
56, (2002), 34 
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2.1.2. Historical Context 
Despite discrepancies concerning Abu Qurra’s biography, there is enough 
information to confidently locate him in the early ninth century, based in the city of 
Harran with probable links to Jerusalem. 
 
Located in the southern region of modern day Turkey, Harran lies little more than 
thirty miles from the city of Edessa and not far from the Patriarchate of Antioch. 
Famed as the home of Abraham on his way from Ur to Canaan, Harran was a city of 
significance for all three of the monotheistic faiths which included him in their 
histories, that is to say Judaism, Christianity and Islam. They, however, were not the 
only traditions present in this area. There were also Sabians there, a pagan sect 
which had been prominent in Harran for a number of centuries and which had 
prompted the church fathers to refer to Harran as the “heathen city”.116 
 
                                                          
116 Van Ess, J. Theologie und Gesellschaft, II, 443 
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The city’s proximity to the theological schools of Edessa and Nisibis is also of 
significance. As described in chapter one of this study, from about the fifth century 
the area became a focal point of disagreement between those who rejected and 
those who accepted ‘Nestorian’ teachings concerning the divine and human natures 
of Jesus. As a Melkite, then, Theodore Abū Qurra would have most likely been 
outnumbered by his Christian neighbours of other denominations, particularly those 
of Syrian Orthodox persuasion, who appear to have been the majority in that area. 
Certainly this picture of his historical situation corresponds with his vigorous efforts to 
commend Melkite doctrine as the correct Christian teaching. 
   
In 750 the first ‘Abbāsid caliph, Abū al-‘Abbās al-Saffāḥ (r.750-754), moved the seat 
of power from Damascus to Harran, most likely shortly before Abū Qurra’s birth. 
Although there are few notable Muslim individuals or sects associated particularly 
with Harran, as most who would be prominent during Abū Qurra’s career were to be 
found further south in the vicinity of Baghdad and Basra, he would nevertheless have 
been familiar with Muslim thought. In the first two centuries after the coming of Islam, 
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some of the names associated with the area include Ja‘d ibn Dirham117 and Abū ‘Amr 
Sālīm ibn ‘Aghlān al-Afṭas118 who are linked with the Qadarites and the Murji’a 
respectively; sects which to an extent laid the groundwork for Mu‘tazilī thinking. 
Meanwhile, the ‘Hanifites of Harran’, a pagan sect with whom Muḥammad is said to 
have been in contact119, also appear to have been a significant presence in the area 
and, despite essentially being regarded as pagans, are said to have emphasised the 
divine transcendence of God through the use of negative theology, and to have 
understood the meanings of the “beautiful names” of God to be metaphorical, 120 thus 
advocating an anti-anthropomorphist position not dissimilar to that of the Mu‘tazila.  
 
Whether or not there were many Mu‘tazilī thinkers in Harran itself, it is likely that 
Theodore would have come across such thought through correspondence with 
leading Muslim thinkers; for example we know that the “monk of the Mu‘tazila”, ‘Īsā 
ibn Sābih al-Murdār (d.840), wrote a treatise against Abū Qurra, although there is no 
                                                          
117 ibid., 449-458 
118 Ibid., 458-9 
119 Ibid.,  IV, 397 
120 Ibid., 444 
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evidence of the latter writing a response. Nevertheless, the fact that Abū Qurra was 
known to prominent Islamic scholars suggests that he may also have been aware of 
them. Moreover, his debate with and in the presence of the Caliph al-Ma’mūn in 829 
would have brought him into direct contact with Mu‘tazilite thinking, as we know the 
Caliph was a great supporter of the school. Theodore’s works, some of which will be 
explored in due course, clearly demonstrate an awareness of his Islamic intellectual 
surroundings. 
 
In 762, the second ‘Abbāsid caliph, al-Mansūr (r. 754-775), relocated to Baghdad, 
which became the new centre of imperial power and would remain so until the mid-
thirteenth century. The effects of this move are well summed up by Griffith:  
‘Syria/Palestine, and especially Jerusalem, which had been an important and 
religious center of the burgeoning Islamic culture for almost a century under the 
Umayyads, became a venerated but neglected, provincial backwater in the early 
Abbasid caliphate.’121   
                                                          
121 Griffith, S. ‘Byzantium and the Christians in the world of Islam: Constantinople and the church in 
the Holy Land in the ninth century’, Medieval Encounters 3 (1997), 233 
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This shift of the capital of the Islamic Empire cannot have been insignificant for 
Theodore. Having been born in what was the capital of the Empire, he would have 
found himself fairly far removed from the new political and intellectual centres of 
Baghdad and Basra at the time that he would have been composing his numerous 
theological works. This geographical factor may well have contributed to the subtle 
differences which will be seen between his writings on the Trinity and those of his 
Jacobite and Nestorian contemporaries, and as such will be explored further in Part 
Two of the present study.  
 
A word should be said here concerning the identity of the Melkite Church. Of the 
three major Christian denominations in the Middle East, the Melkite Church was the 
last to form its distinct identity, which has a lot to do with the specifically Islamic 
context in which it found itself from the middle of the seventh century onwards. 
Theologically speaking, of course, those who came to be known as Melkites were 
defined by their recognition of the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon in 451, and 
therefore their loyalty to the creeds of the Byzantine Church. However, their labelling 
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as ‘Melkite’ comes from a later period. Indeed, the term ‘Melkite’, or in Arabic 
malakiyya, based on the Syriac and Arabic root ‘m-l-k’, means ‘royalists’, i.e. those 
loyal to the Byzantine Emperor. During the period of Byzantine rule over 
Palestine/Syria, those who professed the Chalcedonian faith enjoyed a privileged 
position with respect to other denominations, who were frequently persecuted. The 
dawn of the Islamic Empire brought about the relegation of the Melkites to a 
denomination like any other: in the Qur’an both Jews and Christians were considered 
equal as ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitāb). 
  
Therefore, although doctrinally aligned with Rome and Constantinople, the combined 
effects of being within the Islamic Empire both geographically and politically, of 
gradually moving away in a cultural and linguistic sense, and being directly 
theologically challenged by Islam and Islamic concerns, led to the almost complete 
severance of the Melkites from the Byzantine Church over the course of the ensuing 
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centuries and the development of a distinct denominational heritage within the 
Islamic Empire.122 
 
 
2.1.3. Intellectual Context  
Whether or not Abū Qurra was a monk at Mar Sabas, it is known that he travelled to 
Jerusalem123 and that he was familiar with the works of John of Damascus. He 
followed in the latter’s footsteps as a staunch supporter of the Chalcedonian creed, a 
defender of the veneration of icons and an apologist for the Christian faith in the 
context of the Islamic Empire.124  Although also able to read and write in Greek and 
Syriac, Theodore wrote mainly in Arabic and more consciously reflected his Islamic 
surroundings than John of Damascus. There is no doubt he viewed Christians of 
                                                          
122 See: Griffith. ‘Byzantium and the Christians’ 
123 In a letter to David the Monophysite, Abū Qurra speaks of them praying together in Jerusalem. 
Lamoreaux, ‘The biography of Theodore Abū Qurrah revisited’, 34 
124 See: Dick, I. ‘Un continateur arabe de saint Jean Damascène : Theodore Abuqurra, évêque melkite 
de Harran, La personne et son milieu’, Proche-Orient Chretien, vol. 13, (1963), 114-129 ; Griffith, S.H. 
‘“Melkites”, “Jacobites” and the christological controversies in Arabic in the third/ninth century Syria’ in 
D. Thomas (ed) Syrian Christians under Islam, the first thousand years (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2001), 
38ff. 
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other denominations alongside Sabians and Manicheans as heretics, and wrote and 
spoke against the other Eastern churches, particularly the Jacobites.125 How he 
regarded Islam is a question which will be explored during the course of this study, 
but it is sufficient to say here that he appears to have taken Islam more seriously 
than did John of Damascus, presumably as the consolidation of Islamic rule took 
place from one generation to the next. 
 
Among the issues which concerned Melkite theologians at the time were both the 
need to uphold Byzantine orthodoxy against the Syrian Orthodox Church and Church 
of the East, and the defence of icons126. One of Theodore’s central concerns, aside 
from interfaith polemic with Muslims and Jews, was clearly engaging in intra-Christian 
polemic, in order to prove the truth of Melkite doctrine. The need to defend the 
Melkite Church became more important following the establishment of the Islamic 
                                                          
125 See for example: his debate with Nonnus of Nisibis in front of Ashūt Msker in Griffith, S. ‘The 
apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis’. 
126 The defence of icons appears to have been a fairly prominent concern of Abū Qurra following 
problems within his see of Harran. Griffith, ‘“Melkites”, “Jacobites” and the christological controversies, 
32 
See also: Griffith, S.H. (ed., trans.) Theodore Abū Qurra. A treatise on the veneration of the holy icons, 
Eastern Christian texts in translation; vol. 1, (Louvain: Peeters, 1997) 
89 
 
Empire in previously Byzantine areas, which led to the elimination of the privileged 
position of the Melkites with respect to other Christian denominations.  Not 
surprisingly therefore, we find, amongst Theodore’s works in Arabic and Greek, those 
directed at the Nestorians and Jacobites, and those which clearly seek to commend 
Chalcedonian orthodoxy.127 
 
In terms of the Islamic intellectual context, the two most substantive testaments to his 
engagement with Islam include: the work written against him by Ibn al-Murdār and a 
report of a debate held at the court of al-Ma’mūn.128 Wilferd Madelung also suggests 
similarities between the theological approach of Abū Qurra and that of the Zaydī 
 Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (785-860) ,129 although the latter lived in Medina and so 
direct contact would have been unlikely, and Madelung’s claim is that al-Qāsim was 
                                                          
127 See: Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, 439-491 
128 Guillaume, A. ‘A debate between Christian and Moslem doctors’, Centenary supplement of the 
journal of the Asiatic society, (Oct. 1924), 233-244. The authenticity of this source is questioned by 
some scholars. 
129 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrahīm (785-860), grew up in Medina and lived part of his adult life in Egypt. Among 
other works he wrote an epistle on the existence of God and His creation and, like many Muslim 
theologians of the period, also wrote a refutation of the Christians. He was a fierce 
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influenced by Abū Qurra and not the other way around. Nevertheless, certainly 
during Theodore’s time, even though not at the heart of Islamic Empire, Mu‘tazili 
thought would still have been the dominant strand of thought. The contents of his 
own works, of course, also tell us something about the Muslim context, as will be 
seen below. 
 
As a result of the particular context in which Abū Qurra lived, there are a number of 
themes which can be detected across his works. These are: what the human mind 
can know about God (primarily that He exists and has a Son who is his equal); the 
relationship between faith and reason; the determination of the “true” religion; free 
will; the death and Incarnation of Christ; the veneration of icons; and whether Christ 
willed to be crucified. His treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity lies within in a wider 
treatment of the nature of God and a particular emphasis on the divine nature of the 
Son, with the first three of the themes mentioned above preceding the subject by way 
of grounding his arguments concerning the nature of God.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
deanthropomorphist, and agreed with the Mu‘tazila on the topic of the existence and unity of God, 
although not a Mu‘tazilī thinker himself. See: Abrahamov, B. Al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm.  
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2.1.4. Works relating to the Trinity 
Of a considerable volume of Abū Qurra’s extant works, only one treatise can be said 
to have the Trinity as its main subject, which will therefore form the basis of the close 
textual discussion which follows. However there are small sections of other works 
which relate to the doctrine of God, and in particular to the nature of the eternal Son 
as the Word of God, and the divine attributes of God. These will also be examined 
where appropriate. 
 
The treatise which deals specifically with the doctrine of the Trinity is a work which is 
given the rather lengthy title: Mīmar yuḥaqqiqu annahu lā yulzamu l-Naṣārā an  
yaqūlū thalātha āliha idh yaqūlūna l-Āb ilāh wa-l-Ibn ilāh wa-Rūḥ al-Qudus (ilāh) wa-
anna l-Āb wa-l-Ibn wa-Rūḥ al-Qudus ilāh wa-law kāna kull wāḥid minhum tāmm ʿalā  
ḥidatihi 130, ‘Treatise confirming that Christians do not necessarily speak of three 
gods when they say that the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is 
God, and that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, even though each of 
                                                          
130 ibid., 453  
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them is fully God by himself’. It is a self-contained work dealing with the question of 
the Trinitarian nature of God and, as such, will be the main source to be examined in 
this study. For the purposes of convenience, this treatise will hereafter be referred to 
as the Mīmar. The work is currently available in six manuscripts, two of which date 
from the twelfth century and the remainder from somewhere between the sixteenth 
and eighteenth centuries.131 
 
A section in a work entitled the Mīmar fī wujūd al-khāliq wa-l-dīn al-qawīm , ‘Treatise 
on the Existence of the Creator and the True Religion’132, concerning the divine 
attributes of God and God as Trinity will also be examined here. The treatise can be 
found in two manuscripts from between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.133 In 
one manuscript, the full title of the work is given as: ‘On the truth of the existence of 
God and that he is a Trinity of hypostases and on the truth of the Christian religion 
and that there is absolutely no religion in the world other than it’134, which further 
                                                          
131 ibid., 453-454 
132 ibid., 448 
133 ibid., 449 
134 ibid., 448 
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indicates its relevance to the doctrine of the Trinity and will be referred to as ‘wujūd 
al-khāliq’. In this work, Theodore Abū Qurra imagines himself coming down from a 
deserted mountain to find people of various religions claiming to have the truth. His 
imaginary task is to assess which religion is the most worthy or true based on rational 
methods alone. He does this by ascertaining what can be known about God from 
what we know about man, and looking at agreements and disagreements between 
religions on the subjects of the ‘permitted and the forbidden’ and ‘reward and 
punishment’. His conclusion, unsurprisingly, is that based on rational evidence only 
Christianity can claim to be the true religion.135  
 
The third work which proves relevant to the question of the explanation of the Trinity 
is entitled: Maymar ʿalā sabīl maʿrifat Allāh wa-taḥqīq al-Ibn al-azalī, ‘Treatise on the 
way of knowing God and the confirmation of the eternal Son’.136 The work can be 
found in a total of five manuscripts, the earliest dated to the twelfth century and the 
                                                          
135 Griffith, S.H. ‘Faith and reason in Christian kalām. Theodore Abū Qurrah on discerning the true 
religion’, in Samir, S. K. and Nielsen, J.S. (eds) Christian Arabic apologetics during the Abbasid period 
(750-1258) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994)  
136 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, 457 
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latest to the eighteenth.137 Prior to the section about the eternal Son, Abū Qurra 
outlines three ways in which humans are able to achieve some understanding of 
God. The first he calls ‘knowledge through effect’, in which he puts forward a 
causality argument which leads back to an ultimate maker. This proves that God 
exists. The second method is knowledge through likeness, whereby Abū Qurra 
explains how God’s creation must resemble Him in some way, something which he 
also addresses in his Mīmar, and, as such, which will be examined more fully later 
on. Abū Qurra’s final method is knowledge of what is dissimilar, which has to do with 
God’s attributes meaning an entirely different thing to their human counterparts. He 
then sets out to explore how these methods of knowledge can guide the scholar to 
the knowledge that God has a Son, again something which will be touched upon in 
due course. 
 
A number of Abū Qurra’s other surviving works, both in Arabic and Greek, which 
while not necessarily meriting a detailed investigation, are nevertheless linked to the 
                                                          
137 ibid., 457-458 
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explanation of the nature of God. A number of these works involve the status of the 
Son as the ‘Word’ of God and as co-eternal with the Father, and the refutation of 
those who claim that the Son and Spirit are created.  
 
 
2.2. Setting the context 
2.2.1 Relationship between faith and reason 
As mentioned previously, the relationship between faith and reason and the question 
of what the human mind can know of God are two themes which Abū Qurra 
addresses in a number of his works. He almost invariably uses analogy and 
metaphor to explain himself. In the treatise concerning the Trinity, which forms the 
main text of this study, Abū Qurra gives analogies of people who are too proud to 
accept something which they do not understand, and yet trust a doctor to diagnose 
them and treat them without knowing whether the medication he prescribes will kill 
them; or people who trust the captain of a ship to transport them safely without 
knowing for certain whether he is capable of sailing a ship. Equally, he criticises 
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those who have blind faith in God without seeking to determine through the use of 
their intellect whether a certain person is sent to them by God. He says: 
In faith concerning what has come from God, are three [types]. Among them there are 
those who obstruct faith completely, because they feel that their mind is following a 
message that their knowledge does not comprehend. And among them are those 
who have made their mind accept that a message comes to them from God, which 
their knowledge does not comprehend, but they neglect their faith and do not allow 
their intellect to verify it. And among them are those who use their intellects to verify a 
message that is attributed (yusnad) and truly related (yastanid) to God but [at the 
same time] do not ignore their faith.’138 
 
Although there is no explicit mention of any particular religion at this point, it soon 
becomes clear that Abū Qurra considers the Muslims to be those who have blind 
faith without verifying whether a message or prophet is sent from God or not, and 
furthermore who accept as a prophet a person who suits them based on their greed 
and desire and who will offer them the easiest path, rather than one who merits 
                                                          
138 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 22. 6-11    
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acceptance through the performance of miracles. As will be seen shortly, the topic of 
motives for the acceptance of a particular religion forms the mainstay of his argument 
concerning the “true” religion.  
 
 What Abū Qurra advises is that a person should humble him or herself to have faith 
in something which they cannot fully grasp, but then guide their faith using their 
reason. The person who does this, Abū Qurra explains: 
‘… resembles a fair judge who does not execute a judgement with clear testimonies 
until  he has unequivocally examined what is to be examined and settled whether 
their testimonies are worthy of acceptance regardless of whether their testimony 
agrees with his views or not.’139 
 
Unsurprisingly, the only people who can be seen to balance faith and reason in the 
correct manner, according to Abū Qurra, are those who profess Christianity. The idea 
of using one’s God-given reason in order to aid the understanding of revelation is one 
which also sums up the Mu‘tazilī theological approach. Whether such Muslim thinkers 
                                                          
139 ibid., 26.1-4 
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were influenced by Christians like Abū Qurra, or vice versa, remains an unresolved 
question.140 Broadly speaking, it is likely to have been a case of mutual influences 
and borrowings as opposed to a unilateral transfer of ideas. The transmission of 
Greek philosophical and logical thought into Arabic via Christian translators may well 
have created a renewed interest in rational thought in both Christian and Muslim 
circles. Whatever the case, it can be seen that Abū Qurra, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, begins from a shared standpoint; the existence of a God who can be 
best ‘known’ through a combination of reason and revelation. 
 
 
2.2.2. Christianity as the true religion 
Having determined the correct balance between faith and reason, Abū Qurra briefly 
explains that based on the reasons which have incited people to adopt a given 
religion, only Christianity can be said to be the true religion. Other religions, he 
claims, were all accepted through deception or desire; or for political or tribal 
                                                          
140 For a brief summary of the debate surrounding theological influences in this period Cf. Chapter 1, 
66, n. 86  
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reasons. The only reason that Christianity was accepted was due to miracles sent by 
God, performed by individuals who consequently deserved to be followed and 
believed. This, again, is a theme which appears repeatedly in Abū Qurra’s works; in 
fact he himself refers to having written a whole treatise on the subject, which may be 
a reference to his wujūd al-khāliq141 or to another work which is no longer extant. In 
the wujūd al-khāliq , Abū Qurra outlines his scheme for discerning the correct religion 
which assesses each religion based on revelation and reason concerning three 
categories: what human nature tells us in terms of us being created in the likeness of 
God; commanding the good and forbidding the bad; and reward and punishment.  
For Abū Qurra then, reason leads one to the only true religion, which is Christianity, 
and therefore it should be accepted.  
 
It is also interesting to note that these categories once again correspond to Mu‘tazilite 
concerns; indeed the latter two of the three categories correspond directly to two of 
                                                          
141 Dick, Ignace (ed.) Thawdūrus Abū Qurra, Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq wa-al-dīn al-qawīm, (Jūniyah : 
al-Maktabah al-Būlūsīyah, 1982) and Lamoreaux, J. Theodore Abū Qurrah, (Utah: Brigham Young 
University Press, 2005), 1-25 (for English translation)   
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the five central tenets which came to characterise the Mu‘tazila142. As pointed out 
above, the general inquiry into what human reason can discern about God also 
formed a fundamental backdrop to Mu‘tazilī thinking. However, where Abū Qurra and 
his Christian contemporaries differed significantly is in their basic assumption that 
whilst God is ultimately transcendent, something can be known of Him, as humans 
bear a resemblance to the divine being, albeit a far inferior one. This difference will 
be explored further in Part Two of this study as it is one which all three of these 
Christian authors share, and one which significantly affects the arguments they 
employ in giving proofs for the doctrine of the Trinity.143 
 
The two themes of the relationship between faith and reason and the way to discern 
the true religion form a prelude for Abū Qurra’s explanation of the Trinity. He clearly 
advocates the use of reason in order to determine which religion can claim to be the 
true religion and sets out to show that only the Christian gospels can make this claim. 
As such, Abū Qurra firmly believes that the gospels should be accepted without 
                                                          
142 Al-wa‘d wa al-wa‘īd ﺪﻴﻋﻮﻟا و ﺪﻋﻮﻟا and al-amr b-il-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahī 'an al-munkar  
  ﺮﻜﻨﻤﻟا ﻦﻋ يﻬﻨﻟا و فوﺮﻌﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﺮﻣلأا 
143 Cf. Chapter 5.1. 
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further question, and, as they describe God’s nature as Trinitarian, this should be 
accepted without the need for further rational proofs. This is something which he 
repeatedly emphasises during his explanation of the Trinity in the Mīmar.  
 
2.3. Explanation of the Trinity 
Having laid the groundwork for the rest of his Mīmar, Abū Qurra explains the purpose 
of his work: 
‘…to convince those who have confused minds in regard to the teaching of the 
Christians that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three hypostases (aqānīm) [and] 
one God when they [the Christians] claim that each one of these hypostases is a 
perfect divinity according to itself, because those who are confused say that this 
teaching cannot be so; rather it must be the case that either one of the hypostases 
can be called divine in order that there is [only] one God, or that each one of the 
hypostases is divine and therefore it is said that they are three gods.’144 
 
                                                          
144 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 27.11-16 
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In setting himself this task, Abū Qurra is addressing the main problem his Muslim 
counterparts have with the doctrine. In their minds, it is logically impossible for God, 
who is strictly one and simple, to be considered as three distinct divine aspects 
without attributing division and composition to His nature or implying a plurality of 
divinities and therefore falling into the error of polytheism (shirk). Theodore is aware 
of Islamic objections to the doctrine with which he intends to engage and refute in the 
rest of the work, through the use of scriptural and rational proofs. He does not feel 
the need to explain the term uqnūm, meaning hypostasis, which suggests that both 
his Christian and Muslim readers would have been familiar with its usage.145 
 
Fortunately for modern scholars of Abū Qurra, one of the Melkite theologian’s extant 
writings is his Christian ‘Confession of Faith’, which sets out his fundamental beliefs 
in opposition to the various ‘heresies’ as deemed by several Church councils, and 
which therefore lays out his Trinitarian expression in a non-polemical context, or at 
least a context where his opponents are not directly Muslims. It is therefore worth 
summarising Abū Qurra’s statements on the Trinity, in order to gain an insight into 
                                                          
145 The issue of terminology used to convey the term hypostasis will be addressed in Chapter 5.3. 
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how he understood and expressed the Trinity in Arabic, before looking at his 
explanations and justifications in more Muslim-orientated texts. 
‘I believe in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: three hypostases  
(aqānīm), one nature (ṭabīa‘). Not one hypostasis as Sabellius said, and not three 
natures as Arius said…I do not say that the son is of the substance (jawhar) of the 
Father but the Holy Spirit is not from the substance of these two as Macedonius said. 
Rather I say that the three of them are one substance…Each one of them has an 
essential property (khāṣṣa dhātiya) which does not cease and does not transfer [to 
another member of the Trinity]. For the Father it is being unbegotten; for the Son it is 
being begotten; and for the Holy Spirit it is procession…The three of them are eternal, 
not one of them precedes the others…I recognise each one of them as a perfect 
divinity in his distinctiveness. The three of them are one God, not three gods as the 
wretched Philoponus claims. For their substance is one, and the Son and Spirit are 
related to the Father without composition or intermingling in its hypostasis.’146 
 
This passage is particularly useful as it gives us Theodore’s preferred and accepted 
Arabic terminology for the expression of the Trinity, and therefore provides a useful 
platform from which to investigate the terminology used in his more apologetic works, 
                                                          
146 Dick, Ignace, ed. And trans. ‘Deux écrits inédits de Théodore Abuqurra’, Le Muséon 72, (1959), 
pp.56-57 
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and indeed the works of his Christian contemporaries, which will be examined more 
closely in Chapter 5.3. 
 
 
2.3.1. Scriptural Proofs 
Abū Qurra offers two broad types of evidence in order to support the notion that the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity is the most fitting way to express the nature of the 
Godhead. The first are scriptural proofs. Having already asserted that Christianity is 
the only religion which can claim to be the true religion, Abū Qurra proceeds to give 
some examples from the Bible. He clearly feels that these proofs should be accepted 
if one recognises the validity of his former arguments, which show that both faith and 
reason commend Christianity as the best religion. 
‘We have already affirmed for you in this treatise in part and in other [treatises] in 
summary 147 that it is indeed compulsory for everyone to believe in the Gospel and the 
                                                          
147 Lamoreaux explains that he reads bi-talḥīṣ in order to understand the phrase as ‘…in this treatise in 
brief, elsewhere in detail’, as opposed to bi-talkhīṣ, meaning in summary and therefore being 
synonymous with al-ījāz. This author has not been able to find the term ‘talḥīs’ meaning ‘in detail’: the 
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Law of Moses and what is between them from the books of the prophets. And these 
books which we mentioned we find them mentioning that the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit are one God.’ 148 
 
Within his section concerning biblical evidence, Abū Qurra first puts forward three 
quotations from Psalms to show that when God refers to himself in the third person, 
for example, ‘The Lord said to my Lord…’149, he is actually referring to Himself and 
Christ, thus pointing out that He has an eternal Son. Next he quotes the likes of 
Moses, Noah, Hosea and David to point to out that although God often refers to 
Himself, he is still one God. According to Genesis 9:6 God said to Noah: ‘In the 
image of God I created Adam’ and also in Gen 1:27 it is said: ‘God created man, in 
the image of God He created him’. These two quotations are provided to show that 
although in each instance God is both the one who speaks and the one who is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
closest term with such a meaning would be ‘tamḥīs’, which seems less likely than bi-talkhīṣ, in terms of 
a scribal error.  
148 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 27.17-20 
149 Ps.110:1 
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referred to, He is not counted as two gods. Theodore adds a number of similar 
quotations to the same effect. 
  
Abū Qurra then uses quotes from John 1:1 ‘In the beginning was the Word and the 
Word was with God and the Word was God…’ and Job 33:4, ‘The Spirit of God 
created me’, to clarify that once again God is counting His Word and Spirit as being 
God and with God but that this does not imply multiple gods. Finally Abū Qurra gives 
the baptismal formula as found in Matthew 28:19, thus leading the reader to the 
Trinitarian nature of God, as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as revealed by the Old and 
New Testaments. Once again he emphasises the fact that the scriptures alone are 
enough evidence to prove a Trinitarian Godhead. 
‘As for the Christian community, we praise Christ who alerted our minds to have good 
faith and guided us to believe in the Holy Books. It would have been sufficient for us 
to believe that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God and each one of them is 
God, as was testified for us by the Holy Books, even if we did not see in these 
matters anything that verifies for us what we have believed according to the realm of 
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intellect. How would the testimony of the scriptures not be sufficient for us? The 
implementation of the intellect has no purpose except to convince others.’150  
 
Once again, Abū Qurra has stressed the fact that biblical evidence alone should be 
enough prove the Trinitarian nature of God, on the basis that Christianity has already 
been proven to be the true religion and so the truth of its scriptures has also been 
proven.  
 
 
2.3.2. Rational Analogies 
Having given a number of biblical passages which point to the Trinitarian nature of 
God, Abū Qurra then turns to rational proofs, presumably in order to strengthen his 
argument for those who do not accept Christian scriptures. He begins with an 
argument, based on Aristotle’s unity of species151, in which he explains the unity of 
                                                          
150 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 47.12-16. The word ‘nā’ (us) the end of this 
passage is read in a generic sense meaning ‘others’ in order to convey the sense of the paragraph. 
151 Aristotle identified five types of unity whereby something could be indivisible (and therefore one) in 
one respect, and at the same time divisible (and therefore many) in another respect.  His categories 
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the Godhead as one ‘nature’ (ṭabī‘a) and three ‘persons’ (wujūh), giving illustrative 
examples based on the temporal world. An example of nature, he tells the reader, 
would be that of ‘man’, where ‘Peter’ would be an example of a person. The 
fundamental difference between the two categories is that number may be predicated 
of person but not of nature. In the example given, therefore, one could refer to Peter, 
James and John as three persons with a single nature, ‘man’, but one could not 
logically refer to ‘three mans’. In the same way, Abū Qurra continues, the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit may be referred to as ‘three persons’ with a single nature which is 
‘God’, but not as ‘three Gods’.  
‘Likewise know that the Father is a God but God is not the Father. And the Son is 
God but God, in person, since the term God indicates the nature,152 is not the Son. 
And the Holy Spirit is God but God is not the Spirit, so if you were to count the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit then you ought not to attach number to the name of God so that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
included; one by accident, one by continuity, unity of substratum, unity of genus and unity of species.  
For Aristotle, it seems, the latter three categories were to some degree interchangeable and it is the 
‘unity of species’ which most Christian philosophers seemed to accept as most suitable. The ‘unity of 
species’ allowed that two individuals of the same species could be described as one in the sense that 
they are both ‘humans’ for example.  The example Aristotle gave is that of Socrates and Plato being 
described as one category, that of ‘rational animal’. 
152 Lamoreaux removes the phrase ‘fi wajh idh ism al-ilāh dalīl ‘alā al-ṭabī‘a’ as it appears to be added 
in by a later hand as further clarification.  
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you would say three Gods. Otherwise you have attached number to what cannot be 
numbered. You ought [instead] to count three persons as one God, because ‘person’ 
is a logical name (ism mantiqī) and it is not constant (bi-thābit), nor does it belong to 
[only] one of them. The name ‘person’ belongs to the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit and every one of the angels and humans and animals and other connected 
beings (ghayr al-munfaṣilāt). The logical name was brought in so that one can apply 
number to it because it is incorrect for number to be applied to their common name 
that is associated with their constant nature, so that it does not follow from this that 
there are different natures, as we have said previously.’153     
 
With this explanation, Abū Qurra is taking the conception of the unity of species and 
attempting to further explain how something can be said both to be ‘one’ and ‘three’. 
He distinguishes here between ‘common name’ and ‘logical name’. The former he 
explains, refers to the nature of something, for example, ‘man’ as illustrated above, to 
which number cannot be predicated, whilst the latter refers to the ‘person’ such as 
‘Peter’ or ‘John’, to which number may be predicated. In terms of the Godhead then, 
                                                          
153 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 34.16- 35.5 
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God as ‘nature’ can only be conceived of as one, whereas his hypostases, which fall 
into the category of ‘logical names’, may be considered three. 
 
The analogy of three individual men sharing a common nature, he acknowledges, is 
not a perfect one. Human beings are separated in space and into distinctive forms 
and have differing wills and states, whereas the Father, Son and Holy Spirit do not 
differ in any of these respects. A more fitting analogy, Abū Qurra feels, is that of three 
lamps in a house, which fill a house with light so that the three rays of light emitted 
from them are indistinguishable.154 He then gives two similar examples of three voices reciting a single poem  
and three pieces of gold being referred to as a singular noun ‘gold’ as opposed to 
‘golds’. Being careful to emphasise the incomparability of Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
with such created entities and temporal analogies, Abū Qurra nevertheless clearly 
feels that such analogies are useful in order to help human minds understand the 
Trinitarian nature of God. 
                                                          
154 This analogy is one also favoured by Abū Rā’iṭa. 
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‘And this should be a sufficient indication that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
ought not to be spoken of as three gods, even though each one of them is a perfect 
divinity. Indeed Christianity is crowned [the victor] in its teaching that the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit are one God even though each one of them is a perfect divinity; and 
this is testified by the revealed books and by proper intellect through the employment 
of analogy in the correct manner to things according to how they resemble Him in the 
state in which it resembles Him.’’155   
 
The use of analogy in describing the nature of God is an interesting phenomenon in 
Christian Arabic texts of this period. In some ways, it is very unremarkable, as 
Christians are told in the very first book of the Bible that ‘God created man in His own 
image’ (Gen. 1:27), thus allowing some link between God and his creation. As such, 
Trinitarian analogies are a very traditional Christian tool, found in the earliest 
Christian works concerning the Trinity. They were frequently employed by the 
Cappadocian Fathers, who had much to do with developing and refining the doctrine 
into its widely accepted form. They were also a source of influence for John of 
                                                          
155 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 37 6-11 
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Damascus, and therefore almost certainly for Abū Qurra too. Indeed, Abū Qurra not 
only uses Trinitarian analogies, as will be discussed below, but appears to employ 
analogy and metaphor frequently and almost instinctively, an example being the 
opening to his Mīmar concerning types of faith.156   In the Islamic context, and particularly in 
the Mu‘tazilī school of thought, the use of temporal analogy would have been 
completely rejected due to the strong desire to protect the transcendence of God. 
That said, reasoning by analogy (qiyās), was a process used by Muslim legal 
scholars in order to make judgements about new situations based on the teachings 
of the Qur’an and the Hadith. It is possible therefore, that Abū Qurra felt the use of 
such reasoning would be the most effective way of showing that there is no 
necessary contradiction in the doctrine, rather than to actually attempt to prove the 
truth of it. The use of analogy to explain the doctrine of the Trinity in an Islamic 
context will be considered in Chapter Five of this study, as they relate to all of the 
Christian authors examined.157 
                                                          
156 Cf. 93-94.  
157 For a fuller discussion of the use of analogy and metaphor by all three Christian authors studied 
here, see chapter 5.1. 
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2.3.3. Attributes of God   
In his treatise entitled wujūd al-khāliq, Theodore Abū Qurra includes a section on 
how one can infer the attributes of God from the virtues of Adam. Beginning with a 
metaphor of a man and his reflection in a mirror, Theodore points out that a man only 
sees his face through its likeness in the mirror and can know what it looks like, even 
though the likeness is only a representation. The face of the man, meanwhile, is 
superior to the reflection and unlike it in that it actually exists. 
 
Using this analogy as a way of introducing the idea of resemblance between man 
and God, Abū Qurra begins by explaining that Adam’s attributes, and therefore 
presumably all human attributes, come in pairs. 
‘To the nature of Adam belong virtues and imperfections. In the case of Adam in his 
nature, today he exists and tomorrow he does not exist, and he is also living and 
dead, knowing and ignorant, wise and unwise, powerful and weak. And all of his 
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attributes (ṣifātihi) are like this in pairs, those which are virtues and those which are 
imperfections.’158 
 
God, however, Abū Qurra is quick to point out, has no imperfections. It is only in 
terms of virtue that Adam resembles Him. From this basis, Abū Qurra lists a number 
of virtues which we can see in Adam and from which we can infer something about 
the nature of God, although he always repeats that God ‘is raised up away from it [a 
given attribute] in dissimilarity’ (yartafa‘ ‘anihi/ha bi-l-khillāf). The attributes he refers 
to are: existence, life, knowledge, wisdom, seeing, hearing, power, goodness, favour, 
righteousness, patience, mercy, tolerance, forgiving, and justness. For each one,  
Abū Qurra’s argument takes the same format. Taking knowledge as an example, he 
says: 
‘And likewise we see that Adam is knowing so we say: that Adam was knowing, so 
whomever he comes from is without a doubt knowing. And from Adam being 
knowing, we perceive that God is Knowing. But the Knowledge of God is not like the 
knowledge of Adam, rather it is raised above it and is dissimilar, because the 
                                                          
158 Dick, Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq, 220, section 9 
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knowledge of Adam is from his senses or from someone who taught him. And he did 
not know what went before him nor whatever was in front of him, and not much of 
what was in his hands.’159  
 
The list of attributes given clearly reflects Islamic thought in that the list almost 
mirrors those given by a number of Muslim sects and schools. In particular, 
knowledge, power, life, hearing, seeing and wisdom were the most common 
attributes referred to by Muslim scholars of the period.160  
 
The first three attributes Abū Qurra discusses, and indeed only attributes which he 
discusses in full, are existence, life and knowledge. For those familiar with the 
explanations of the Trinity put forward by his Christian contemporaries, two of whom 
will be explored in Chapters Three and Four, this apparent singling out of three 
attributes might lead the reader to think that Abū Qurra has deliberately highlighted 
                                                          
159 ibid., 222 section 17 and 18 
160 According to al-Ash‘arī, this is largely true of the Rafidites, the Zaydis, and most of the Mu‘tazila; to 
name but a few sects, although they are all seen to differ over the meaning of these attributes and 
how they relate to God. Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt. 
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them, as a prelude to likening them to the hypostases of God. Indeed, as will be 
seen, his contemporaries refer to such attributes in order to draw a parallel with the 
Trinity. However, any suspicion that this is Abū Qurra’s intention is halted  in the next 
section where he goes on to discuss three other ‘more noble virtues’: 
Likewise Adam has other more noble virtues which are in God… I mean begetting 
and procession161 and headship. 
 
In a similar line of argument, Abū Qurra infers that because Adam begot something 
resembling himself and that something proceeded from him, over both of which he is 
head; then the one who created him must also possess these attributes. Again, Abū 
Qurra is careful to point out the differences. For Adam, the begetting of a son took 
place through intercourse with a woman, the procession of Eve from his bone 
resulted in a decrease in him, and he preceded both Eve and his son in time. None of 
                                                          
161 The word ‘inbithāq’ appears in Dick’s Arabic but not Lamoreaux’s English translation. However, 
Lamoreaux does use ‘proceeding’ in the next sentence and so it was either not present in the 
manuscript he consulted or has been accidentally omitted, or has been added by Dick. Later, in 
section 30 of Dick’s edition, Abū Qurra uses the phrase ‘begetting and headship’ twice without 
‘procession’- though this makes sense as most of time he refers to the Father and the Son, often the 
inclusion of the Holy Spirit is implied. Cf. Dick, Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq, 224 section 24 and 
Lamoreaux, Theodore Abū Qurrah, 12 
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these things apply to the Godhead: the Son was begotten without need of a partner; 
no decrease occurred to God in either the begetting of the Son or the procession of 
the Holy Spirit; and has no temporal precedence over the Son or Spirit. 
 
Begetting and headship are regarded by Abū Qurra as the ‘best of virtues’ (afḍal al-
fawāḍil), without them, he claims, Adam would not have had the pleasure of life or 
headship. He would be reduced to the same level as beasts and his attribute of 
speech would therefore be unnecessary. Indeed, Abū Qurra argues, none of his 
virtues would be classed as virtues if he did not have someone who resembled him. 
Therefore, the virtue of begetting, on which all other virtues rely,162 must be a virtue 
which God Himself possesses. If not, Abū Qurra tells us, Adam would be better than 
God in that he would have two virtues that God did not: begetting and headship, 
which is clearly absurd. Continuing to add weight to his argument, Abū Qurra 
reasons that if Adam were the head of one like himself, then God could not merely be 
the head of His creation, but must be head of one resembling Him, namely Christ. 
                                                          
162 ‘Ammār makes a similar argument concerning attributes relying on or deriving from the two 
attributes of Life and Speech. 
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Adam would not have been content with being the head of creation without one like 
himself, for that would make him head of beasts and insects. Moreover, the distance 
and difference between God and humans, who share nothing in common, is so much 
more than between humans and animals, who share the nature of being living, so 
God cannot simply be head of creation alone. 
He concludes: 
‘Therefore, from what intellect [can] deduce from the resemblance of Adam’s nature, 
God is three persons: Begetter, Begotten and one who Proceeds.’163 
   
This argument, using the virtues of Adam to determine the attributes of God, is one 
which appears to be unique to Theodore Abū Qurra. Once again, Abū Qurra leads 
the reader to the concept of a Trinitarian God by beginning with a discussion of His 
divine attributes, and it is perhaps significant that he never uses the term hypostases, 
even after moving away from the concepts of divine attributes and introducing the 
distinctly Christian notions of begetting, headship and procession.  He then continues 
to explain the relative unity of the persons of the Trinity in a traditional Christian 
                                                          
163 Dick, Ignace (ed.) Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq, 228, section 41 
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manner, that is to say that the three persons are distinguished only by the nature of 
relationship to one another as the one who begets, the one who is begotten and the 
one who proceeds.  
 
This argument can also be found, in part, in his treatise On the way of knowing God. 
Here he argues again that God must be able to beget one like Himself, otherwise He 
has a major imperfection. Abū Qurra also expands on the difference between man 
and God in terms of temporal precedence. A human father precedes his son in time 
only because of an imperfection in humans, that is to say humans are begotten in an 
incomplete state; they are not able immediately to beget another until they have 
matured. God however, does not have this inability or imperfection and so begot His 
Son from eternity, and therefore does not come before Him in time. 
 
This work, the wujūd al-khāliq, is one of Abū Qurra’s few almost completely rational 
treatises in which he seeks to give reasoned proofs as to the Trinitarian nature of 
God. In terms of leading the reader to this nature of God, he employs a clever and 
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inventive scheme which uses logical proofs to show what can be inferred about the 
nature of God, which is that he has a number of virtues or attributes, of which the 
three most important are begetting, headship, and procession, which highlights the 
Trinitarian nature of God in accordance with Christian scriptures. Yet, in terms of 
Christian-Muslim exchange and the potential Muslim element of his readership,164 it 
is worth noting that all of his arguments are based on the acceptance of man’s 
resemblance to God, which, as has been mentioned, is something which would have 
been unacceptable to the majority of Muslims.  
 
Moreover, the three attributes which Abū Qurra identifies as being the best of virtues 
are very much Christian attributes which relate specifically to the doctrine of the 
Trinity and so draws away from Islamic thought at this point. This, as will be seen in 
due course, is unlike his the approach of his contemporaries, who go further in terms 
of likening divine attributes which feature in Islamic thought to the three persons or 
hypostases of the Trinity.  
                                                          
164 The question of audience is addressed in more detail in Chapter Six. 
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2.4. Response to Muslim Questions 
Aside from his discussion of the attributes of God in his wujūd al-khāliq, Abū Qurra 
also engages with his Muslim counterparts by answering hypothetical questions put 
to him by those to whom he refers as having ‘no intellect.’165 In the Mīmar, after 
giving proofs from both scripture and reason, Abū Qurra turns to deal with the 
question of whether one being or three beings created the world. The question 
evidently stems from the fundamental inability to understand how something can be 
said to be simultaneously one and three, which we know was an issue for the Muslim 
thinkers who engaged with Christian thought.  Abū Qurra explains: 
‘If you say three created the world, they find this repulsive. If you say that one created 
the world, they consider that the other two hypostases (uqnūmayn) to be 
invalidated.’166 
 
Once again, the lack of translation or explanation of the term uqnūm would suggest 
that Abū Qurra’s audience were familiar with the Syriac concept which is used by all 
                                                          
165 This could equally refer to Jews as well as Muslims, since both have issues with the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 
166 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 37.13-14 
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three of the Christian authors who appear in this study and which will be explored 
further in Chapter Five. The term also appears in a number of the extant Muslim 
sources we have from a later period.167 Moreover, the fact that Abū Qurra, who came 
from a Greek liturgical and theological background, uses a Syriac term as opposed to 
a Greek or Arabic one, supports the notion that the term uqnūm was common 
currency as regards discussions concerning the Trinity.  
 
In the above quotation Abū Qurra is showing awareness of the Muslim disdain for the 
doctrine of the Trinity and their inability to understand how God can be spoken of as 
one when He also has distinct hypostases. In order to address this 
misunderstanding, Theodore once again launches into a series of temporal analogies 
to clarify how the Christian expression of only one God creating is not contradictory 
to saying that the Father, Son or Holy Spirit created. Taking the example of the 
prophet Moses, Abū Qurra points out that it is possible to say “The prophet Moses 
                                                          
167 The term ‘uqnūm’ is acknowledged in most extant Muslim sources dealing with the Trinity in the 
ninth century, such as Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” (Thomas Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s 
“Against the Trinity” ), al-Nāshi’ al-Akbar’s “Refutation of the Christians” (Thomas, Christian doctrines 
in Islamic theology) and Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī’s refutation of the Christians, as preserved by the Jacobite 
Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī. (Périer, A. ‘Un traité de Yaḥyā ben ‘Adī’) 
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spoke the truth” and possible to say “The tongue of the prophet Moses spoke the 
truth”. However, one cannot logically say “The prophet Moses and his tongue spoke 
the truth”, as Moses spoke through his tongue, i.e. not separately from it.168 He uses 
further examples including the sun and its rays; a person and their eye; and fire and 
its heat. Fire can be said to burn a person, and the heat of a fire can be said to burn 
a person, but one cannot say “The fire and its heat burnt me” because fire burns a 
person through its heat.  
‘You say that the heat of the fire burnt me and you say that the fire burnt me but you 
do not say that the fire and its heat burnt me because the fire does not burn except 
with its heat.’169 
 
In a similar way, one can say that “The Father created the world” and that “the Son 
created the world”, but not “The Father and the Son created the world”, because the 
Father creates through the Son.170 The rest of his argument concerning this question, 
posed by real or hypothetical opponents, is rather long-winded, as will be seen, but is 
                                                          
168 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 37  
169 Ibid., 38.19-20 
170 Ibid., 38 
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designed to prove the above statements about the Father and Son (and later on the 
Holy Spirit); that individually either one can be said to act, but not together. Here, Abū 
Qurra uses terms common the discourse of Arabic grammar, one of the oldest 
Islamic sciences, explaining the inability to logically say, for instance, that both the 
heat and the fire burnt me’ in terms of the construct phrase in Arabic (al-iḍāfa). His 
argument is that if one refers to ‘the heat of the fire’, it makes no sense to say that 
both the noun which is annexed in the phrase (i.e. ‘heat’), and the noun to which 
‘heat’ is annexed (i.e. ‘fire’) do something together, even though each individual 
element can be said to do it separately (‘the heat burnt me’, ‘the fire burnt me’) or as 
a construct phrase (‘the heat of the fire burnt me’). In the same way, both the Father 
and Son cannot be said to create together as Father and Son, which implies multiple 
gods, but one can say that ‘the Father creates’ or that ‘the Son creates’ or that ‘the 
Father creates through the Son’ which by implication might literally be expressed as 
a construct phrase “the Son of the Father”. The use of Arabic grammatical categories 
may well have been a bid on Abū Qurra’s part to express the relationship of the 
hypostases in logical terms which a Muslim opponent may more readily understand. 
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Having used the heat analogy to introduce the relationship of the hypostases, Abū 
Qurra explains further: 
‘We are not of the opinion that the heat is more related to the fire than the Son is 
related to the Father nor that the heat is more connected to the fire than the Son is to 
the Father and as each one of them [Father and Son] is a hypostasis, because the 
divine nature does not accept composition as bodies do. Nor is there matter and form 
in them [the hypostases] and one does not find difference (ghayriyya) in a certain 
hypostasis from among them. But the position of the Son [in relation to] the Father is 
the same as the position of the heat of the fire [in relation to] the fire and the ray to 
the sun and the word to the mind, though the Son is a complete hypostasis, because 
the divine nature is too refined to have difference in terms of its hypostases.’171  
 
The relationship of the Son to the Father, therefore, is like that of heat to fire, but not 
identical as the Son, unlike the heat is a full hypostasis (and so fully God), as the 
divine nature is not subject to composition or change. This statement, that God is not 
a body and therefore not subject to division, composition or change, is one which is 
                                                          
171 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 39.2-9 
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confirmed in both the Christian and Muslim tradition, and which was emphasised 
particularly by the Mu‘tazila in their desire to protect the transcendence and simplicity 
of the divine Being. 
 
In order to solidify his argument concerning the relationship of the hypostases to one 
another and the Godhead, Abū Qurra cites biblical passages taken from the words of 
St. Paul and St. John which refer to the Son using various metaphors such as the 
‘Light’, ‘Wisdom’ and ‘Power’ and ‘Word’ of God, something which John of Damascus 
also does in his Exposition.172 and offers an explanation for why these names were 
used: 
 ‘And John the evangelist has called him “Word” when he said that in the beginning 
there was the Word, and the Word was with God. Why did the two theologians refer 
to him with these names? It was not because he [Christ] is not a hypostasis and a 
perfect divinity. Rather it was to teach the people that, in the same way as it is not 
said that the annexed noun and the noun to which annexation is made [i.e. the two 
nouns in a construct phrase such as ‘heat’ and ‘fire’] are [both] said to have done 
                                                          
172 John of Damascus, Exposition, 14-15 
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something, even though each one can be said to do it by itself, so too are the Father 
and Son not said to create [together], even if each can be said to create by 
Himself.’173 
 
Such metaphors, Abū Qurra claims, were used simply to help people understand this 
fundamental concept of two related entities and what can be said about their actions. 
Abū Qurra is quick to add, however, that theologians such as John and Paul were 
concerned that conceiving of the godhead in such a manner would imply that the Son 
were not a complete hypostasis or not fully God in the same way as the Father. For 
this reason, they also referred to the Son, in places, as God.174 In doing this, Abū 
Qurra implies, those such as Paul and John were referring to the divine nature of the 
Son which is common to all the hypostases. Therefore if one refers to the divine 
                                                          
173 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 39.15-18. The term ‘annexed noun’ (al-muḍāfa) is 
a grammatical term referring to what is also known in terms of Arabic grammar as the construct phrase 
(iḍāfa), which refers to possessive phrases such as ‘the heat of the fire’ or ‘the light of the sun’. Abū 
Qurra appears to be likening the relationship of the Son to the Father (or put differently ‘the Son of the 
Father’) to the relationship between the two nouns in a construct phrase. This may reflect an 
awareness on the part of Abū Qurra, whether conscious or subconscious, of the importance of 
grammatical science in Arabic, especially in the realm of Qur’anic exegesis. This, however, given the 
brevity of the reference, can be little more than speculation. 
174 Cf. John 1:1 and Rom. 9:5 
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nature, it not only preserves the simple and non-composite nature of God, but also 
removes the need to say ‘the Father and Son created.’ The Holy Spirit, Abū Qurra 
explains, is similar to the Son in that he is annexed to the Father in a similar way and 
yet also a full hypostasis. 
 
In summary, Theodore lays out the teachings of the Church with respect to the 
nature of the Godhead. The point of his fairly convoluted argument, it would seem, is 
to show that each of the hypostases is fully God, even though the Son and Holy Spirit 
are annexed hypostatically to the Father and that, at the same time, the three 
hypostases are all one God. Christians use analogies to help people understand, but 
in reality, analogies are not a perfect representation of the relationship between the 
hypostases, which are unlike anything temporal. One of Theodore’s main concerns, it 
seems, is to show that where apparent contradictions appear in the Bible, they can 
be explained rationally, without affecting the Christian conception of God.  
 
129 
 
The second question from those with ‘no intellect’ is of a similar nature and once 
again guided by the inability to understand how Father, Son and Holy Spirit can be 
one God. A question is put to the Christians, asking whether they deny every God 
other than the Father; or every God other than the Son; or every God other than the 
Holy Spirit. The suggestion is that if a Christian were to answer that he denies every 
God other than the Father, then the Son and Holy Spirit must not be God, or, if he 
were to reply that he does not deny every God other than the Father, then he must 
affirm multiple Gods.175 
 
Abu Qurra dismisses the question as crass. The analogy he uses to demonstrate this 
crassness is that of a person having a gospel placed in front of them and being 
asked if they believe in that gospel. When they say yes, they are then asked whether 
they deny all other gospels, to which they also reply yes, even though there many 
copies in the world. The implication is that it is permissible to deny every other 
gospel, as one is not referring to the individual copy of the gospel which sits before 
                                                          
175 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 42 
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them, but to the substantial nature (jawhariyya) of the ‘gospel’, which is one and the 
same for all copies. In a similar vein, if one were to talk about denying Gods other 
than Christ, they would not be referring to His hypostasis, but to His nature (ṭabī’a), 
which is ‘God’.176 Theodore once again supplements his explanation with more 
illustrative analogies, this time of a person’s image in three different mirrors, or as 
drawn on three pieces of paper.  
 
Having answered the two questions put to him, Abū Qurra turns the tables, so to 
speak, and addresses a question to those who ‘deny the Son and Spirit out of fear of 
believing in three Gods’177 and asks them directly ‘Does God have a Word?’ 178 Abū 
Qurra concludes immediately that if his interlocutor says no, then he would be 
making God mute and a lesser being than humans, therefore they must say yes.  He 
                                                          
176 ibid. It is interesting that Theodore uses jawhariyya to speak of the temporal substance of the 
gospel but uses tabi‘a for the substance (ousia) of God. The use of terminology relating to God is 
explored in Chapter 5.2. 
177 Once again this would appear to be a reference to the Muslims but in theory could also be aimed at 
the Jews. 
178 ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī asks a similar question of his Mu‘tazilī reader in his k. al burhān. Cf. Chapter 4.2.1. 
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then moves onto a follow up question: is the Word of God a part of God?179 If his 
opponent replies that God’s Word is a part of God then he allows composition in 
God’s nature, which he knows the Muslims will not allow. Therefore his opponent is 
forced to make God’s Word a full hypostasis, with the same being said about His 
Spirit. This is a very concise argument. Both Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī ask 
similar questions of their Muslim counterparts, but go into much more detail, as will 
be seen in the following chapters. Abū Qurra either shows little awareness or 
acknowledgement of the intricacies of Mu‘tazilī teachings concerning the ‘word’ or 
‘speech’ of God, or assumes that his reader will follow the argument without detailed 
explanation.  He makes no attempt to justify why, in the Muslim intellectual context, 
Word and Spirit should be accepted as hypostases and not other of God’s divine 
attributes.180 It may be that he has engaged in this argument in more detail 
elsewhere, although he does not say this and does not appear to do so in any other 
of his extant works. Another possibility is that he has borrowed the argument in an 
                                                          
179 This is a question which Abū Rā’iṭa asks in his al-Risāla al-ūlā but as part of a much longer, more 
detailed argument than Abū Qurra. Cf. Chapter 3, 175 
180 John of Damascus alludes to the argument that God must have a Word and Spirit in chapter 100 of 
De Haeresibus, as so does Timothy I in his debate with al-Maḥdī. For them it is obvious that He must 
have. 
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abbreviated form, though this is probably unlikely due to the concise nature of it, and 
the fact that similar but not identical arguments appear in the works of Abū Rā’iṭa and 
‘Ammār, which makes it likely that it is a common one.  
 
 Abū Qurra then re-iterates that God and his Word and Spirit are one and likens it to 
a human being and word his and spirit being one person, although he is careful to 
point out that God is far above human beings in His transcendence.181 The final issue 
Theodore deals with is biblical passages which refer metaphorically to the Son and 
Holy Spirit as body parts of God, the Son being referred to as ‘ the right hand of God’ 
and the ‘Holy arm of God’, for example, and the Spirit as the ‘finger of God’. Abū 
Qurra explains that there are lots of other names like this in scriptures which help 
people to understand that the God and His Son and Spirit are one God, much like a 
person and his arm and finger is one person, although the two are not fully 
                                                          
181 This analogy is attacked by al-Baqīllānī and 'Abd al-Jabbār among others. See: Thomas, Christian 
Doctrines. 
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comparable as ‘the divine nature is exalted above division, composition and other 
such things’.182 
 
In his conclusion of his Mīmar, Abū Qurra tells his reader, be he one ‘who believes in 
the Torah’, one ‘who believes in both the Torah and the gospel as well the books that 
stand between these’ or one ‘who does not believe in the Old and New Testaments 
which are in the hands of the Christians, those who reject and disregard faith’ that 
they should accept the Trinitarian nature of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
Theodore directs the latter group, presumably his Muslim audience, to the beginning 
of the treatise, whereby his rational proofs for the acceptance of Christianity as the 
true religion should lead his readers to accept Christianity and therefore Christian 
doctrine, which is attested to in the scriptures. 
 
 
 
                                                          
182 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 45.16-17  
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2.5. Discussion: Theodore Abū Qurra’s understanding of the nature of God 
From his works relating to the doctrine of the Trinity it is clear that Theodore Abū 
Qurra understood the nature of God in a traditional Christian sense. For him, God is 
one nature and three hypostases named Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who share a 
relative unity based on their relationship to one another as ‘begetter’, ‘begotten’ and 
the one who ‘proceeds’, which is a prominent feature of Cappadocian thinking. Both 
his Trinity specific treatise, the Mīmar, and the short section relating to the Trinity in 
the wujūd al-khāliq, confirm Abū Qurra’s position. The former aims to show that the 
concept of the Trinity is not inherently contradictory and that three hypostases can be 
one God without implying multiplicity in the Godhead, whilst the latter is concerned 
with showing rationally that God’s most noble attributes are begetting and headship, 
leading to the acceptance of the doctrine of Trinity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit as 
described above. In addition, Abū Qurra’s confession of faith in Arabic gives a clear 
insight into the terminological expression of his Christian beliefs in a non-polemical 
context.  
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Theodore Abū Qurra’s whole approach to the explanation of the Trinity is rooted in 
the truth of Christian scriptures, along with the teachings of the Fathers and edicts of 
the Church councils. To his mind, since the truth of Christian scriptures has been 
verified, biblical proofs which point to the divine being as Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
should be enough to persuade anyone of God’s Trinitarian nature. As a prelude to his 
explanation of the doctrine, therefore, Abū Qurra discusses the relationship between 
faith and reason, and briefly sets out his rational criteria through which one can 
determine which religion can claim to be the true religion. This is a theme which 
appears repeatedly in Theodore’s works, and is set out in much more detail in his  
wujūd al-khāliq.  
 
Abū Qurra appears to believe, or at least implies that he believes, that if one uses his 
own intellect, and Abū Qurra’s criteria, in order to ascertain ‘the true religion’ then 
one must conclude that Christianity is the true religion and therefore unreservedly 
accept its scriptures. This is something which he emphasises repeatedly in his 
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Mīmar, before agreeing to give rational proofs alongside biblical ones, for those who 
refuse to accept Christian scriptures. 
 
The biblical passages which Theodore chooses to quote towards the beginning of his 
treatise are all designed to show how God is one, despite Him referring to Himself 
when He speaks, or being referred to by different names. He then turns to rational 
proofs in order to explain the Trinitarian aspect of the nature of God. Abū Qurra 
begins this section with a discussion of names referring to individuals and names 
referring to natures, an argument which is based on the Aristotelian concept of the 
unity of species. In this way, Abū Qurra shows how three individuals can share a 
common nature, which, by analogy, can be likened to the nature of God. He uses a 
number of Trinitarian analogies, most of which can be traced back to the early 
Church Fathers, and which will be examined more closely in chapter five. In defining 
his categories of ‘nature’ and ‘person’, Abū Qurra uses terms relating to Arabic 
grammar in order to further clarify the relationship of the three hypostases and 
demonstrate that they are not three separate divinities. 
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The other major facet of Abū Qurra’s rational approach to the nature of God concerns 
the divine attributes of God, which tell us about His nature. In dealing with this topic, 
it appears that Abū Qurra is aware of Muslim teaching concerning the divine 
attributes, as he gives a list of attributes which sound very much like those given by 
Muslim sects of the period.183 However, the basis of his whole discussion of the 
attributes is that there is a resemblance between man and God, as God’s attributes 
are to be inferred from the virtues of man. The logic behind this is that man could not 
possess a quality which the one who created him does not possess. Moreover, Abū 
Qurra maintains that the best of these virtues seen in Adam are those of begetting 
and headship, and that the fact that Adam begot a son like himself, and that Eve 
proceeded from his bone points to the Trinitarian nature of God as one who begets, 
one who is begotten and one who proceeds. Although Abū Qurra is careful to stress 
the perfection and ultimate transcendence of God regularly throughout his works, he 
seems to be very much at ease with the use of temporal analogy and the concept of 
resemblance between God and man, despite the deep dislike of it within the 
                                                          
183 The “Attribute-apology” of each author forms the subject of Chapter 5.5. 
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dominant strand of Muslim thought during this period. This issue will be discussed 
further in part two of this thesis. 
 
Whether or not Muslims formed the main component of Abū Qurra’s audience, it is 
clear that his explanation of the Trinitarian nature of God would have been written in 
response to direct or indirect Muslim pressures and questions concerning the 
doctrine. Indeed, Theodore’s engagement with Islamic thought can be detected 
throughout his works, not only in the questions he responds to, but in terms of the 
language he uses and strands of thought to which he alludes. One of the most overt 
instances in which Abū Qurra can be seen to engage with Muslim thinking, is when 
he refers to those ‘who deny the Son and the Spirit for fear of believing in three 
gods’, whom he then challenges by asking them whether they say that God has a 
Word.  
Abū Qurra then goes on to force his opponents to admit the Word and Spirit as 
complete hypostases, through a brief series of questions in a style similar to that of 
kalām dialectical reasoning. 
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However, there is also an argument to be made for how little Abū Qurra engages with 
Islamic thought in terms of his explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity. He does not 
explain any of his Trinitarian terms such as ‘nature’, ‘person’ or ‘hypostasis’; he relies 
heavily on biblical proofs which would most likely be dismissed by his Muslim 
counterpart with the accusation of tahrīf; and he bases many of his explanations and 
arguments on a premise that would be fundamentally unacceptable to most Muslims: 
the resemblance of God to His creation, which is promoted through his almost 
unceasing use of metaphor and analogy to aid his explanation of the doctrine. 
Although he makes mention of God’s attributes and gives a Muslim-sounding list, 
Theodore never really engages with the concept of particular divine attributes 
referred to by Muslims and their potential comparability with the hypostases as the 
other two Christian authors of this study will be seen to do. His questioning of those 
who are afraid of falling into the error of believing in three Gods, while it touches on 
the divine attributes debate and stylistically echoes kalām methodology, is incredibly 
brief and concise and does not engage with the Muslim (particularly Mu‘tazilī) thought 
in anywhere near the detail that his two contemporaries, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār al-
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Baṣrī, do. This question of how far each author engages with Muslim thinking will be 
addressed in more detail in Chapter Six of this study. 
 
Abū Qurra, therefore, uses a combination of biblical and rational proofs, in an attempt 
to demonstrate the reasonableness of the doctrine of the Trinity. His aim, it would 
seem, is not to prove the truth of the doctrine, which is already proven by Christian 
scripture, but to express it clearly in Arabic for what appears to be both a Christian 
and Muslim audience.184 His works relating to the Trinity, of course, naturally have an 
apologetic tone, and do respond to some of the questions his Muslim opponents are 
asking, using Muslim concepts and language where he feels they aid his explanation. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Melkite theologian’s central concern is his scheme 
for discerning the true religion, which can be ascertained from both the number of his 
works which deal with this topic and his repeated argument in his Mīmar, that the 
doctrine of the Trinity should be accepted on the basis that he has logically shown 
Christianity to be the true religion,. As a result it would seem, Abū Qurra’s 
                                                          
184 The question of audience will be examined further in Chapter Six. 
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explanation of the Trinity itself is a fairly traditional one, relying heavily on biblical 
proofs and Trinitarian analogies, with a relatively limited engagement with Muslim 
thinking in comparison to his two contemporaries who will be examined shortly.  
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CHAPTER 3: ABŪ RĀ’ITA AL-TAKRĪTĪ (C.755-c. 835) 
 
3.1. Background 
3.1.1. Biography 
‘Habīb ibn Khidma Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī the Jacobite’, as he refers to himself in the title of his 
Refutation of the Melkites,185 is a man about whom little is known. From his name we can 
infer that he came from the Christian town of Takrīt, situated around 140 kilometres 
northwest of Baghdad on the Tigris River. Abū Rā’iṭa’s dates can be established primarily 
through two recorded events which make reference to him. The first is found in the prefatory 
comments of his Refutation mentioned above, in which we are told that he was called to the 
court of the Armenian Prince Ashūt Msaker around 815186 to argue against the Melkite, 
Theodore Abū Qurra, on behalf of the Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) Church.  Abū Rā’iṭa 
responded by sending Nonnus, deacon of Nisibis and his relative, in his place. The second 
reference is found in a text by Michael the Syrian who refers to both Abū Rā’iṭa and Nonnus 
                                                          
185 Abū Rā’iṭa, Die Schriften des Jacobiten. 
186 Haddad, Rachid.  La Trinité divine chez les theologiens arabes: 750-1050 (Beauchesne: 
Beauchesne, 1985), 55 
143 
 
of Nisibis in connection with a synod held in 828.187 These two dates therefore put his period 
of activity in the early ninth century, along with Abū Qurra and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. There is no 
mention of his activities after 828. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s role within the Jacobite church remains a matter of dispute. Having been 
referred to as both Bishop of Takrīt188 and Bishop of Nisibis in different places, it is actually 
now thought that he was probably neither.189 What can be ascertained, however, is that Abū 
Rā’iṭa was a respected theologian, a ‘teacher’ or ‘apologist’ (malpōnō in Syriac, vardapet in 
the Armenian texts which refer to him), who was invited on at least two occasions to 
represent the Jacobite church and defend its beliefs in official settings.   
3.1.2. Historical context 
During Abū Rā’iṭa’s life, the city of Takrit and the surrounding area had very much become 
Syrian Orthodox region, the ‘“Jacobite” centre in Mesopotamia’190.  The Jacobite Church, so 
                                                          
187 Ibid., 56 
188 Rachid Haddad feels that Abū Rā’iṭa was probably the Bishop of Takrīt but explains his doubts. 
Haddad, La Trinité divine, 55 
189 Sandra Keating addresses the question of his role and position in some detail. Keating, S. 
Defending the “People of Truth”, 41-48 
190 Griffith, ‘“Melkites”, “Jacobites” and the christological controversies’, 49  
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called after the sixth century Bishop of Edessa Jacob Baradeus (d.578) who is noted for his 
reorganisation of the Syrian Orhodox Monophysite community, appears to have flourished 
there during the early ninth century, though Christians are said to have been in the area from 
the first Christian century.191 Cyriaque, the Patriarch of Antioch (793-817) is reported to have 
gone to Takrit during his office to establish a strong metropolitan in the region,192  which lay 
to the South East of Antioch and the important theological schools of Nisibis and Edessa. 
 
Following the cession of a number of provinces to the Sassanid Empire by the Roman 
Emperor Flavius Iovianus (Jovian) in 363,193 the Syriac-speaking Christian communities had 
found themselves cut off from the Byzantine Empire. Although they remained Christian and 
continued to be theologically influenced by the Greek Fathers, the church developed its own 
distinctive cultural identity through the use of the Syriac language as the language of liturgy.  
Just over a century later, the Councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451) would lead to 
                                                          
191 Rassam, S. Christianity in Iraq  (Herts, UK: Gracewing, 2005), 67 
192 Fiey, J.M. Chrétiens syriaques sous les Abbassides: surtout à Baghdad (749-1258), Corpus 
Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Vol. 420, (Louvain: Secretariat du CorpusSCO, 1980), 64 
193 Peters, F.E. Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradition (London: University of London Press 
Ltd, 1968), 36 
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the theological divorce of the Syriac Christian communities from the Melkite Church, which 
advocated the official Byzantine doctrine.  
 
Shortly after Abū Rā’iṭa’s birth, the nearby city of Baghdad became established as the new 
capital of the Islamic Empire under the ‘Abbasid ruler al-Mansūr. As a result of this move, the 
Syriac Christian communities of the region suddenly found themselves living side by side 
with their Muslim rulers, at the heart of the Islamic Empire. 
  Abū Rā’iṭa, therefore, would have found himself in close contact with Islamic thought and 
may well have been involved in munazarāt, debates held at the court of the caliph where 
Christians were often invited to defend and discuss their beliefs with a Muslim scholar in the 
presence of the Caliph.194 Certainly from his written works it is clear that he had substantial 
knowledge of Islam as will be seen in due course. 
  
The establishment of the Islamic seat of power in Baghdad would also have continued to 
promote the development of Arabic as the lingua franca of the region, though it is almost 
                                                          
194 See: Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”. 
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certain that Abū Rā’iṭa originally came from a Syriac-speaking background. This is evident 
not only from his familial connection to Nonnus of Nisibis, who wrote most his works in 
Syriac195, but also from the style of his works and the language and grammar used, which 
Joshua Blau refers to as ‘Middle Arabic’196, Arabic which had some deviations from the 
classical  which were typical of Aramaic style and grammar. Abū Rā’iṭa, then, would have 
been fluent in both Syriac and Arabic, enabling him to stand on the threshold between the 
Syriac Christian community and their Muslim neighbours. 
 
 
3.1.3. Intellectual Context 
Like his contemporaries, Abū Rā’iṭa flourished during an intellectually fascinating period, 
which saw many strands of thought overlapping, diverging, colliding, reshaping and 
developing as a result of communities with different cultures and beliefs finding themselves in 
                                                          
195 Griffith cites evidence that Nonnus also wrote in Arabic, although none of his Arabic works are 
extant. Griffith, S.H. The beginnings of Christian theology in Arabic: Muslim-Christian encounters in the 
early Islamic period, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), chap. IV, 116 
196 Blau, J. ‘The state of research in the field of the linguistic study of middle Arabic, Arabica, vol. 28, 
no. 2-3, numéro special double: etudes de linguistique Arabe (Jun-Sep 1981), 187-203 
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contact under Islamic rule. Part of a long Christian Syriac tradition, Abū Rā’iṭa came from a 
tradition which boasted the likes of Philoxenus of Mabbug and Jacob Baradeus. 
  
The Jacobites, who had been persecuted under Byzantine rulers for their Christological 
beliefs, appear to have experienced a change of fortune under Muslim rule, which effectively 
elevated their status alongside their Melkite contemporaries as ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-
kitāb).197 Indeed, a number of his works are concerned with inter-denominational matters,198 
two of which were written against the Melkites and one of those which names Theodore Abū 
Qurra specifically .199 As a monophysite thinker, Abū Rā’iṭa criticised the Melkites for 
essentially making the same error as the Nestorians in allowing Christ to have two natures.200 
 
Meanwhile, being in close proximity to the development of Islamic thought, Abū Rā’iṭa clearly 
felt the need to respond to questions posed by Muslims concerning the Christian faith, which 
                                                          
197 Lamoreaux, J. C. ‘Early eastern Christian responses to Islam’ in J. Tolan (ed.) Medieval Christian 
perceptions of Islam: A book of essays, Garland  Medieval Case Books, Vol. 10, (New York: Garland 
Press, 1996), 4 
198 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, 568 
199 Graf, G.(ed) Die Schriften des Jacobiten Ḥabīb ibn Khidma Abū Rā‘iṭa, Corpus Scriptorum 
Christianorum Orientalium Vol. 130 (Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste L. Durbeq, 1951) 
200 Griffith, ‘“Melkites”, “Jacobites” and the christological controversies’, 51 
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he did in several works.201 This threefold intertwining of traditional Christian beliefs with 
Islamic theological concerns and the transmission of Greek philosophy into Arabic is very 
much reflected in Abū Rā’iṭa’s works. He is clearly aware that evidence from scripture is not 
sufficient for his Muslim adversaries, as he responds directly to the accusation of tahrīf , but 
also feels the need to find other ways to answer challenges of Islam. 
 
In terms of both subject matter and method, one can see the response to Muslim questions 
using language and concepts borrowed from internal Islamic debate and Greek philosophical 
thought, particularly Aristotelian thought, alongside more traditional Christian proofs which 
can be found in Syriac and Greek literature.  
 
The evidence relating to the munazārāt, whether applicable to Abū Rā’iṭa or not, points to a 
somewhat intellectually open atmosphere, shows the close contact of Christians and 
Muslims, and explains the need for such Christian works, which consciously or 
unconsciously respond to their Islamic surroundings and a Muslim agenda. 
                                                          
201
 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, 571-581 
149 
 
3.1.4. Works relating to the Trinity 
The various writings of Abū Rā’iṭa have been preserved by the Monophysite community, in 
particular by the Coptic Church. To date there have been found twelve manuscripts 
encompassing eleven works, to which a further two titles of now lost works may be added.202 
His writings can be broadly separated into two categories; those written in defence of 
Christianity and those written specifically in defence of the West Syrian Jacobite church. Two 
of his works specifically deal with the doctrine of the Trinity and will be discussed here. 
However, other of his works may also prove useful, especially when dealing with 
terminological considerations, and will be referred to as and when relevant. 
 
The main work to be discussed is entitled ‘al-risāla al-ūlā fī al-thālūth al-muqaddas’ (The First 
Letter on the Holy Trinity) 203 and, as is suggested by the title, is a work dedicated specifically 
to the doctrine of the Trinity, addressed to a fellow Christian who has asked about the 
teachings of ‘the People of the South’, the phrase Abū Rā’iṭa uses for the Muslims. The work 
appears in five manuscripts, three of which were available to Georg Graf in preparing his 
                                                          
202 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, 567ff. 
203 ibid., 572-574 
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edition of Abū Rā’iṭa’s works in 1951 and all of which were available at the time of Sandra 
Keating’s edition in 2006. Although these are the two major modern editions of Abū Rā’iṭa’s 
works, there exists one further modern Arabic edition, specifically presenting the al-risāla al-
ūlā, which was edited by the Lebanese Jesuit scholar, Salim Dakkash in 2005.204  
 
The second work which contains a defence of the doctrine of the Trinity is a more general 
apology for Christianity known as ‘Risālat al-abī Rā’iṭa al-takrītī fī ithbāt dīn al-naṣrānī wa 
ithbāt al-thālūth al-muqaddas’  (A letter of Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī on the Proof of the Christian 
Religion and the Proof of the Holy Trinity).205 This work is found in three extant manuscripts, 
all of which contain the same eight writings, including his al-risāla al-ūlā. All of the 
manuscripts appear to be copies made and preserved by the Coptic Church in Egypt. Sandra 
Keating places the date of composition of Al-risāla al-ūlā and the Ithbāt between 820 and 828 
and 815 and 825 respectively. The Ithbāt, she argues, is less sophisticated in terms of detail 
and argument which would suggest its earlier composition. Whilst this conclusion is certainly 
plausible, the amount of detail and complexity of argument is likely to have as much to do 
                                                          
204 Dakkash, S. (ed.) Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī wa risālatuhu ‘fi al-thālūth al-muqaddas’ (2005); available 
from: www.muhammadanism.org; accessed on 15/12/09. It is this edition which will be referenced in 
terms of the al-risāla al-ūlā, although all available editions have been consulted throughout. 
205 Thomas and Roggema. Christian Muslim relations, 571-572 
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with the intended audience for each of the works as opposed to purely being a chronological 
matter, which Keating does acknowledge.206 
 
Al-risāla al-ūlā would appear to be the first of a series of three letters written by Abū Rā’iṭa. 
Like the first, the Second Letter on the Incarnation (Al-risāla al-thāniya li-abī Rā’iṭa al-takrītī fī 
al-tajassud ) is widely available, though the third letter is now lost, known only by references 
to it made in other writings, whereby Abū Rā’iṭa speaks of three letters dealing with the 
Trinity and Incarnation.207 This has lead Sandra Keating to speculate that the third letter may 
have contained a defence of Christian practices, seeing an overarching structure to the three 
works. This would certainly make sense given the topics which most Christian authors writing 
at this time appeared to have addressed, an agenda clearly motivated by Muslim objections 
to particular doctrines and practices. 
 
Al-risāla al-ūlā is set up as a series of questions posed by opponents with answers. It is 
addressed to a fellow Jacobite asking to defend himself against Muslim polemic. The 
                                                          
206 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 81 
207 ibid., 147-8 
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opening to this work is a fairly short one which follows the form of a typical Syriac preface 
asking God for guidance in his task, followed by a specific introduction to the purpose of his 
work, which is to clarify the teachings of the Muslims for a fellow Christian and to provide the 
confession of his own Jacobite community.208 After laying out the difficulties he faces in this 
task, Abū Rā’iṭa says he feels compelled to do as Jesus Christ has commanded209 and will 
therefore ‘make an effort to reveal and clarify what is claimed about the two parties 
[Christians and Muslims] from the matter of their religion…’210 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s start point is a Muslim statement of belief about God which suggests that 
although both Christians and Muslims agree that God is one, their two conceptions of 
‘oneness’ differ vastly. This leads Abū Rā’iṭa onto a long discussion about the nature of 
God’s oneness. By identifying and logically eliminating various types of ‘oneness’, Abū Rā’iṭa 
demonstrates that the best way to describe God is as one in jawhar (‘ousia’ or substance), 
encompassing three hypostases (aqānīm). In doing so, he makes indirect reference to the 
                                                          
208 Abū Rā’iṭa never mentions the Qur’an, Muslims or anything Islamic by name: preferring terms such 
as ‘your book’, ‘the People of the South’, and for his own Christian community the term ‘People of the 
Truth’. The reason for this, most probably, was that Abū Rā’iṭa was exercising caution for fear of 
directly attacking or upsetting his Muslim rulers though there is no explicit evidence for this. 
209 Here he paraphrases Luke 12:4-5 and Matthew 5:42 and 10:19 
210 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 63.17-18 
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Muslim divine attributes debate by asking questions concerning God’s attributes, their 
meaning and ontological status. Abū Rā’iṭa also directly responds to common questions 
posed by Muslims,211 such as why the three hypostases should not be called three Gods, 
and why there are only three and not more. Towards the end of his letter, Abū Rā’iṭa also 
deals with the Muslim accusation of falsification (taḥrīf) of their holy scriptures. Although 
largely centred on philosophical and rational proofs taken from Aristotle, Abū Rā’iṭa also 
incorporates a number of other methods and arguments such as analogy and various biblical 
proofs. 
 
The Ithbāt is of a slightly different nature, though it contains much of the same information 
concerning the Trinity as his treatise dedicated specifically to the doctrine. As mentioned 
above, this work is much more general in terms of subject matter, which includes not only 
discussions of God’s unity, but also the Incarnation, the cross, direction of prayer, the 
Eucharist, circumcision and food laws. As such, the letter functions as a general exposition of 
                                                          
211 Such questions appear to be common as they are found in texts from other Christian apologists of 
the period, as well as later Muslim sources. The two questions mentioned here are found in both Abū 
Qurra and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. Al-Bāqillānī poses the question about the number of hypostases (Thomas, 
Christian Doctrines, 152ff.)  
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Christian belief in a polemical context, in response to the main concerns or criticisms of 
Muslim contemporaries.  
 
Although probably aimed at Christians, it is clear from the subject matter that Abū Rā’iṭa has 
Muslim concerns in mind when writing. Indeed, his first topic after the introduction deals with 
how to assess the best or truest religion, by naming six fallacious reasons to accept a 
religion followed by one good reason. It would appear that the six unacceptable reasons are 
some of those which many Christians associated with Islam. Unfortunately the end of the 
treatise is missing and so the author’s own conclusion is lost, however, the direction and 
overall structure of the work is clear up until this point. 
 
The section on the Trinity comes directly after his opening discussion about reasons to adopt 
or convert to a certain religion, whereby Abū Rā’iṭa concludes that Christianity is the best 
religion. It is no surprise that the Trinity comes first in his list of specific teachings and 
practices to be dealt with, as we know that, as a Muslim, it was the most difficult doctrine to 
understand.  For the Mu‘tazila in particular, who were very much engaged in polemics and to 
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whom the unity of God was strictly emphasised, this doctrine would have been highly 
unacceptable. As a result, this sort of ordering of topics can be found in contemporary 
writings such as those of ‘Ammār al- Baṣrī and Abū Qurra. In this section, Abū Rā’iṭa 
explains the doctrine of the Trinity initially through the use of analogy, which he is careful to 
qualify. He then makes brief reference to and link between God having life and word which 
correspond to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, before putting forward a small number biblical 
proofs to further bolster his argument, after which he turns to the issue of the Incarnation.  
 
 
3.2. Setting the Context  
3.2.1. Agreement that God is one 
Abū Rā’iṭa begins the main body of his Al-risāla al-ūlā  with a statement of belief which he 
attributes to the ‘People of the South’.  
‘…God is one, [who] has never and will never cease to be living, knowing, seeing, 
hearing, without companion in his substantial nature (jawhariyyatihi) or his dominion. 
He is the first and the last, the creator of the seen and the unseen, free from want, 
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perfect [in] His essence, he cannot be described by those who [try to] describe him, 
elevated above imperfection and incapacity, not described by division (tab‘īḍ) nor 
partition (tajazz’u )212, reigning, powerful, acting according to what He wishes, not 
seen, not felt, not comprehended and not limited, encompassing everything in His 
knowledge.’213  
 
From the outset, then, Abū Rā’iṭa outlines a common starting point, a list of Muslim sounding 
attributes with which Christians presumably agree. This list demonstrates knowledge of the 
Qur’an and some of the teachings of certain Muslim sects of his day. Many of the given 
attributes appear a number of times in texts such as al-Ash‘arī’s maqalāt, a compendium of 
the positions and doctrines of different sects within Islam, written at least fifty years after this 
letter. It is most likely to be aspects of Mu‘tazilī teaching that Abū Rā’iṭa is quoting, although 
                                                          
212 Keating reads this word as al-tajrā which she translates as ‘nor by [having] an envoy’. Dakkash 
reads it as al-tajazz’u (partition), which, given the context makes more sense. ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī uses 
this pair of synonyms in both of his works. Also, the pair is given in Al-Ash‘ari’s report of the position of 
the Mu‘tazila 155/7-8 (wa laysa bidha ab‘āḍ(in) wa ajzā’), the type of statement which this list of Abū 
Rā’iṭa seems to have depended on. However, Dakkash does acknowledge, however, that in the P, S 
and G manuscripts it is given as al-tajrā. 
213 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 64.6-16 
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the list al-Ash‘arī gives is much more extensive than Abū Rā’iṭa’s account. The attributes 
given by Abū Rā’iṭa, which also appear in al-Ash‘arī’s work are as follows:  
‘…God is one, there is nothing like him and He is hearing, seeing…He is not limited 
within space…cannot be touched…cannot be described…and the senses don’t reach 
Him…He did not and does not cease to be knowing, powerful, living, eyes do not see 
Him and sight does not reach Him…there is no partner in His kingdom and no 
minister in His dominion.’214  
  
The statement ‘He has no partner in His dominion’ can also be located in the Qu’ran (17:111, 
25:2). Other Qur’anic phrases from Abū Rā’iṭa’s list include: ‘the First and Last’ (57:3) and 
‘Knower of the seen and unseen’ (6:73, 23:92). 
 
However, despite these obvious references to Muslim teaching and thought, it would appear 
that Abū Rā’iṭa has included some language which would be unlikely to be found in a Muslim 
statement concerning God and which seems to be deliberately placed in order to establish a 
                                                          
214 al-Ash‚arī, Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī. Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, H. Ritter (ed.),  Die Dogmatischen Lehren der 
Anhänger des Islam, 3rd edition (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1930), 155-156 
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common start point, which will eventually allow for his explanation of the Trinity. In particular, 
the phrase ‘without companion in his substantial nature’ should raise suspicions. Although 
‘jawhariyya’ and its more commonly used form, jawhar, meaning substance or being (most 
often the translation of the Greek term ousia) was known to the Mu‘tazila and used by them 
to denote worldly substances in terms of their Atomistic view of the world, it was not used to 
refer to the divine being. Indeed, earlier in the same statement reported by al-Ash‘arī above, 
we are told that God is ‘not a substance’215. Therefore it is unlikely that this term would be 
included in a statement of the Mu‘tazila.  
What Abū Rā’iṭa seems to have done is cleverly inserted the word ‘jawhariyya’, into the list of 
Muslim statements which he gives at the beginning, so that the phrase reads ‘He has no 
partner in His substantial nature or his dominion’, which, without the phrase ‘fī jawhariyyatihi’, 
can be found in statements made by the Mu‘tazila, according to Al-Ash’ari216. That is not to 
rule out altogether the possibility that Abū Rā’iṭa found this phrase in another source, be it 
Muslim or Christian, but from the sources available to us it would seem that this term has 
been inserted to suit his purposes; allowing him to introduce God’s ‘oneness in substance’ as 
a basis for explaining the doctrine of the Trinity. 
                                                          
215 Al-Ash‘ari, Maqālāt, 155.4 
216 ibid., 156 
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Having made the effort to show that Christians agree that ‘God is one together with the rest 
of His attributes’217, Abū Rā’iṭa comes to what he seems to see as the crux of their 
disagreement, which is in their varying interpretations of the concept of ’oneness’: 
‘Nevertheless, even if we agree with you in your teaching that God is one, what a 
great distance lies between the two statements in terms of what you think and what 
we describe!’218  
 
According to Abū Rā’iṭa, it is not that Muslims simply disagree with the Christian conception 
of God, rather they misunderstand what Christians mean by their doctrine. This, therefore, is 
the first issue which Abū Rā’iṭa feels needs to be addressed in order to set the context for his 
explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
217 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 65.16. It is unlikely that Muslims would actually describe God in this particular 
manner, although they certainly would have referred to the attributes of God (ṣifāt allah). 
218 ibid., 66.11-12 
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3.3. Explanation of the Trinity 
3.3.1. Types of Oneness  
Abū Rā’iṭa opens with a hypothetical question to his opponents as to whether they describe 
God’s oneness as one in genus (al-jins), species (al-nau‘) or number (al-‘adad). The 
categories of oneness to which he refers are taken from Aristotelian thinking, and indeed he 
relies heavily on Aristotle throughout most of his ‘rational’ arguments, which will be seen in 
due course.219 His main concerns here are: to point out that the Muslims understand one in a 
numerical sense; to argue that this is not a fitting way to talk about the divine being; and to 
demonstrate that the question of the Trinity is not a numerical issue.  
 
 Abū Rā’iṭa quickly dismisses ‘one in genus’, as it would mean that: 
‘He [God] becomes a general ‘one’ for all kinds of different species, [which] is not 
permissible as an attribute of God.’220 
  
                                                          
219 Around a century later, the Jacobite Christian Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (893-974) also refers to the categories 
of genus, species and individual in a debate with the Muslim philosopher Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī. Périer, A. 
‘Un traité de Yaḥyā ben ‘Adī’, 6 
220 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 68.8-9 
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Abū Rā’iṭa appears to be confident that no further explanation is needed and therefore that 
no Muslim would allow God to be a genus encompassing different species. 
 
Assuming that his Muslim counterparts would say that God is one in number, Abū Rā’iṭa 
dwells on this option for a little longer.  
‘With your description of Him by number, you describe him with divisions and 
imperfections. Do you not know that the individual ‘one’ in number is a part of the 
number? Since the perfection of the number is that which comprises all types of 
number. So the number ‘one’ is part of number and this is a contradiction of the 
words that He is “perfect” [and] “undivided”.’221  
 
For Abū Rā’iṭa, one in the numerical sense signifies a single unit, the first in a series of other 
numbers, which is how all things in the world are counted and described. Referring to God as 
one in the numerical sense contradicts the fundamental Muslim belief that nothing resembles 
God, Abū Rā’iṭa informs us, and so is not a fitting description for the divine being. He makes 
                                                          
221 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 69.1-5 
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this point later on in the same treatise, accusing the Muslims of anthropomorphism (tashbīh) 
by comparing God to ‘number’ which is comparable to creatures.222 This little comment again 
demonstrates Abū Rā’iṭa’s knowledge of his Muslim opponents and skill as a polemicist, as 
he turns the accusation of anthropomorphism against those such as the Mu‘tazila, who 
strived to protect God’s transcendence through the profession of His strict unity and the 
deanthropomorphisation of Qur’anic terms. 
 
Concerning the category of ‘one in species’, Abū Rā’iṭa explains that the Muslims mistakenly 
think of ‘one in species’ in terms of ‘one in number’, as species comprises individuals which, 
in Muslim minds, are understood in a numerical sense. It is at this point that Abū Rā’iṭa 
introduces the concept of ‘one in substance’ (jawhar), which is evidently what he 
understands by ‘one in species’. Here, Abū Rā’iṭa can again be seen to be subtly introducing 
Christian terminology into his argument, as with the introduction of ‘jawhariyya’ to his 
otherwise Muslim sounding statement at the beginning of Al-risālat al-ulā. 
 
                                                          
222 ibid., 88.10-13. The Muslim philosopher, Al-Kindī, said a similar thing in respect to God’s oneness 
not being a numerical oneness. See: Atiyeh, Al-Kindī, 64 
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What Abū Rā’iṭa is doing then, is calling upon the Muslims to define what they mean when 
they say God is ‘one’ and forcing them to logically dismiss all options except ‘one in species’, 
in the sense of ‘one in substance’. In this way he is able to set context for introducing the 
Trinitarian formula: 
‘We described Him as one perfect in substance not in number, because in number, 
that is to say hypostases, He is three; so indeed this description of Him is perfect in 
both aspects.’223 
 
One in substance, he tells the reader, shows that God is exalted above all other things, and 
three in hypostases because the number three encompasses both categories of even and 
odd. ‘One’ is the lowest and simplest form of odd number and two is the lowest and simplest 
form of even number. Together therefore, they encompass both types of number and so the 
number three is more perfect and a more adequate way to describe God, who encompasses 
everything. This is an interesting little argument which appears at two different points in Al-
risālat al-ulā  but not in the Ithbāt. It has been suggested that this argument may have 
Patristic roots, as numerical proofs were common among the Church Fathers, or even that it 
                                                          
223 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 70.2-5 
164 
 
might be traced back as far as Aristotle and Plato.224 However, it may well be Abū Rā’iṭa’s 
own argument. In any case, it is an argument which his nephew Nonnus of Nisibis also 
uses225, which may suggest either that uncle or nephew invented the argument, or that they 
were both taking it from another, presumably Jacobite, source.  
 
What they are both attempting to demonstrate is that the Christian conception of the nature 
of God is more appropriate and actually better preserves the transcendence of God because 
it makes Him stand further apart from his creatures, unlike the Muslims and especially the 
Mu‘tazila, who make Him one in number like His creatures.226  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
224 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 177 
225 Griffith, S. ‘The apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis’, in Griffith (ed.) The beginnings of Christian 
theology, chap. IV, 124 
226 ‘Ammār says this more directly where Abū Rā’iṭa only insinuates it. Cf. Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 51 
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3.3.2. Absolute vs. relative names  
Returning to the statement of belief which he attributed to the ‘People of the South’ at the 
beginning of Al-risālat al-ulā , Abū Rā’iṭa questions them as to the meanings of descriptions 
of God such as ‘living’ and ‘knowing’, beginning with whether they are considered to be 
absolute names or relative names. Again Abū Rā’iṭa is laying the groundwork for explaining 
the Trinity in terms Muslims might understand, at this point by borrowing language and 
concepts from Arabic grammar and the divine attributes debate and merging it with Greek 
philosophical notions.227 By stating that their definitions are ambiguous, Abū Rā’iṭa is able to 
question such definitions and pursue what he understands by them, as a way to further his 
argument. 
 
Absolute names are given to objects which cannot be predicated of something else, such as 
“earth” or “fire”, he says, whereas relative or predicative names are linked to something else 
such as “knower” and “knowledge” or “wise” and “wisdom”, for example. Attributes such as 
                                                          
227 Harold Suermann points out that the distinction between absolute and relative attributes can be 
found as early as Tertullian, as well as in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers. Suermann, H. ‘Der 
Begriff Ṣifah bei Abū Rāʾiṭa’, in S.K. Samir and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Christian Arabic apologetics during 
the Abbasid period (750-1258), (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 167  
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“living” and “wise” are therefore related to God. After laying out this distinction, Abū Rā’iṭa 
then asks whether the names or attributes belong to God’s substance eternally, or whether 
He was described by them later as a result of His actions. Again he distinguishes between 
the two types of attribute, the former being inherent in God and the latter created by His 
action. For the attributes of divine knowledge, life and wisdom, Abū Rā’iṭa dismisses the 
latter option, as he knows that if one were to say that God acquired attributes as he merited 
them, then there would be a time when God was neither living nor knowing, which neither 
Christians nor Muslims would accept.  
 
Having established that such attributes are related to God’s essence, the author then asks 
how they are related. The possibilities include: either as entities other than Himself, ‘as one 
partner is related to another’; ‘from Him’, as an action he has made; or ‘from His 
substance’.228 Dismissing the first two possibilities, knowing that his Muslim counterparts 
would also dismiss them, Abū Rā’iṭa concludes that these attributes are related in that they 
are from His substance, in which case there are two further possibilities. The first is that they 
‘parts of something perfect’, which neither party can accept as this allows division in the 
                                                          
228 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 74.17-75.1 
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Godhead, leaving the only other option, that these attributes are ‘something perfect from 
something perfect’.229  
 
This detailed inquiry betrays an awareness of contemporary Muslim debate, as Abū Rā’iṭa 
puts his finger on a central issue within Muslim circles as to the meaning of the divine 
attributes and their relationship to God. For Muslim thinkers, the question was not merely 
ontological; it also relied heavily on the science of grammar, which had developed as one of 
the earliest sciences in Islamic thought. As discussed in chapter one of this study, those such 
as Abū al-Hudhayl and his followers wrestled intensely with the problem of how the attributes 
of God could have real meaning and yet not imply a plurality of divinities. Abū Rā’iṭa is clearly 
aware of the Muslim debate, and uses what he knows about Muslim teachings to lead his 
adversary logically towards a Christian conception of the unity of God. 
 
The other very much related issue which Abū Rā’iṭa touches upon here, is that of the 
gradual categorisation of attributes in Muslim thinking, which came about as a result 
                                                          
229 ibid., 75.3-4 
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of dealing with this attributes problem, as discussed in Chapter One. As Islamic 
thought developed, those who affirmed the reality of the divine attributes, al-ṣifātiyya 
or traditionalists (as they are sometimes referred to), such as the followers of Ibn 
Ḥanbal, came to distinguish between seven essential attributes (ṣifāt al-dhāt): 
knowledge, life, power, will, hearing, sight and speech; which were seen to exist 
eternally in God; and a number of attributes of action (ṣifāt al-fi‘l) such as generosity 
and creation, which came into existence in time and space at the point of interaction 
with their ‘worldly’ object, as an action of God. The Mu‘tazilites also began to 
categorise the attributes of God into attributes of ‘being’ or ‘essence’ (ṣifāt al-dhāt or 
ṣifāt al-nafs), and attributes of ‘act’ or ‘action’ (ṣifāt al-fi‘l), however their 
understanding of the essential attributes was that although they could be accepted as 
eternal, they were not distinct from God in any way. 
 
Here Abū Rā’iṭa essentially asks whether Muslims see God’s attributes as being inherent 
attributes of essence or created attributes of action, language which would be familiar to his 
Muslim readership, who were beginning to categorise God’s attributes in this way. He 
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dismisses the option of them being created attributes, as this suggests that there was a time 
when they did not exist, and therefore there would be a time when God had no knowledge or 
life, for example. As seen above, Abū Rai’ta then logically leads his reader through to the 
concept of attributes being ‘something perfect from something perfect’, using what he knows 
from Muslim teachings to dismiss various alternatives. 
 
Satisfied that he has shown that the life, knowledge and wisdom of God to be ‘something 
perfect from something perfect’, Abū Rā’iṭa explores this concept further. The attributes must 
either be described as separated and dissimilar, or continuous and connected, or 
simultaneously connected and separated. The first option cannot be accepted, he explains, 
as it would limit God and nothing within his substance can be divided and separate, unless 
the attributes are outside of His being. The second description is also incorrect, as it goes 
against the idea of the attributes being something perfect from something perfect, a teaching 
which attributes to ‘them’ i.e. the Muslims. By the process of elimination, therefore, the only 
option left is the third one, which describes the attributes of life, knowledge and wisdom as 
simultaneously connected and separated, and which leads him directly to his elucidation of 
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the doctrine of the Trinity, without yet having mentioned the Trinity at all during the build-up 
of this argument.230  
 
In order to introduce and explain the doctrine of the Trinity for the benefit of the ‘People of the 
‘South’, Abū Rā’iṭa clearly felt that a number of premises had to be laid down, and a number 
of qualifications made. This he did by beginning with his account of a Muslim statement of 
belief and the agreement that God was one, before showing how Christian and Muslim 
conceptions of oneness differ vastly through the use of rational argument based on 
Aristotle’s thinking. Then, using questions and language which are key to intra-Muslim 
debates about the nature of God and His attributes, Abū Rā’iṭa leads his reader to the point 
where one must agree that the life, wisdom and knowledge of God are both ‘something 
perfect from something perfect’ (the latter being the substance of God) and that they must be 
                                                          
230 The manner in which Abū Rā’iṭa sets up this question of the relation of the attributes  is clever: he is 
clearly phrases his questions to lead to the Christian conception of the  relationship of the substance 
to the hypostases and the  hypostases to one another, but speaks at this point about ‘attributes’ (ṣifāt) 
still, almost certainly knowing that his Muslim opponents have discussed and disagree upon the 
relation of the attributes to God’s essence, and as a result, to one another. As seen in chapter one of 
the present study,  Abū al-Hudhayl  held that the attributes of God were identical to His essence, 
which raised questions as to how to distinguish the attributes from the divine essence and from one 
another. Meanwhile,  Ibn Kullāb would say that God’s attributes are ‘neither identical nor not identical’, 
which is not dissimilar to what the Christians say about the hypostases and which perhaps 
unsurprisingly helped to fuel accusations of him being sympathetic to Christianity. 
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continuous and divided at the same time, as both other options would invalidate Muslim 
teaching. 
 
It is at this juncture, having established the aforementioned, that Abū Rā’iṭa begins to 
elaborate upon the nature and unity of God in traditional Christian terms, based on the 
accepted formula of one ousia and three hypostaseis. This switch in terminology is also 
noted by Harold Suermann who writes:  
‘Bei der folgenden Erklärung des “zugleichs” wechselt Abū Rā’iṭah die Terminologie. 
Der Begriff Attribut is nicht mehr der zentrale Begriff, sondern die drei Begriffe der 
Trinitätstheologie…’231 
 
Using language and concepts which would be familiar to a Muslim audience, therefore, Abū 
Rā’iṭa prepares his audience for the traditional Christian conception of the nature and unity of 
God, upon which he will begin to elaborate in the remainder of the treatise.   
                                                          
231 ‘In the following explanation of the “simultaneously [connected and separate]”, Abū Rā’iṭa switches 
the terminology. The concept ‘attribute’ is no longer the central concept, but instead the three 
concepts of Trinitarian theology.’ Suermann, ‘Der Begriff ṣifah bei Abū Rā’iṭah’, 162 
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God must logically be continuous and divided at the same time. Abū Rā’iṭa admits that this 
sounds absurd but explains: 
‘For we only describe Him as having continuity in [terms of] substance and 
dissimilarity in [terms of] individuals (ashkhāṣ)232, that is to say in [terms of] 
hypostases (aqānīm). Then if they deny this description because of its obscurity to 
them and they say that this description is something which contradicts itself because 
the one whose substance were different from his hypostases and hypostases 
different from his substance would never be described [like this]; it would be 
contradictory and inappropriate. It is to be said to them: Does our description of his 
substance differ from his hypostases as you have described?’233  
 
Aware that his Muslim audience will find the idea of something being simultaneously 
connected and divided logically absurd,234 Abū Rā’iṭa protests that of course this is not what 
                                                          
232 shakhṣ (pl. ashkhāṣ) meaning ‘individual’, appears to have been a common synonym used to refer 
to the hypostases in Arabic, and is certainly known to Muslims such as Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq, Abū Yūsuf 
al-Kindī and later al-Bāqillānī. Interestingly, however, ‘Ammar outrightly rejected the term as being too 
corporeal to refer to God. The question of terminology is dealt with in chapter 5.3. 
233 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 77.4-11 
234 For instance, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq spends much of his detailed refutation of the doctrine of the Trinity 
pointing out this perceived absurdity.  Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity”. 
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the Christians mean, they do not describe God as continuous and divided at the same time. 
Rather, they speak of connection and continuity in terms of God’s substance and dissimilarity 
and division in terms of his hypostases. Again preempting his Muslim adversaries, Abū Rā’iṭa 
refutes the claim that, in describing the divine being in this manner, Christians are saying that 
God’s substance is other than His hypostases.235 In order to clarify his meaning, Abū Rā’iṭa 
uses an analogy of three lights in a house: 
‘…we only describe Him as agreeing (muttafaq) in substance, differentiated (mufāriq) 
in hypostases and his substance is his hypostases and his hypostases are his 
substance, like three lights in one house.’236  
 
The light of the three lamps, he says, can be distinguished as three self-subsistent entities, 
but they are all united in one inseparable light which lights up the house. This analogy also 
features in his treatise, the Ithbāt. In both cases he is careful to acknowledge that the 
analogy is limited, and that God is above all analogies. Indeed, when hypothetically 
challenged about how three lights being emitted from three separate sources (three lamps) 
                                                          
235 In al-Warrāq, this accusation of maintaining that the substance is other than the hypostases is one 
primarily levelled at the Melkites. Thomas, “Against the Trinity”. 
236 ibid., 77.16-18  
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can resemble the being of God, Abū Rā’iṭa replies that the analogy is limited and only shows 
similarity in one way (that of one inseparable light created by three different lamps) but not in 
every way, as one would then have to question whether it were a sound analogy. In doing so 
he refers to the ‘ahl al-rayy’ (People of Opinion), most likely meaning the Islamic legal 
scholars who used analogy in their interpretation of Islamic law,237 saying that they 
themselves teach that analogy is limited.  
 
Being aware that the light analogy is far from perfect, Abū Rā’iṭa explains that actually it 
would be more appropriate, if the light were to resemble God more closely, to say that one 
light was the cause238 of the other two in ‘a natural substantial relation’239, the two being 
‘something perfect from something perfect’240. To further illustrate his point, Abū Rā’iṭa then 
launches into a series of other analogies designed to show how things can be described 
simultaneously as one and three.  
 
                                                          
237 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 187 
238 This model of the Trinity, emphasising the Father as the cause of the Son and Holy Spirit, is a 
common one in the Eastern churches of this period. As such, all three of the authors studied here 
make reference to it. 
239 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 79.8 
240 Ibid. p.79.9 
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His next analogy is a more fitting one, he feels; that is the relationship of Eve and Abel to 
Adam, who together are one in terms of their human nature and three in terms of 
hypostases. This is because their relationship to one another mirrors that of the Godhead: 
Adam being the begetter, Abel the begotten and Eve the one proceeding from Adam, just as 
the unity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is a relative and relational unity. This analogy can 
also be found in John of Damascus, who refers to Seth rather than Abel, but uses the 
analogy in the same way to describe the relationship between the three hypostases, and in 
Abū Qurra, as mentioned in the previous chapter.241 Abū Rā’iṭa also includes this analogy 
demonstrating the relative unity of the Trinity in the Ithbāt, where he appears to give a more 
directly Christian account of the doctrine by not spending time discussing the attributes of life 
knowledge and wisdom beforehand.242  
 
 Abū Rā’iṭa’s other analogies include: Moses and Aaron being united in humanity and yet two 
individuals; the soul, intellect and faculty of speech being both continuous and divided; the 
sun with its radiance and heat; and the five bodily senses. Once again he is careful to 
reiterate that God is above all analogies, but seems to feel that they are useful to his 
                                                          
241 John of Damascus, Exposition, 8 
242 Keating, Defending the “People of truth”, 112 
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purpose. With each analogy Abū Rā’iṭa’s aim is to show how something can have 
simultaneous continuity and division; as well as point out that none of the three preceded the 
other two; that is to say that the Father does not precede the Son or Holy Spirit although they 
are ‘from’ Him. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s extensive use of analogy seems odd if one accepts that his audience is primarily 
a Mu‘tazilī one, as the Mu‘tazila’s concern with the utter transcendence of God meant that 
the likening of temporal things to Him would have been completely unacceptable. There are 
a few possible explanations for this. One is that Abū Rā’iṭa’s audience were not from this 
Muslim theological school or at least not exclusively- indeed it has been suggested by 
modern scholars of Abū Rā’iṭa that his works were primarily aimed at Christians seeking to 
defend their beliefs to a Muslim audience. Another possibility is that he expected his Muslim 
audience to accept the use of analogy, either as he was not aware of their distaste for it, or 
because he hoped they would accept it even though they did not like it. His reference to the 
ahl al-ra’y might suggest that he was in part appealing to them as they were known to use 
analogy as a methodology. They, however, unlike Abū Rā’iṭa, used analogy in terms of 
temporal matters, not as a way to describe God Himself. Furthermore, Abū Rā’iṭa’s deep 
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awareness of Islamic thought in other areas would make the possibility of his being ignorant 
of Muslim, and particularly Mu‘tazilī feeling, on this issue highly unlikely. 
 
 From his explanation of the term and his repeated warnings as to the imperfect nature of 
analogy, it would seem that Abū Rā’iṭa was aware of Muslim dislike of it, but felt that it was a 
rational argument which would aid his clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity, even if he 
risked the Muslim rejection of the use of analogy in itself. Moreover, as a traditional Christian 
method of clarifying the difficult and abstract doctrine of the Trinity, it was perhaps a natural 
tool to employ, especially having a significant Christian element to his audience. In his Ithbāt, 
Abū Rā’iṭa explains his use of analogy,243 which he considers a form of rational proof aside 
from divine revelation. Here, he is very careful to stress that analogy must be used carefully 
and accepted fully, even though analogies are far removed from what they describe (i.e. the 
Godhead). For Abū Rā’iṭa, analogy is a useful tool to explain the Christian conception of God 
with the most comprehensible approach (aqrabiha ma’khadh).244 
 
                                                          
243 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 104.4-13 
244 ibid., 104.7 
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In order to further clarify the relationship between the substance and hypostases, Abū Rā’iṭa 
explains that the hypostases differ in their ‘properties’ or ‘characteristics’ (khawāṣṣ245) but 
that this difference in properties does not cause their substance to be different. This 
explanation is coming towards a traditional Christian clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity 
and how God’s substance relates to his hypostases as a relative unity. The difference 
between the hypostases, he tells us in Al-risāla al-ūlā, is a relative difference and each 
hypostasis is recognised by the property which represents this relative difference.  
‘Rather, each one of them is recognised by its property; the Father by His 
Fatherhood, the Son by His Sonship, and the Spirit by His procession from the 
Father.’246  
 
Like Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa begins to phrase the Trinitarian nature of God in a traditional 
Christian manner, clarifying the distinction between the hypostases as begetter, begotten 
and one who proceeds. The names Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Abū Rā’iṭa explains, are 
indicated in the New Testament through the baptismal formula found in Matthew 28:19. 
                                                          
245 The term khawāṣṣ is also used by ‘Ammār and Abū Qurra as well as other Christian authors (See: 
Haddad, R. La Trinité divine, 182-3), and will be discussed further in Chapter 5.3. 
246 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 80.17-18 
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These names are not found earlier, he tells the reader, as they were hidden from people who 
would not understand their meaning.247 
 
Having set the context, used logical premises to introduce the types of oneness and thus the 
doctrine of the Trinity as a valid expression of God’s oneness, and supported his explanation 
with illustrative analogies; Abū Rā’iṭa, in roughly the final quarter of his Al-risāla al-ūlā, turns 
to biblical proofs to enhance his argument that the doctrine of the trinity is the best 
expression of God’s nature.  
 
The first biblical-based argument he employs, is that of God referring to Himself in the plural, 
which appears in both the Bible and the Qur’an.248  
‘The close friend of God, Moses, said about God when creating Adam [that He said]: 
“Let us create249 man in Our image and Our likeness”. He did not say ‘I will make man 
in My image and My likeness.’250 
                                                          
247 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 118.15-120.1 
248 The ‘plural argument’ is one found in many of the extant Christian Arabic works from this period 
and will be examined further in chapter 5.2 of this thesis as it is common to all three of the authors 
studied. 
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Abū Rā’iṭa gives a few such examples from the Bible and then turns to his hypothetical 
Muslim reader: ‘You will remember that in your book similar things to what we have 
described from the sayings of Moses and Daniel are also written, instances regarding God: 
“We said”251, “We created”252, “We commanded”253, “We inspired”254, “We destroyed”.255 
Preempting a Muslim response that in Arabic the use of the first person plural is acceptable 
as a ‘royal we’, Abū Rā’iṭa rejects this on the grounds that Hebrew, Greek and Syriac all 
precede Arabic and do not allow this type of language. If the Arabs then insist that one man 
can say “We”, then Abū Rā’iṭa will allow that a man can do so as he is made up of composite 
parts, namely body and soul, whereas God, who according to both Christians and particularly 
the Mu‘tazila is simple and one, cannot use the first person plural in this manner. In this way, 
Abū Rā’iṭa cleverly uses the Muslim emphasis on the strict oneness of God against them. In 
the Ithbāt, Abū Rā’iṭa gives a much briefer account of this argument, using one or two biblical 
examples to show how ‘He pointed to both of His attributes: His threeness and His 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
249 In the Ithbāt he presents the reference as: Let us create (li-nakhluq) man (insānan) in our image 
and our likeness’ Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 116.12; in al-Risāla al-ūlā he replaces the 
verb khalaqa with ṣana‘. 
250 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 91.9-11 
251 See for example: The Qur’an 2: 32, 34, 35, 37, 7:10, 14:47 
252 ibid., 7:180, 15:26, 85 
253 ibid., 10:24, 11:40, 17:17 
254 ibid., 4:61, 7:117 
255 ibid., 6:6, 10:14. The anonymous Melkite author of On the triune nature also makes reference to 
the Qur’an as ‘your book’. Gibson, On the triune nature, 77.19 
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oneness’.256 Here he elaborates no further and makes no mention of the Qu’ran at all, which 
may be significant to the question of his audience, which will be discussed further in due 
course. 
 
In a similar vein, Abū Rā’iṭa next relates a short story about Abraham, taken from Genesis 
18:1-3, in which Abraham sees three men outside his tent whom he recognises as the Lord 
and so bows down in front of them, again pointing to the oneness and threeness of God.  
 
The last of Abū Rā’iṭa’s biblical arguments involves giving examples of God being referred to 
together with His Word and Spirit, in order to again show the oneness of the divine being in 
three hypostases. Here he references Psalm 33:6, ‘By the Word of God were the heavens 
created and by His breath each of their hosts’ and Isaiah 6:3, in which he speaks of the 
angels praising God by saying ‘Holy Holy Holy’ three times, among others.  
 
                                                          
256 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 118.1 
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Having laid out these biblical proofs, Abū Rā’iṭa, in Al-risāla al-ūlā, anticipates the accusation 
of taḥrīf, that is the Muslim accusation that the Christians have altered or corrupted the 
scriptures which were sent down to them from God. This he defends by pointing out that 
these scriptures, meaning the Old Testament scriptures, are also with their enemies, the 
Jews, and that they are the same text, which means they could not have been corrupted. If 
his Muslim interlocutor argues that it was the Jews who corrupted them and misled the 
Christians, Abū Rā’iṭa encourages his fellow Christians to respond that if this were the case, 
then there would be original, unaltered copies in the possession of the Jews, as they would 
not want to risk their own salvation by adhering to corrupted scripture. 
 
Arguments such as this in response to the accusation of taḥrīf can be found in contemporary 
Christian writings,257 which suggests that it was a common accusation employed by Muslims 
                                                          
257 ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī dedicates substantial sections of both of his extant works to the authenticity of 
Christian scripture; before him Theodore bar Konī also addressed the question of taḥrīf in the tenth 
chapter of his Scholion. Bar Konī, Theodore. Théodore Bar Koni: Livres des scolies (recension de 
Séert) II. Mimrè VI-XI, R. Hespel and R. Draguet (trans.), CSCO, vol. 432, no. 188. 
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polemicists.258 Indeed, the Qur’an itself refers to the distortion of the Old Testament at the 
hands of the Jews.259  
 
 
 
3.4. Responses to Muslim questions 
The final section of Abū Rā’iṭa’s Al-risāla al-ūlā is made up of four questions likely to be 
posed by a Muslim adversary, and his responses to them. The first is a question already 
mentioned earlier in the letter, asking why the three hypostases are not considered three 
Gods, even though they are each described as Lord and God.260 Abū Rā’iṭa denies that this 
is the case, and tells his hypothetical questioner that the individual hypostases are never 
spoken of without being in relation to one another. Using the human analogy, he explains 
                                                          
258 Although, interestingly, extant Muslim works which deal specifically with the Trinity make less 
mention of taḥrīf than one might expect, nor do they make much reference to Christian or Muslim 
scriptures, preferring to use logical and abstract arguments to show the absurdity of the Christian 
teaching. 
259 Cf. 2:75, 4:46 
260 This is a very typical question put to Christians by their Muslim counterparts. As such, all three of 
our Christian authors respond to it, and it can be found, in one form or another, in most of the extant 
Muslim works dealing with the Trinity from the ninth century and beyond. 
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that multiple human beings are multiple hypostases, not multiple substances, of the one 
general substance which is called ‘human being’.  
 
This leads onto a question as to whether the name ‘God’ is considered to be the name of the 
substance in general.261 Abū Rā’iṭa affirms this, but says that the name God, being the name 
of the substance, is also the name of his hypostases. Here he introduces a new analogy 
concerning gold. A piece of gold, like the general term gold, is still referred to as gold, and a 
number of pieces are still called ‘gold’ as opposed to ‘golds’.262 
 
The third question revolves around the issue of whether or not the Father precedes the Son 
and Holy Spirit, as He is the cause of the other two. The Muslims argue that, as their cause, 
He must precede them. Abū Rā’iṭa, however, argues that this is not the case, and that one 
can find natural examples of a cause not preceding other elements, such as the sun, which 
                                                          
261 The designation of the hypostases as ‘particular’ or ‘specific’ and the substance as ‘general’ is 
something which ‘Ammār treats in some detail in his Masā’il. cf. Chapter 4, 234-39. The terminology 
may well be traced as far back as Aristotle (cf. chap 5 , 43-35) and is found in pre-Islamic Christian 
authors such as Philoxenus. cf. Chapter 1, 38 ff. 
262 Abū Qurra also uses this analogy, though does not specifically talk about the relationship between 
the substance and hypostases as that of the general to the particular. cf. Chapter 2, 109  
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he feels proves his point. The sun, he says, is the cause of its heat and light, and yet it is 
never without them. Similarly, the Father is the cause of the Son and Holy Spirit, yet has 
never been without them. 
 
Continuing on from this matter of causality, the question is put to Abū Rā’iṭa as to whether 
something which is caused by something else can be classed as its part or its action. Either 
answer cannot be allowed in Muslim eyes, as a part or action could not be referred to as 
‘God’. Abū Rā’iṭa agrees with his interlocutor, in that if this were the case then it could not be 
allowed. However, the Muslims have once again misunderstood what the Christians mean. 
The term ‘part’, according to Abū Rā’iṭa, has two different meanings. The analogy he 
employs here is that of Moses and Aaron being parts of the category of ‘human being’ and 
yet still being perfect whole individuals, whereas body parts such as hands and feet are parts 
which individually cannot be referred to as ‘human being’.  
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‘Now  it is said that ‘he is from him’ not [as] an action, nor as a part of him, rather 
something perfect from something perfect as we have described. And it is deserving 
of the name which it is from, that is to say human being from human being.’263 
 
This, Abū Rā’iṭa concludes, is how the Son and Holy Spirit relate to the Father. They are a 
part of the number not of the essence (dhāt) of the Father: two perfect beings from two 
perfect beings. 
 
 
3.5. Discussion: Abū Rā’iṭa’s understanding of the nature of God 
The Ithbāt and the Al-risāla al-ūlā vary not so much in content as detail. In the former work, 
the subject of the Trinity makes up just under a third of the treatise, as part of a number of 
Christian beliefs and practices which were objectionable to their Muslim neighbours. The 
latter is a letter dealing specifically with the Trinity, which spends much more time 
questioning and defining particular terms surrounding the nature of God. The works also 
                                                          
263 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 101.9-11 
187 
 
differ in the way in which the author approaches the subject of the Trinity and therefore in 
how the material is ordered. This is most likely a result of the two works being aimed at 
slightly different audiences, which will be discussed further in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
The Ithbāt reads like a traditional Christian exposition which puts forward and explains 
Christian beliefs and practices in a general way. Naturally the work is shaped by its context 
and therefore guided by the concerns of their Muslim rulers in terms of the beliefs and 
practices which are defended. Abū Rā’iṭa shows awareness of his Muslim counterparts 
throughout: explaining the use of analogy as rational proofs for the Trinitarian nature of God; 
likening God’s being living and speaking to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and responding 
to things that ‘they may say.’264 However, his writing is seems to be primarily aimed at 
Christians looking to defend their beliefs, as there is little direct reference to a Muslim 
readership; only to questions that may be asked of a Christian and how he should respond.  
 
Meanwhile, although Abū Rā’iṭa himself claims to be writing his Al-risāla al-ūlā for a fellow 
unnamed Christian, it is evident that this treatise is focused much more on a specific Muslim 
                                                          
264 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, see for e.g. 106.13, 122.13, 124.7 etc. 
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audience and engages with Islamic thought to a far greater extent. To this end, Abū Rā’iṭa 
spends a great deal of the treatise laying the groundwork in order to lead his Muslim, and 
most likely Mu‘tazili265, audience to the doctrine of the Trinity. His structure seems to be fairly 
clear. The first part of the risāla is spent setting the context, and leading the Muslim reader 
from a place of agreement on the oneness of God to the concept of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, by first discussing issues concerning the divine attributes debate, and using language 
from that debate to lead the hypothetical Muslim reader from known to unknown. In this 
section, Abū Rā’iṭa only uses rational proofs and arguments, as well as Aristotelian logic, 
which he seems to presume his opponents will accept. In this way Abū Rā’iṭa appears to 
arrive at the doctrine of the Trinity logically, by first establishing that God has attributes of life, 
knowledge and wisdom, and afterwards using a number of analogies to illustrate his 
explanation, followed by biblical proofs which support the Christian conception of the nature 
of God over the Muslim one.  
 
                                                          
265 That his Muslim audience is likely to be made up mainly of those of Mu‘tazilī persuasion can be 
seen particularly in his Al-risāla al-ūlā, through the way he structures his various arguments leading 
towards the doctrine of the Trinity, by using language and concepts which would have been 
particularly familiar, or relevant, to a Mu‘tazilī reader as discussed above.  
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It is not until his analogies section, that Abū Rāi’ṭa describes the godhead in the traditional 
Trinitarian terms of ‘begetter, begotten and proceeding’. Meanwhile, in the Ithbāt, he begins 
with the analogy of light; introduces the unity of species through individual men having one 
human nature, using the terms substance (jawhar) and hypostases (aqanīm) throughout; and 
then describes God in terms of being existent, living and speaking, immediately explaining 
that this means ‘a Father who does not cease to beget His Word, a Son who is begotten 
without time, and a Spirit who proceeds from Him without ceasing…’266 This explanation of 
the doctrine is then followed by biblical proofs, before turning to address the Incarnation, 
whereas, in Al-risālat al-ūlā , Abū Rāi’ṭa deals with common questions which Muslims ask 
concerning the doctrine. The differences between the works in terms of the organisation of 
his arguments, do seem to suggest different purposes in terms of expected readership. 
 
In both works, the sections containing biblical proofs are similar, with quotations concerning 
the Trinitarian nature of God taken most frequently from the Book of Genesis and Psalms, 
and the repetition of the account in Genesis of Abraham seeing three men outside of his tent 
whom he recognised to be the Lord. In the Ithbāt, Abū Rā’iṭa gives a few examples of the 
                                                          
266 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 112.19-114.1 
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Word of God being God and then quotes the baptismal formula from Matthew 28:19, before 
stating that this is enough to answer the first of ‘their questions’ (concerning the Trinity) and 
moves swiftly onto the Incarnation. In Al-risāla al-ūlā, however, Abū Rā’iṭa cites more biblical 
examples, which not only refer to God’s Word but also His Spirit, in order to show that when 
Christians refer to Father, Son and Holy Spirit, they are merely referring to God together with 
His Word and Spirit. The detail in Al-risāla al-ūlā may suggest, as Keating claims,267 that it is 
the latter of the two works in terms of date, but also must be linked to the type of work it is 
and its intended audience. Firstly, Al-risāla al-ūlā concerns only this one doctrine as opposed 
to a general exposition of Christian beliefs; and secondly, as it seems to be aimed at a more 
intellectually elite audience, be it Christian or Muslim, and so the treatise requires more 
engagement with the Muslim element of the audience and more detail in certain areas.  
 
There are some terminological differences between the two works, which may or may not be 
significant. Māhiya, as will be seen in chapter five, seems to be a term that some of the 
Muslim mutakallimūn began to reject in relation to God and appears four times in Ithbāt 
                                                          
267 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 162 
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compared to once in al-Risala al-ūlā.268 Meanwhile, ṣifa appears 23 times in al-Risāla al-ūlā 
and only 9 times in the Ithbāt. Whilst there perhaps is not enough conclusive evidence 
concerning terminology, and indeed, as will be seen in the second part of this study, 
terminology appears not to be settled at this point, such frequency of occurrences, in 
conjunction with other evidence, may allow the tentative suggestion that the Ithbāt is aimed 
more at a Christian readership and the al-Risāla al-ūlā  a Muslim one. 
 
Aside from pure detail, there are two further ways in which the section containing biblical 
proofs differs in the Al-risāla al-ūlā. The first is that when making the argument about God 
using the first person plural in the Bible, Abū Rā’iṭa also adds in Qu’ranic examples of the 
same phenomenon, which he does not in the Ithbāt. Furthermore, he goes into much greater 
detail in terms of this argument, as if to directly show the Muslims that they must accept his 
evidence, as the use of the plural to speak about God is clearly there in their scriptures, and 
that they cannot escape this by trying to argue that it is permitted for a single person to use 
‘we’ in the Arabic language. Even if it were permitted, he argues, such language would apply 
to man, who is a composite being, and not God. This goes beyond the argument in the 
                                                          
268 This is not dissimilar to ‘Ammār who uses māhiya in his Masā’il but not at all in his Burhān   
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Ithbāt, which ends after showing that God refers to himself as ‘We’ in the Old and New 
Testaments. 
 
The other main difference is that in Al-risāla al-ūlā, Abū Rā’iṭa addresses the matter of taḥrīf, 
albeit briefly. For Keating, even though it is only mentioned briefly, this issue of taḥrīf is 
responsible for determining Abū Rā’iṭa’s whole structure and agenda.269 At the very least one 
must agree that Abū Rā’iṭa writes for an audience who will not necessarily accept biblical 
proofs: the proofs he does use appear to be rather supplementary to his argument 
concerning the Trinity, as seen above. Fundamentally, the Muslim belief or claim that 
Christian scripture had been corrupted meant that biblical proofs would not be accepted as 
credible evidence of whatever doctrine a Christian was trying to defend. It is this which forced 
Christian authors, faced with the Muslim challenge for the first time, to turn to other forms of 
argument, drawn both from their own tradition, innovation and the thinking of their Muslim 
counterparts.   
 
                                                          
269  Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 156-7.  
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In style and method also, one can see the use of the dialectical tools which had become 
standard to kalām argumentation and discussion, both in the sense of posing a series of 
questions which would force the opponent to agree with the questioner, and in terms of the 
linguistic structure ‘If they say… We say…’ (fā in qālū… qulnā). That is not to suggest that 
this work was not written for a Christian, but that if it was, then this Christian would likely be 
another theologian looking to engage with the mutakallimūn on a much deeper and more 
intellectual level than a reader of the Ithbāt. 
 
In terms of his overall presentation of the Trinity, there can be no doubt that Abū Rā’iṭa’s 
understanding of God’s nature is a traditional Christian one which would be expressed as 
one ‘ousia’ and three ‘hypostases’. In both works which deal with the Trinity, one finds 
arguments and proofs drawn both from Christian scripture and the Greek philosophical 
tradition as assimilated and passed down by the Church Fathers. However, what one also 
finds is the borrowing of some Islamic terms, concepts and methods of argumentation, which 
has led some modern scholars to refer to Abū Rā’iṭa as a ‘Christian mutakallim’, one who 
presumably involved himself so deeply in an Islamic conceptual framework that he could be 
classed among those theologians who discussed religious questions in a distinctive manner, 
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and with an emphasis on finding divine truth through reason alongside revelation. The theme 
of the ‘Christian mutakallimūn’ will be explored in chapter six of the present study. Certainly, 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s awareness of his intellectual surroundings cannot be denied. The challenge of 
Islam was a novel one, and to some extent required a novel response. This can be seen in 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s works in terms content, structure and style. 
 
From a close reading of the texts dealing with the Trinity, it would that appear that Abū Rā’iṭa 
was writing with two purposes in mind: firstly, to provide a reference for Christians to help 
them defend their beliefs in a Muslim Arabic context; and secondly to explain the doctrine of 
the Trinity to his Muslim counterparts in terms that they may understand. 
 
From his works relating to the Trinity, Abū Rā’iṭa clearly understands the doctrine in a 
traditional Christian manner, but introduces it in such a way that it might be more acceptable 
to his Muslim counterparts. This is particularly the case with al-Risāla al-ūlā, which appears 
to be aimed more directly at a Muslim audience.  
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Beginning the treatise with a discussion of Christian and Muslim understandings of the term 
‘one’, Abū Rā’iṭa then examines Muslim references to God as Knowing, Living etc. in the 
language of the divine attributes debate, before switching to a fundamentally Christian 
expression of the doctrine furnished with analogies and biblical proofs. In this way, Abū 
Rā’iṭa effectively holds up the two concepts of the unity of God side by side in order to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of the doctrine as opposed to proving its truth. He does not 
go as far as to equate hypostases with attributes, but simply makes use of Muslim language 
and concepts to lay the groundwork so that the doctrine of the Trinity might be more 
palatable to a Muslim audience. Indeed, Harold Suermann, who explores Abū Rā’iṭa’s use of 
the term ṣifa, concludes that, speaking of the divine attributes debate, ‘Abū Rā’iṭa did not 
enter into it as such.’270 
 
The most striking aspect of Abū Rā’iṭa’s treatise is that he recognises the very crux of the 
problem that the Muslims have with the doctrine of the Trinity, that is to say the apparent 
contradiction of something being simultaneously one and three. This leads him to spend time 
examining the concept of ‘oneness’, in order to address the central concern of his Muslim 
                                                          
270 Suermann, ‘Der Begriff Ṣifah bei Abū Rāʾiṭa’,  
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counterparts as effectively as possible, before using the language of the divine attributes 
debate to aid his clarification of the Christian conception of the nature and unity of God. 
 
If his aim is to express the doctrine of the Trinity in Arabic for his fellow Christians, and to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of the doctrine for his Muslim interlocutors, then it would be 
fair to suggest that he succeeds as far as far as is possible. It is unlikely that he would ever 
expect his Muslim adversaries to accept his arguments to the point that they would be 
persuaded of the truth of the doctrine, but he may well have felt it possible that they might 
see the rationale of the Christian conception of the nature of God. Abū Rā’iṭa recognises that 
the issue between Christians and Muslims is their differing understanding of the term ‘one’, 
and therefore carefully places his explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity after he’s prepared 
the groundwork by discussing the terms relating to the oneness of God and the divine 
attributes debate. He never claims that the hypostases and attributes are identical, but simply 
lays the two concepts side by side. The use of traditional analogies in each of his works 
implies that, whilst Abū Rā’iṭa is aware of their likely rejection by a Muslim audience, he 
seems to feel they are useful for clarification purposes. In al-risāla al-ūlā he adds biblical 
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evidence along with a response to the accusation of taḥrīf, presumably in order to give as full 
a defence as possible in the face of Muslim criticism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
 
CHAPTER 4: ‘AMMĀR AL-BAṢRĪ (d.c. 840) 
 
4.1. Background 
4.1.1. Biography 
The few available details of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s life and activity are now fairly well known. 
Originally placed somewhere between the tenth and thirteenth centuries by Georg Graf, who 
found ‘Ammār’s name last on a list of Nestorian scholars after Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq (809-873 
C.E.), there is now strong evidence to suggest that ‘Ammār actually lived during the early 
ninth century, thus being a contemporary of both Theodore Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa. The 
main piece of evidence is found in The ‘Fihrist ‘ of Ibn al-Nadīm (d.c.995), who, in a list of 
works attributed to the early Mu‘tazilī scholar Abū al- Hudhayl al-‘Allāf (d.c.840) includes one 
entitled ‘Against ‘Ammār the Christian in Refutation of the Christians’ (Kitāb ‘alā ‘Ammār al-
naṣrānī fi-l-radd ‘alā al-naṣārā). 271 In addition, a reference found in one of ‘Ammār’s works to 
‘a king of our time who left his kingdom with all of his soldiers for the Roman lands in pursuit 
                                                          
271 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist , 204 
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of a woman in a citadel’272, seems to refer to an expedition carried out by the Caliph al-
Mu‘taṣim (r.833-842) in 838. This theory is put forward by Michel Hayek273, the modern editor 
of ‘Ammār’s works, and reiterated by Sidney Griffith in his various writings on ‘Ammār274. 
Certainly in terms of the contents of ‘Ammār’s works, these rough dates would seem to make 
sense, as will be explored further in due course. 
 
 
4.1.2. Historical Context 
If his name and proposed dates of his life are to be accepted, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī lived in the 
city of Basra, close to the seat of the ‘Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad, the heart of the Islamic 
Empire. Both cities at this time were flourishing as intellectual centres of Islamic thought, 
under the leadership of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty, who had moved the seat of power from 
                                                          
272 Hayek, M. (ed.) `Ammar al-Baṣrī: kitāb al-burhān. wa-kitāb al-masā’il wa-al-ajwiba, (Beirut: Dar al-
Mashriq: al-Maktabah al-Sharqiyah, 1977), 38. 
273 ibid 
274 See for example: Griffith, The church in the shadow of the mosque; ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s Kitāb al-
Burhān: Christian Kalām in the First Abbasid Century’ in S. Griffith, The Beginnings of Christian 
theology; and ‘The concept of al-uqnūm in ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s apology for the doctrine of the Trinity’ in 
S.K. Samir (ed.), Actes du premier congrès international d’études arabes chrétiennes, Goslar, 
septembre 1980 (Rome: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1982),169-191 
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Damascus, via Harran from 750 onwards, to Baghdad in 762. A great interest in learning and 
scientific knowledge on the part of early Abbasid caliphs such as al-Manṣūr (754-775), al-
Mahdī (775-785), Harūn al-Rashīd (786-809), and al-Ma’mūn (813-833), stimulated an 
impressive translation movement of Greek learning into Arabic, often via the medium of 
Syriac.  Prominent individuals including the scholar and founder of the Ḥanbalī school of law 
(fiqh) Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (780-855) and the Muslim philosopher Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (c.800-
870) are associated with this area, along with Mu‘tazila, who had emerged as the dominant 
school of Islamic thought at this time and had formed two branches in Basra and Baghdad 
under the leadership of Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf (d.c.840) and Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir (d.825) 
respectively. 
 
 Meanwhile, the region was also home to a number of Christian populations, the earliest 
perhaps adopting the faith at the beginning of the fourth century C.E.275 Like ‘Ammār, most of 
the Christians living in the region came from the so-called ‘Nestorian’ denomination (more 
properly called the Church of the East), although there were also some Jacobite communities 
in places such as Takrit and small pockets of Melkites who are supposed to have come to 
                                                          
275 Allard, Michel. ‘Les Chrétiens à Baghdād’, 375-388 
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Baghdad originally as prisoners and slaves.276 A number of prominent individuals of the 
Church of the East certainly enjoyed respected positions such as Timothy I (d.823), who held 
the office of Patriarch of Baghdad for some forty three years, and Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (809-
873) and his family, who are most famously associated with the translation movement under 
al-Ma’mūn. 
 
During this period it is evident from a number of sources that Christians became active in 
theological debate with Muslims. Prominent Christian theologians were often invited to the 
Caliph’s court to explain their beliefs, one of the most famous examples perhaps being the 
debate between Timothy I and the Caliph al-Maḥdī in 781 C.E.277 where Timothy was called 
to answer questions about his faith and Islam. Other examples of munāzarāt or 
‘disputations’, during which a scholar from one faith aimed to convince the other of his 
beliefs, seem to have taken place fairly frequently.278 Moreover, the fact that Christian 
authors such as ‘Ammār seem to have felt able to write polemical works under their own 
                                                          
276 Allard. ‘Les Chrétiens à Baghdād’, 377 
277 For more on this debate see: Newman, N.A.  Early Christian-Muslim dialogue: a collection of 
documents from the first three Islamic centuries 632-900A.D. (Hatfield, P.A.: Interdisciplinary Biblical 
Research Institute, 1993)  
278 See: Keating, S. Defending the "People of Truth", 24-32 
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names suggests an intellectually open society and a degree of tolerance shown by Islamic 
leaders.279 This is not to suggest that Christians were seen as equals or that they were not 
often put on the defensive in responding to challenges set by Muslims, but merely highlights 
the fairly open nature of ‘Abbāsid society towards Christian intellectuals,280 at least until the 
reign of al-Mutawakkil in 847.281 
 
 
                                                          
279 The three Christian authors at the heart of this study all appear to have written under their own 
names, although none of them refer overtly to the Muslims. Abū Qurra often addresses his works 
against the Jews although Muslims are clearly included as his opponents, Abū Rā’iṭa calls Muslims 
‘People of the South’ and ‘Ammār uses the phrase ‘mu’min bi-l-wāḥid’ (Believer in the One). 
280 Griffith acknowledges that ‘Dhimmitude brought hardship and eventual demographic diminuition, 
but it also for a time brought with it a new cultural opportunity for the articulation and defense of 
Christianity in Arabic, within the world of Islam.’ Griffith, The church in the shadow of the mosque, 17 
281 Al- Mutawakkil’s reign proved to be a turning point in that he reversed the decree of his 
predecessor al-Ma’mūn (r.813-833) that the Qur’an was created rather than the eternal word of God, 
which al-Ma’mūn had forcibly imposed through the use of a type of inquisition called the miḥna. 
Although this meant an end to the persecution of those more traditionally minded Muslims who could 
not accept the doctrine of the created Qur’an, al-Mutawakkil did begin to take harsher measures 
against those who had preached the doctrine and Christians who had engaged in debates with them. 
It seems that al-Mutawakkil felt that allowing non-Muslims such freedoms was disruptive to society. 
Meanwhile, his decision to rely more heavily on Turks in his administration also meant that Christians 
were not perceived to be as useful in Muslim society as they had been previously. (Bogle, Islam: origin 
and belief, 60) Indeed, Abū Rā’iṭa’s nephew, Nonnus of Nisibis, was imprisoned under al-Mutawakkil 
which may well have influenced his decision to write his apologetic treatise in Syriac as opposed to 
Arabic. Griffith, S. ‘The apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis’, Aram, vol. 3, no. 1 and 2 (1991), 115-
6 
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4.1.3. Intellectual Context 
Given that ‘Ammār lived at the heart of ‘Abbāsid society, in a city which saw the rise of 
Mu’tazila and the development of Islamic theology, and that Christians, particularly members 
of his own Nestorian denomination, had played an important role in the transmission of 
Greek philosophical thinking into Arabic, it is not surprising that ‘Ammār was in touch with 
Islamic thought. However, the extent to which his works betray an understanding of specific 
debates taking place among Muslims on issues surrounding the nature of God is striking. 
From the very outset of his discussion of the Trinity in his kitāb al-burhān (Book of Proof), 
‘Ammār gives a telling description of a Mu‘tazilī belief about God, who, ‘they say is living and 
speaking yet [somehow] lifeless; He has no life and no word’.282 From the fortunate discovery 
in Ibn al-Nadim’s Fihrist, there can be little doubt that this statement refers, in part at least, to 
a formulation attributed to the Mu‘tazilī scholar Abū al- Hudhayl al-‘Allāf (d.c.840), in his 
attempt to tackle the issue of how God’s attributes could be divine and eternal, but not 
compromise His unity.  
 
                                                          
282 Hayek,`Ammār al-Baṣrī, 46.10 
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In terms of ‘Ammār’s Christian intellectual heritage, one finds among his two extant works the 
kitāb al-masā’il wa-l-ajwiba  (Book of questions and answers). In structure the work appears 
to be a sort of systematic theology loosely along the lines of traditional works of the Greek 
Fathers such as Origen’s On First Principles and John of Damascus’ Exposition of the 
Orthodox Faith. Like these two works, the Masā’il  is divided into four parts; each part being 
subdivided into smaller sections. In terms of content, the three works deal with similar topics 
in as far as they are all explaining elements of the Christian faith. They do vary in emphasis 
and specific subject matter, of course, as each work reflects its own time and context, and 
therefore each one is shaped by the intellectual currents and challenges which surround it. 
Being set against the backdrop of Islamic society, The exposition of the orthodox faith and 
the Masā’il contain more detail on the doctrine of the Trinity and the nature of the word and 
spirit of God, as well as a space dedicated to the Incarnation, and the use of ‘reasoned 
proofs’ as opposed to pure scripture.  
 
 Books of questions and answers also formed a common genre in the Syriac literature of the 
Nestorian Church to which ‘Ammār belonged. Parallels have been drawn between ‘Ammār’s 
Masā’il and the Scholion of Theodore bar Konī. Written in 792, the Scholion is a book of 
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eleven chapters, set out in the form of questions and answers. The first nine deal with 
Biblical books, whilst the sixth also explains a number of philosophical terms. Chapter ten 
and eleven deal with Muslims and heretical Christian sects.283 Although the work is largely 
based on biblical texts, Sidney Griffith highlights the underlying philosophical and theological 
themes which underpin the work. These themes, he explains, are the same sorts of issues 
found in later Christian Arabic works such as those of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. Griffith refers to the 
Scholion, therefore, as ‘a manual of Nestorian theology, presented in response to the 
intellectual challenges of its day.’284  
 
Within this setting of traditional Christian literature, in both Greek and Syriac, the production 
of a work like ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s Masā’il can be more clearly understood as both an 
exposition of Christian teachings explained in a manner similar to traditional Christian works 
but shaped by its particular intellectual and historical context, and also a work of apologetic, 
responding directly to the ever growing challenge of Islam and, as will be seen, mirroring the 
style and concerns of ‘Ammār’s Muslim counterparts. 
                                                          
283 Griffith, S.H. ‘Theodore Bar Koni’s Scholion: A Nestorian Summa Contra Gentiles from the First 
Abbasid Century’ in N. G. Garsoian, T.F. Matthews and R. W. Thomson (eds) East of Byzantium: 
Syria and Armenia in the formative period (Washington D.C. Dumbarton Oaks: 1982) 
284 ibid., 67 
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4.1.4. Works relating to the Trinity 
To date, there are two extant works attributed to ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī: the kitāb al-masā’il wa-l-
ajwiba  (Book of questions and answers) and the kitāb al-burhān (Book of proof).285 Michel 
Hayek suggests that the Masā’il  is to be dated sometime after the accession of the Caliph 
al-Ma’mūn in 813, as in his opening to the work ‘Ammār praises the reigning caliph for his 
interest in a rational approach to religious matters.286 Although the Caliph is not specifically 
named, under the circumstances al-Ma’mūn would seem to be the most logical guess. Hayek 
puts the upper end of the date range of this work at 818, when Abū al-Hudhayl is said to 
have left Basra for Baghdad.287 Hayek’s reasoning is that he feels that this is the work to 
which Abū al- Hudhayl al-‘Allāf replied when he wrote his work ‘Against ‘Ammār the 
Christian’.  However, there is no solid evidence that Abū al- Hudhayl was the recipient of this 
work. Although it is very likely from the content of the work that ‘Ammār not only knew of Abū 
al- Hudhayl’s teachings, but had them clearly in mind when writing them, it is not clear who 
was responding to whom, or even whether Abū al- Hudhayl would have read ‘Ammār’s 
works, as none of the Mu‘tazilī’s writings have survived.  
                                                          
285 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, 604-610 
286 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Basrī, 93 
287 Hayek, M. ‘Ammār al-Basrī: La Première Somme de Théologie Chrètienne en Langue Arabe, ou 
deux Apologies du Christianisme, Islamochristiana 1 (1975), 71 
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The Burhān can be dated a little more precisely to 838 or not long after in accordance with 
the reference to the ‘king of our time’ found in the introduction and mentioned previously. If 
the dating of the Burhān to 838 is correct, it is unlikely that Abū al- Hudhayl would have even 
read it, let alone responded to it, as it is thought that he died around 840 in Baghdad, at a 
great age,288 and that he was senile for the last two decades of his life, which would mean he 
would not have written any works after about 820. ‘Ammār’s work does not name am explicit 
recipient, but makes reference to someone he calls the mu’min bi-l wāḥid (believer in the 
one) Although this reference to the mu’min bi-l wāḥid is obscure, it is well known that for the 
Mu‘tazila especially, the unity and transcendence of God was held as perhaps the most 
fundamental tenet of their thinking by this time. It could be then, that the phrase is being used 
to subtly accuse ‘Ammār’s opponent of stripping God of his divine attributes, an argument 
which he explicitly uses in both works. 
 
As the Burhān itself makes reference to a dateable event, and there is not enough 
circumstantial evidence to put a twenty year gap between the two compositions, it is 
probable that the Masa’il was actually written after 818 and anytime up to the death of the 
                                                          
288 Nyberg, H.S. ‘Abu al-Huḏayl al-Allāf’, website available from: 
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ei2/allaf.htm; accessed 18/05/09 
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Caliph al-Ma’mūn in 833, if we accept that it is al-Ma‘mūn who is being referred to. Like, the 
Burhān, the Masa’il may well have been a response to the thinking of Abū al-Hudhayl even 
though he had left Basra and was likely to be less compos mentis by that point, or, by the 
same token, may have actually been written with other Mu‘tazilī scholars in mind such as 
Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr (c. 728-815) or al-Naẓẓām (d.c. 835-845), who also held similar beliefs on the 
unity of God. Indeed, as ‘Ammār makes no direct reference to his addressee, it is entirely 
possible that he is responding to a prominent strand of Muslim thought, which at this time 
would be Mu‘tazilī thought, as he experienced it in Basra, rather than to one specific scholar. 
 
Preserved by the Coptic Church in Egypt, ‘Ammār’s two extant works survive in full in only a 
single manuscript, which is held in the British Library (dated 1297). A summary of the two 
works, made by the bibliographer al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assal (fl. early thirtheenth century) 289   also 
exists in two manuscripts: one located in a monastery in Charfeh, Lebanon and the other in 
the Vatican Library. 290   
 
                                                          
289 Al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assal, along with his two younger brothers, wrote a great number of theological 
works. See: Meinardus, O. F. A. Two thousand years of Coptic Christianity, (Cairo: American 
University in Cairo Press, 2002), 59 
290 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim Relations, 606 
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As its title indicates, the Masā’il is constructed as four sets of questions and answers: the 
confirmation of the eternity and oneness of God and verification of the origination of the world 
(twenty questions); the affirmation of the Holy Gospel (fourteen questions); the affirmation of 
the oneness of the creator in three hypostases (nine questions); and the reason for the 
incarnation of the Word and what follows it, on the uniting and the death and the resurrection 
(fifty one questions).  Certainly many of the questions posed would be the sort of questions 
asked of Christianity by Muslims. However, the way in which they are systematically 
arranged and addressed to logically lead the reader to accept the truth of Christianity would 
suggest that ‘Ammār has moulded such questions to suit a Christian agenda.  
 
It is the third section of the work on God’s oneness in three hypostases which is of 
paramount interest here, as it deals with the question of the Trinity. The section is composed 
of nine questions, although the ninth question is missing from the manuscript and is only 
indicated by a summary made by Ibn al-Assāl291.  
 
                                                          
291 Hayek, ‘La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe’, 115 
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The first ‘question’ immediately addresses the fundamental challenge posed by Muslims in 
relation to the doctrine of the Trinity: How can one be three and three be one? From this start 
point, the rest of the questions logically probe further into the doctrine, requiring ‘Ammār to 
deal with more detailed queries including: why Christians feel the need to establish a 
substantial life and wisdom for God; whether God needs his Word and Spirit; why Christians 
refer to the three aspects of the Godhead as three characteristics or individuals; why these 
three aspects should be referred to as Father, Son and Holy Spirit; why Christians cannot 
prove these names through rational measures; and how each of the hypostases can be a 
perfect divinity without there being three perfect divinities.  
 
The Burhān is composed of twelve sections which together form a general apology for 
Christianity, clearly influenced by the challenge of Islam, much in the same vein as certain 
works written by Christian contemporaries such as Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’ita. The titles of 
the sections, where missing, have been provided by the Coptic scribe Abū Barakāt Ibn Kabar 
(d.1324) and Ibn al-‘Assāl.  
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The apology begins with a section on the ‘Confirmation of the existence of God’, which briefly 
lays out logical arguments for God’s existence, before pointing out that all of the Abrahamic 
religions believe that God is one. Even the dualists argue that there is one God, he says, 
although they place the devil alongside Him. ‘Ammār also quotes Plato and Aristotle claiming 
that they too were monotheists, indicating the importance and use of Greek philosophy in 
Christian and Islamic thought at the time. ‘Ammār then uses this section to set up the second 
chapter, his criteria for discerning the ‘true  religion’292, through an argument for the use of 
rational minds, since although God has ceased to send miracles or prophets, He is still a just 
God, and as such must necessarily continue to guide mankind.  After outlining his criteria for 
the true religion the author’s third chapter illustrates how, according to reason, one should 
accept Christianity as the true religion. The following chapters deal more directly with Muslim 
accusations and concerns about Christian doctrines and practices. Chapter four responds to 
the Muslim accusation that Christians have falsified their scriptures, chapter five addresses 
the Christian belief in the Trinity, whilst chapters six and seven clarify the teaching on the 
uniting and offers proofs for the Incarnation. The last five chapters are concerned with other 
                                                          
292 For more see: Griffith, S. H. ‘Comparative Religion in the Apologetics of the First Christian Arabic 
Theologians’ in Griffith The Beginnings of Christian theology.  
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obvious discrepancies between Muslim and Christian belief and practice, such as the 
crucifixion, baptism, the Eucharist, the cross, and eating and drinking in the hereafter.  
 
 
4.2. Setting the Context 
In his two works, ‘Ammār sets the context for his explanation of the Trinity slightly differently. 
In the Burhān, the Nestorian theologian begins by attacking a Muslim position concerning the 
divine attributes of God; pointing out its contradictions before likening the concept of the 
attributes to Christian doctrine of the Trinity in a way that appears to suggest the two 
doctrines are potentially comparable and that the Trinity is a better expression of the nature 
of God. In the Masa’il his scheme is not quite so linear: whilst he deals with many of the 
same themes surrounding the Trinity, often in more detail, and criticises the Muslims 
position, his explanation is given by way of answering separate questions.  
 
4.2. 1. What can be known about God 
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At the beginning of the Masā’il, Ammār confirms that God is one who is unique in His 
essence (dhāt), nature (ṭabā‘) and eternity (azaliyya), with ‘no equal in his substance and no 
resemblance between his actions and the actions of those whom he created’293, something 
which he repeats in the Burhān.294 The notion of partition in the Godhead is strongly rejected 
by ‘Ammār, who points out that divisions and parts cannot be attributes (ṣifāt) of one who is 
bodiless or has no form. 
‘We have informed you earlier that He who created creatures with His Word and 
Spirit is without a doubt one in his substance and unique (munfarid) in His nature, 
division does not reach him, partition does not apply to Him.’295  
 
‘Ammār seems to stress this point for his Muslim audience. Indeed, it seems necessary for 
him to reiterate again and again that Christians fully agree with Muslims on the basic 
oneness of God, that they are monotheists, and that their doctrine of the Trinity does not 
allow or create partition, division or polytheism (shirk).  
 
                                                          
293 Hayek. ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 149.9 
294 ibid., 50.11 
295 ibid., 153.1-2 
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The question of the nature of God is implicitly linked to that of what can actually be known 
about the divine being. The Neoplatonic notion which led to the concept of ‘negative 
theology’ in both religions was taken to the extreme by some Muslim thinkers of the time.296 
Therefore although ‘Ammār stresses the oneness, uniqueness and ultimate transcendence 
of God throughout both works, he is nevertheless keen to explain and defend the use of 
temporal analogy in describing the nature of God. In contrast to the Muslim position, the 
willingness of Christian theologians to use analogies and metaphors from the visible world in 
explaining the nature of God shows that for them, God could be ‘known’ and ‘described’ to 
some extent, as long as one kept in mind the inadequacy of human language and the limited 
nature of human knowledge. 
 
Fully aware that his Muslim readers would not favour the use of analogy, ‘Ammār is very 
careful to point out that the only similarity between creator and created lies in shared 
                                                          
296 Early influential Mu‘tazilites, such as Abū al-Hudhayl and al-Naẓẓām, strove to protect the utter 
transcendence of God through the use of negative theology, i.e. the ability to say what God is not 
rather than what God is, for example by saying ‘God is knowing’, one would actually mean that they 
deny ignorance of Him. Cf. Chapter 1, 56-61 
Meanwhile the Jahmites, who took their name from their leader Jahm ibn Safwān (d.745), supposedly 
a contemporary of the earliest Mu‘tazilites, stressed the complete inability of humans to know anything 
about God. For Jahm ibn Safwān , God had no characteristics at all, which represented an even more 
extreme position than Abū al-Hudhayl and his followers. 
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common names; there is no resemblance in the ‘essence of their meanings’.297 This is a 
point he repeats in both writings. In the ‘Proof’ ‘Ammār illustrates this point by likening the 
use of analogy to a man asked to create an image or model of a king whom another person 
had never seen. The man would not be able to make the model see or hear or taste or move 
like the king himself can. Therefore whilst the model is a likeness of the king, it actually does 
not resemble him in any respect, which is analogous to Christian descriptions of God.298 The 
use of analogy will be discussed further in Chapter 5.1. 
 
After explaining and defending the ability to know something of God and the use of analogy 
to describe Him, ‘Ammār turns to what we can infer about the nature of the divine being. 
From observing God’s creation, ‘Ammār tells us, it has to be concluded that there is the 
existence of only one pre-existent source (‘ayn)299 which made and created.  
 
                                                          
297 Hayek. ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 166.10 
298 ibid., 50-51 
299 150.2. For a brief consideration of the term ‘ayn. cf. Chapter 5, 338, n.478 
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The nature and actions of inanimate things indicate that they perform actions naturally, such 
as fire burning. A fire cannot choose to stop burning when it comes across wood, and its 
nature is recognised by the characteristics of these actions. In contrast, it is clear that God 
created the world intentionally and that he has the ability to abstain or refrain from creating 
as well as to create. He chose when to begin creating the world and chooses when to act. 
This proves then that God has will and volition, which can only be attributed to one who has 
‘speech’ (nutq), that is to say one who is articulate and rational. Continuing with his 
argument, ‘Ammār observes how animals instinctively perform actions in order to obtain 
sustenance, aspiring to nothing more than what they need to survive. Meanwhile, ‘Ammār 
continues, it is clear that God created the world not to fulfil any need within Himself, but 
through choice.300 As God is infinitely pre-existent (qidam ğanā) it follows that He was able to 
do without what He came to create later on, and placed Himself far above his creation which 
showed that he did not need to create the world for His own sake. If not for His own sake, 
then God’s creation of the world must be an act of generosity (jūd) and grace (na‘ma), 
qualities (faḍā’il) which can only come from one possessing wisdom. Altogether then, 
according to ‘Ammār, this confirms the ‘substantial nature’ (jawhariyya) of God’s Word and 
the eternity (azaliyya) of His Wisdom. By substantial nature, ‘Ammar appears to mean the 
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‘essentiality’301 of God’s Word, that His Word is directly of or inherently linked to His 
substance or ousia.302 He concludes:   
‘And however you consider these creatures, your opinion compels you to be certain 
that whoever created them and whoever governs them is single (mutawaḥḥid) in his 
substance, triple (muthalath) in his characteristics without a doubt.’303 
 
 
4.2.2. Criticism of teaching that God has no ‘Word’ or ‘Life’  
After a short introductory paragraph to chapter five of the Burhān, ‘Ammār directly challenges 
his reader: 
                                                          
301 The connotations of the word ‘substantiality’ in English (which would be a more faithful or literal 
translation of ‘jawhariyya’) would appear to be too concrete and material to convey the sense of 
‘Ammār’s meaning here. Interestingly, it is possible that the connotations of the Arabic terms 
jawhar/jawhariyya were also too temporal to refer to God in the eyes of some of ‘Ammār’s Muslim 
readers. This will be explored further in chapter 5.3. 
302 Later, ‘Ammār will explain that only word and life are of God’s substance, all other attributes are 
somehow derived from or rely upon these two. In the case of wisdom, as mentioned here, ‘Ammār will 
argue that only articulate, rational beings, that is to say those who have ‘word’, can be called wise.  
303 ibid., 152.9-11. The argument from design, that is to say establishing the existence and unity of 
God through what can be seen in the universe, is not an argument which was alien to Mu‘tazilī 
thinking, indeed the proof of the existence and unity of God is the subject of  al-Jāhiẓ’s k. al- ‘ibar wa 
al-‘itibār (Book of advice and admonition). See: Abrahamov, al-Kāsim b. Ibrāhīm, 2-3. However, 
‘Ammār’s conclusion about God being one and three would certainly have been refuted by his Muslim 
opponents. 
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‘Inform me, oh you believer in the One: Do you say that he is living? If he says yes, 
we say: Does He have life in His essence eternally, like that of the human soul 
[which] has a life in its essence which is substantial? Or an accidental life, like that of 
a body- a life which is received from another and does not have life in the essence of 
its substance?’304 
  
In this way, ‘Ammār sets up the sort of logical dialectical question, found originally in Greek 
philosophical works, which is a key feature of texts composed by those who practised kalām, 
whereby he gives his opponent two options: either agree that God has an eternal life in His 
essence, and therefore agree with Christian teaching; or, say that the life of God is an 
accident, which no Muslim could accept. Considering that his opponent may reply that God 
has neither an essential eternal Life nor an accidental one, ‘Ammār responds pre-emptively 
by accusing him of avoiding the issue, and particularly avoiding the term ‘living’ so as not to 
be forced to affirm that God has ‘Life’. There can be little doubt that this argument is aimed at 
those of the Mu‘tazila, such as Ḍirār b. ‘Amr (c.a. 728-815), Abū al-Hudhayl or possibly al-
Naẓẓām, who would say that God is ‘living’ but refused to say that God has ‘Life’ in the noun 
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form, for it was felt that that would imply a real distinct attribute alongside God, which would 
make Him a plurality.   
 
By beginning with this statement of belief which he attributes to his opponent, ‘Ammār 
immediately takes up the problems and paradoxes created by such a formulation, in a 
manner not altogether unlike Abū al-Hudhayl’s Muslim critics, by focussing initially on the 
linguistic and grammatical difficulties caused by Abū al-Hudhayl’s formulation rather than the 
ontological aspect of the problem.305 ‘Ammār asks his Muslim interlocutor:  
‘…then how do you use the noun/name ‘the living’ (al-ḥay), when the name ‘the living’ 
is derived from ‘life’ (al-hayā), because we call the human being ‘living’ as long as 
                                                          
305 The desire among Muslims to understand the Qur’an, God’s word in a ‘clear Arabic tongue’ 
(26:195), meant that linguistic sciences such as grammar and philology were among the first to 
develop in Islam. As Richard Frank puts it, ‘…grammar is the first science to reach maturity in Islam—
before the end of the second/eighth century—and it does so, almost completely apart from earlier and 
alien traditions, as a peculiarly Islamic science. This attention to language, most particularly the 
language of the Koran and to the grammatical and lexical structures and the characteristics of literary 
Arabic, had a profound influence on the formation and development of the kalām…not simply in their 
terminology but also in the manner in which many fundamental problems of ontology and ethics…were 
conceived, formulated, and analysed.’   ‘Frank, R M. Beings and their attributes: The teaching of the 
Basrian school of the Mu‘tazila in the classical period (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1978), 10 
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there is ‘life’ in him and if his spirit of life withdraws from him he is dead306…For we do 
not know [what] a thing is called except from what it has and not from what it does not 
have.307’ 
 
‘Ammār seems to be rejecting his adversary’s statement on two levels. Firstly, appreciating 
the importance of the science of grammar in Islamic thinking, he shows the formulation to be 
grammatically unsound, arguing that the name ‘the living’ (al-ḥayy) as found in the Qur’an 
must be derived from the noun life, therefore it is linguistically impossible to refer to a being 
as ‘living’ without having ‘life’. The adjective cannot apply without the noun as the adjective 
must be derived from the noun, according to ‘Ammār. The idea that the noun or ‘ism’ is at the 
base of everything is one which the Mu‘tazila would most likely have accepted in terms of the 
created world, but one which they rejected with regard to God. Whilst God could be called 
‘Knowing’, He did not necessarily have ‘Knowledge’, a point which would be made and 
argued by different Mu‘tazilī scholars in different ways.  
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On an ontological level, ‘Ammār explains that very ‘entity’ (ma‘nā) of ‘living’ is life and so by 
not affirming life one must necessarily affirm the opposite which is death.  By denying God 
life, therefore, ‘Ammār’s adversary is making Him dead.  
 
In the Masā’il too, ‘Ammār appears to be directly tackling the formulation posed by Abū al- 
Hudhayl concerning God’s relationship to his divine attributes.  
‘But how can it be possible for rational minds to believe, [knowing] certainly that He is 
a substance above partition and division, that the meaning of the statement of the 
one who says ‘does not cease to be living’ is the [same as the] meaning of his saying 
‘does not cease to be wise?’308 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, Abū al-Hudhayl’s formulation that God’s attributes were ‘He’, 
i.e. identical to His essence, created a paradox which his Muslim contemporaries were quick 
to point out.  If the attributes were identical to God, then how was it possible to distinguish 
between them, or why would they need different names, such as ‘living’ and ‘wise’, if they 
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were identical to Him and presumably therefore to each other as well?  From the passage 
above it seems that ‘Ammār also picked up on this difficulty, thus involving himself directly in 
the internal Muslim debate concerning the divine attributes, and showing logically that God 
must have an existent and distinct ‘Life’ and ‘Word’ in order for Him to be deemed ‘living’ and 
‘speaking’.  
 
‘Ammār recognises that in calling God living, wise and so on, Abū al-Hudhayl and his peers 
are wanting only to deny lifelessness and ignorance of Him, but if they deny Him life and 
wisdom, he points out, then surely they are achieving exactly the opposite of what they had 
intended.  
‘He [the Muslim] has fled from confirming the Word and Spirit because he might be 
forced to allow three entities (ma‘ānī) in the essence of the Creator…’ 309 
 
 
‘Ammār’s accusation is that by reducing God to one who is single in entity, who has no life or 
word in his essence, his Muslim counterparts are reducing God to a mere accident or 
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capacity, unable to subsist in Himself. In fact, in ‘Ammār’s opinion, they are actually 
obliterating the Creator completely, stripping Him of his attributes, and making Him no more 
than the idols which were worshipped in pre-Islamic times.310  The Christians, he says, do not 
do this; they attribute to God the most perfect of what they know. This again, is something he 
repeats in both works.311 
 
 
4.2.3. God’s relationship to His Word and Life 
In each of his sections on the Trinity in his two works, but more explicitly in the Burhān, 
‘Ammār explains the doctrine of the Trinity by likening it to the internal Islamic debate 
pertaining to the divine attributes of God. Having demonstrated in the Burhān that God must 
have Word and Life, he states: 
                                                          
310 Interestingly, the accusation of stripping God of his magnificence put ‘Ammār alongside opponents 
of the Mu‘tazila in this respect, agreeing with those such as the followers of Ibn Ḥanbal on one side, 
and the followers of Ibn Kullāb on the other, who all felt that the Mu‘tazila, in their attempt to preserve 
God’s unity and transcendence, were actually going so far that they were to be accused of ta‘ṭīl , that 
is to say ‘emptying’ or ‘divesting’ Him of his divine attributes. 
311 Ibid., 51.20-22 and 164. 3-5 
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We do not say of God that he is three divinities, rather we do not want in our teaching 
of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, to do anything more than give clarification on the 
statement that God is living and speaking. So we mean that the Father is the one who 
has life and word. And the life is the Holy Spirit and the word is the Son…’312  
 
This apparently direct equation of the Son and Holy Spirit with the attributes of life and word, 
within the Mu‘tazilī framework of the doctrine of the attributes, is quite remarkable. For 
although ‘Ammār has been innovative in logically leading his argument to this point, what he 
seems to have done is to reduce the Son and Holy Spirit to attributes of God, which no 
Christian would accept, and from what follows, as will be seen in the following section, it 
seems that it is not what ‘Ammār himself actually believes. However, if ‘Ammār is taken to be 
equating hypostases with attributes, he has placed himself firmly into the framework of the 
divine attributes debate and therefore also into the ‘firing line’ of his Muslim opponents. Up 
until this point, the potential distinction between Muslim attributes and Christian hypostases 
remained a possible loophole. With this statement, however, ‘Ammār appears to have all but 
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committed himself fully to the Islamic debate and therefore is subject to criticism according to 
the dictates of that framework.  
 
In order to see this argument through within the framework of the divine attributes debate, 
‘Ammār must logically show why the attributes of ‘word’ and ‘speech’, which are only two of 
many attributes of God in Islamic thinking, should be related to God’s essence in a special 
way. This explanation takes up a large part of his Burhān and is also found in his Masāil. In 
essence ‘Ammār sets out to show how all other attributes can be seen to somehow rely on or 
derive from the two substantial attributes of word and life. This argument, referred to in this 
study as the “attribute-apology” will be addressed in more detail towards the end of this 
chapter and in Chapter 5.5. 
 
In the Masā’il, the “attribute-apology” is followed by a more typically Christian explanation of 
God’s relation to His Word and Spirit, although still framed in the discourse of the ‘ilm al-
kalām. ‘Ammār does this by answering a question on whether God requires His Word and 
Spirit or not. ‘Ammār directly dismisses the question as absurd. How can one ask whether 
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the Creator needs something which is naturally of the substance? Here he is using logical 
reasoning to criticise the question itself as erroneous: to answer in the affirmative would 
suggest that God is somehow lacking without His Word and Spirit, and to answer in the 
negative would prompt the question as to why the Christians speak of Him in these terms if 
He does not actually need His Word and Spirit. Instead ‘Ammār attempts to clarify that God’s 
Word and Spirit are inherent to his substance, with the effect that one cannot speak of Him 
‘needing’ or ‘not needing’ them.  He uses an analogy to illustrate his point:  
‘Or what would you say if someone were to ask you: ‘Does fire need its heat and 
dryness, and does water need its coldness and moistness? … you know that the 
natural constitution (sūs) of the substance of fire is heat and dryness, and the natural 
constitution of the substance of the water is its coldness and moistness.’313 
 
The implication by analogy is that word and life have a similar relationship or stature in terms 
of the substance of God. The term sūs appears in both of ‘Ammār’s works, here in 
conjunction with ’jawhar’ and later with ‘dhāt’. It is a word which is not common amongst 
                                                          
313 ibid., 159.6-9  
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Arabic- speaking Christian theologians314 or their Muslim contemporaries, seems to mean 
something along the lines of nature, natural constitution or origin.315 
 
What it appears ‘Ammār is trying to say here is that heat and dryness are key elements of 
fire, so much a part of the nature of fire or of the natural constitution of the substance of fire, 
that fire could not be called fire without them. It is not that he is suggesting that fire needs 
these elements or characteristics as such, but that these elements are so much a part of the 
entity of fire that the question of needing them is absurd in itself. In a similar manner, if God 
is God, then He must be living and rational or articulate. This is how ‘Ammār deals with the 
original question put to him, whether God needs his Word and Spirit. In keeping with the 
methodology of kalām disputation, neither potential answer as set up by his hypothetical 
interlocutor can be accepted, therefore it must follow that the statement or question is 
absurd.  
 
                                                          
314 Rachid Haddad notes that the anonymous author of ‘La Somme des aspects de la foi’ uses the 
term sūs, amongst others, in place of ṭabī‘a, though the example he gives refers to the nature of man 
rather than God. Haddad, La Trinité divine, 165 
315 See: Lane, Edward William. An Arabic-English lexicon (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), 1466 Lane 
gives the. example  ﻪﺳﻮﺳ ﻦﻣ ةﺣﺎﺼﻔﻟا meaning ‘eloquence is [a quality] of his nature’. 
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4.3. Explanation of the Trinity 
4.3.1. Four ‘Categories’ 
Despite the apparent comparison of attributes to hypostases, one soon realises that 
‘Ammār’s conception of the Trinity is actually a fairly traditional one. Although he holds the 
two concepts up side by side, ‘Ammār, in both of his works, gives an explanation of the term 
hypostasis which makes it clear that an uqnūm could never be a ṣifa. 
 
As a premise to discussing the use of the terms jawhar (ousia, substance) and uqnūm 
(hypostasis) in relation to God, ‘Ammār reminds his reader, in both works, of the four basic 
categories into which everything falls: substance (jawhar), capacity (quwa), accident (‘araḍ) 
and hypostasis (qunūm). In the Burhān:  
‘For you know that things must fall into four categories. Either substance, as one 
might say ‘human’; hypostasis such as one might say Moses and David and 
Solomon; capacities like heat of fire and rays of the sun; or an accident like blackness 
of something black and whiteness of something white. The most perfect of these four 
things are substances (jawāhir) and hypostases (aqānīm) For all substances have 
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this capacity like heat to the fire, rays to the sun, and they also have the ability to 
support accidents. Every substance also has two capacities such as the earth having 
coldness and dryness; water having coldness and moisture; fire having heat and 
dryness; and air having heat and moisture. They are therefore single in their 
substances and tripled in their entities. And the hypostases too, as one could say of 
Moses, David and Solomon, that each one is subsistent in himself, not needing the 
others, whereas accidents and capacities are single in their entities, they cannot 
stand by themselves like the substance and the hypostasis, they have need of the 
substance which supports them and in which they exist.’316  
 
His description in the Masā’il is very similar.317 ‘Ammār’s argument is that of the four 
categories which are made known to humans, Christians attribute the most perfect, self-
sufficient ones to God, whereas Muslims stress God’s simplicity to such an extent that they 
                                                          
316 ibid., 51.5-14 
317 ibid., 162.6-11 ‘…either a substance (jawhar) which is like the entire human, and fire, water and 
what is similar to these things. Or one of the capacities (qūwa) of the substance, and that is like 
speaking for the human, heat [in relation to] fire, humidity to water and so on, which establishes the 
essence (dhāt) of the thing and its quiddity (māhiya). Or the accident (‘araḍ) in the substance, so this 
is like the whiteness in snow or blackness in tar and length, width and shortness and such similar 
things. Or the hypostasis (qunūm) from the substance, so this is like the human being in his soul and 
his body from the human race, and like the angel Gabriel in his particular hypostasis from among the 
angels, and what resembles this from the spiritual and corporeal hypostases…’ 
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make Him no better than capacities or accidents, both of which are simple, cannot stand 
alone, and have need of substances to support them in order to exist, unlike the categories 
of substance and hypostasis. By implication, an attribute (ṣifa), would have to be an attribute 
of something, and therefore is similar the categories of capacities and accidents, in that it is 
not a self-subsistent entity, like a hypostasis. 
 
‘Ammār’s categories appear to be loosely based on Aristotelian ones, four predicables which 
will always fall into one of the ten categories or predications which he lists as: substance, 
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. In Aristotle, the 
four predicables are accident, genus, peculiar property and definition. Accidents and 
particular properties are non-essential, whilst a genus such as ‘animal’, for example, and a 
definition such as ‘horse’ are essential.318 ‘Ammār’s schema, which is also found in Theodore 
bar Konī319, has clearly been adapted to suit his Christian agenda, and therefore would seem 
to be representative of this aspect of Greek philosophy as passed down through the 
Nestorian church. The schema, in this particular form, does not appear to be referred to in 
                                                          
318 Smith, R. ‘Aristotle’s Logic’, The Standford encyclopedia of philosophy, available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/; last accessed 7/3/11 
319 Cf. Griffith, ‘The concept of ‘al-uqnūm’, 185 
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contemporary Muslim sources, though Muslims do often attribute to Christians the 
Aristotelian notion that all things must be either substance or accident.320 
 
Shortly after discussing the ‘four categories’ in the Masā’il, ‘Ammār challenges the Muslims 
by commenting that it is surprising that intelligent people would refuse to call God a 
substance with specific hypostases but then would allow the ‘simple capacity’ and ‘needing 
accident’, both of which are imperfect and limited in that they cannot exist independently. The 
Christians, he points out, have only spoken of God using the best of terms available, implying 
that the Muslims have, in fact, done the opposite.321 This is another argument upon which he 
elaborates in the Burhān.322 It is highly unlikely that any Muslim would actually allow God to 
be considered a simple capacity or accident. What ‘Ammār appears to be implying, however, 
is that by making God strictly one and simple, and by refusing to conceive of the divine 
                                                          
320 Most of the  Muslim mutakallimūn would also have adhered to this principle, though only in terms of 
temporal beings. For them, God transcends such categories. 
321 ibid., 163-164 
322 ibid., 51-52 
232 
 
nature in terms of substance and hypostases, his Muslim opponents are forced to speak of 
God as an accident.323 
 
 From the Islamic side, these terms, which ‘Ammār seems to feel Muslims will accept, if they 
appeared at all in Islamic thought, had somewhat different connotations to his usage of them. 
Jawhar and ‘araḍ both appear in Islamic thought but together had a distinctive role in the field 
of physical theory or ‘Atomism’, as developed by some of the Mu‘tazilī thinkers, and 
significantly Abu al-Hudhayl. Al-qūwa does not appear to be a Mu‘tazilī term. As for the term 
qunūm, as a transliterated loan word from Syriac it would have been introduced by Christian 
thinkers and not used within Islamic circles, although we know Muslims were aware of the 
term as Christians used it, as it appears in most of the extant Muslim works referring to the 
                                                          
323 Here again, one finds the implication that all things fall into one of four categories. This is 
something which Muslims such as al-Warrāq (Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity”, 100) 
and later al-Bāqillānī reject. Al-Bāqillānī addresses a Christian claim that everything must be either 
substance or accident and dismisses it by arguing that whilst such rules may be true for the created 
world, they cannot be said in relation to God. Thomas, Christian Doctrines, 144 
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Trinity from the early ninth century and beyond.324 The Arabic terminology used by Christian 
authors in relation to the nature of God will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.3.  
 
 
4.3.2.‘One and three’ is not a numerical issue  
The question of oneness and threeness, which he clearly knows is troublesome for his 
Muslim counterparts, is one which ‘Ammār addresses directly in the question of the third part 
of the Masā’il. ‘Ammār begins by clearly stating that the oneness and threeness of God is not 
a numerical issue.325 What the Christians mean, when they talk about the Trinity, is that God 
is ‘one eternal substance who does not cease to be existent by three properties (khawāṣṣ) or 
essentialities326 (jawhariyyāt) which are not dissimilar or distinctive or separated.’327 Drawing 
fundamentally on Aristotle’s ‘unity of species’, ‘Ammār sets out to show that God is not one 
                                                          
324 See for example the works of Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq (d.c.864) in Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s 
“Against the Trinity” ; Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (d.c.870) in  Périer, A. ‘Un traité de Yaḥyā ben ‘Adī’; and Al-
Nāshi’ al-Akbar (d.906) in Thomas, Christian Doctrines, 19-77 
325 This is an argument which Abu Rā’iṭa uses as the basis of his defence of the doctrine of the Trinity 
in his Al-risāla al-ūlā, whereby he goes into more detail on Aristotle’s categories. Cf. Chapter 3, 162-7 
326 Cf. n. 35 
327 Hayek, `Ammār al-Baṣrī, 149.3-4  
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or three in number, but that he is one in ‘ousia’ or substance (jawhar) with three 
characteristics or properties (khawāṣṣ).   
 
In the Burhān, ‘Ammār does this by using analogies of the human soul, fire and the sun. 
Firstly he aims to show that without their respective characteristics each of these substances 
could not be given that name, for instance, without light and heat the sun could not be 
referred to as the sun; and secondly how having three aspects does not necessarily 
invalidate the unity of a being. Although one can discern between the sun, its light and its 
heat, one would not refer to it as three suns.328 Here, however, ‘Ammār is careful to 
distinguish between the hypostases of God which are perfect in themselves and not lacking 
or depending upon anything, as opposed to the light and heat of the sun, for example, which 
are merely an illustration. He does this by responding to a question from his possibly 
hypothetical interlocutor about this. The term ‘hypostasis’, he explains, is something used in 
reference to God alone in order to recognise the perfection of God, which ultimately no 
analogy can achieve. The use of analogy is simply to show how a single thing can be 
recognised as three entities, ‘whereby calling its entities three does not invalidate its oneness 
                                                          
328 His other analogies include the word and life of the human soul, and the radiance and heat of fire. 
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of substance.’329 The main example given in the Masā’il is that of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob 
being three individual men, but at the same time sharing a common human nature;330 one 
wouldn’t refer to them as being three different human species.  
 
 
4.3.3. ‘Al-uqnūm’ and the relationship between substance and hypostases  
The substance and hypostases are therefore the most perfect of all the categories, according 
to ‘Ammār. Before he can move on to explain the relationship of the divine hypostases to the 
substance of God, however, ‘Ammār feels it necessary to explain the meaning of the term 
aqānīm. The Muslims, it would appear, ask the question of why Christians call the three 
characteristics or properties (khawāṣṣ) of God three individuals or persons (aškhāṣ), yet not 
three gods. This question is particularly fascinating, as it provides an insight into why 
Christian authors used certain Arabic terminology and particularly why ‘Ammār chooses to 
use the transliterated Syriac term qunūm to denote the Greek term hypostasis as opposed to 
                                                          
329 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 50.12-13 
330 ibid., 171-2 
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any Arabic translation,331 a question which will be dealt with in part two of this study, 
alongside other terms used to describe the nature and unity of God. 
 
In response to the question, ‘Ammār explains that the original statement is incorrect, 
that the Christians do not use the term ‘shakhṣ’ because it connotes ‘a [physical] 
body limited by measurements and characteristics’332, but prefer the term qunūm. 
We did not call them three individuals (ashkhāṣ) and nobody should imagine that we 
have called [them] individuals because for us the individual (shakhṣ) [means] each 
body (jism) defined by its measurements and limbs that separate between him and 
other bodies. Rather we called them in the Syriac tongue three aqānīm.333 
 
The term khawāṣṣ (properties), it would seem, has been employed thus far by ‘Ammār, as a 
kind of temporary alternative to aqānīm (hypostases), until the above passage where he 
introduces and explains the term aqānīm properly. From this point onwards, the appearance 
of the term khawāṣṣ in his writings is significantly less, though he seems to retain it in some 
                                                          
331 In connection with this issue see: Griffith, ‘The concept of al-uqnūm’. 
332 Hayek, `Ammār al-Baṣrī, 162.2 
333 ibid., 162.1-3 
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places as a way to describe temporal or human analogies of the Trinity, as the perfection of 
the hypostases means that they should only be used to refer to the Godhead.334 In the fifth 
chapter of the Burhān, the term khawāṣṣ, is not used at all, with the term ma‘ānī (entities) 
used in its place. 
 
It is possible that, because a khāṣṣa would have to be a property of something and therefore 
dependent on something else, the term did not correctly denote the relationship of the 
hypostases to the substance, which, as ‘Ammār has already told his reader, are independent 
and self-subsistent. Therefore, although maybe useful as a way to introduce the concept of 
al-uqnūm, ‘Ammār may well have felt that the term would be problematic in terms of his 
model of the Trinity. 
 
The Syriac term for hypostasis, he says, means the specific perfect source (al-‘ayn al-khāṣṣ 
al-kāmil) not lacking anything or wanting in any respect. In attempting to find appropriate 
terms to describe the unity and existence of God, he tells his reader, the Christian leaders:  
                                                          
334 ibid.,163  
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‘…could not find in the perceived things anything more perfect in its essence (dhāt) 
or higher in its quiddity (māhiya)335, or self-sufficient in itself (aghnā bi-nafsihī)…so for 
that reason they called it a substance (jawhar). And they saw in this one substance 
known properties (khawāṣṣ), which informs us of the actuality of the original creative 
cause (‘ayn al-‘illa al-aṣliyya al-khalāqa) and its spirit and its word’336.  
 
What ‘Ammār is expressing here, is a model of the Trinity which follows in the tradition of the 
Greek Fathers, who distinguished between what is common to the whole Trinity, that is to 
say of the substance of God, and what is particular to each individual hypostasis. The 
‘original creative cause’ refers to the Father, who differs in hypostatic property to the Son 
(Word) and Holy Spirit (Spirit) in being the cause, principle or source of the other two 
hypostases.337  The best way to describe the perfection of these properties, ‘Ammār tells us, 
                                                          
335
 Māhiya is a philosophical term meaning quiddity or essential nature, literally ‘whatness’. Cf. Chapter 
5.3. 
336 Hayek,`Ammār al-Baṣrī, 162.19-163.3 
337 The debate over the procession of the Holy Spirit, and whether it was caused by the Father alone 
(or through the Son) or whether it was caused by the Father and the Son, known as the ‘filioque 
controversy’, is one which became increasingly important during the ninth century. Cf. Chapter 1, 47, 
n 58   ‘Ammār’s description is clearly one which follows in the tradition of the Greek fathers, as one 
would expect. 
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from the names available to them [the early church], was hypostasis. And so they called 
them hypostases.  
 
As for the relationship between the substance and hypostases, ‘Ammār further explains that 
two of the four categories, which he mentioned previously, are independent, and they are the 
‘general substance’ (al-jawhar al-‘āmm) and ‘specific hypostasis’ (al-qunūm al-khāṣṣ)338, 
whereas the other two cannot stand alone. The idea of the hypostases being the specific or 
particular, as set against the common or general substance was not new in terms of 
Christian thinking, and yet are not directly employed by either Abū Qurra or Abū Rā‘iṭa. There 
are, however, one or two references to be found in Muslim polemical texts, which may shed 
some light on the concepts. The Mu‘tazilī al-Nāshi’ al-Akbar (d.906) refers to the teaching of 
the ‘Trinitarians’, that ‘the Maker is three hypostases and one substance: Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, so the substance is the hypostases in a general way.’339 David Thomas, the 
modern editor of al-Nāshi’’s work who reads the word as ‘general’ (ma‘mūman), does so on 
the basis of two other texts containing similar terms. One is by philosopher Abū Yūsuf al-
Kindī (d.c.866-873) and the other is by the early ninth century theologian Abū ‘īsa al-
                                                          
338 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 162.14 
339 Thomas, Christian Doctrines, 36 
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Warrāq.340 Al-Bāqillānī (d.1013), whose refutation of the Christians has been shown to rely 
on that of al-Warrāq341, also refers directly to the al-jawhar al-‘āmm and asks what it is: ‘Tell 
us about the common substance that combines the hypostases…’342. The Jacobites and 
Nestorians, he claims, say that the substance is not other than the hypostases and the 
question is of whether the substance and hypostases are identical or differentiated. Al- 
Bāqillānī’s argument is that if the substance, which the Christians claim is undifferentiated 
and uncountable, is the hypostases, which are differentiated and countable, and they (the 
hypostases) are the substance, then the substance must also logically be differentiated and 
countable.  
 
A little further on, ‘Ammār introduces a ‘specific substance’ as contrasted with the general 
‘comprehensive’ (shāmil) substance.343 Each hypostasis being a perfect specific substance 
                                                          
340 ibid, 37 n.3 
341 ibid., 132 
342 ibid., 159  
343 Book 5 of Aristotle’s Categories refers to the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ substances; the former 
being particular such as an individual man, and the latter being universal and generic such as 
‘mankind’. In Trinitarian terms, Wallace-Hadrill notes, God became this universal substance and the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit became ‘substantial realities’. John Philoponus followed this logic, we are 
told, and was denounced for it by Severus of Antioch. For Severus the categories should be reversed, 
with the unity of God as the primary term due to the indivisibility and oneness of the substance and the 
hypostases being second in rank. Meanwhile, John Chrysostum appears to have coined the phrase 
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does not require that they are three substances and therefore three divinities, but instead 
one general comprehensive substance and therefore one God.  
Al-Warrāq, in the opening paragraphs of his Against the Trinity, says of the Nestorians, 
Jacobites and Melkites that:  
‘They all claim that these three hypostases are uniform in substantiality and 
differentiated in hypostaticity, that each of them is a specific substance, and that the 
one comprehensive substance is common to them.’344  
 
Al-Warrāq continues to address the Trinity in terms of general and specific substance 
repeatedly throughout his refutation. Therefore, despite not being specifically referred to in 
such terms by Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa in their works on the Trinity, it would seem that the 
concept was a common one in the ninth century eastern Christian context.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
‘particular substance’ in reference to the incarnate Word. Wallace-Hadrill, D.S. Christian Antioch: A 
study of early Christian thought in the East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 93-95 
344 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity”, 66 
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Using a human analogy, ‘Ammār demonstrates that Abraham, Isaac and Jacob each have a 
specific perfect substance, but that they as humans are not three complete substances.345 
They all have the same one ‘human’ substance. Likewise, he says, each of the eternal 
properties is a complete substance because of their superiority and height above capacities 
(al-qūwā) and ‘wanting accidents’ (al-a‘rāḍ al-muḍtarra). Therefore, the three hypostases are 
one comprehensive divinity and so not three complete gods but one general comprehensive 
God.346  
 
Here we see ‘Ammār coming towards a standard Christian explanation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity as one ousia and three hypostases, each of the hypostases being perfect, 
independent and differentiated amongst themselves, but at the same being inseparable from 
the substance.   
                                                          
345 This analogy is also common to Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa, who adopt Aristotle’s unity of species to 
aid their explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity, though they do not phrase their explanation in 
terms of general and specific substances.  
346 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 172 Al-Warrāq rejects this argument in exactly the same way as he rejects 
most arguments concerning the doctrine, by returning to the question of whether two entities are 
identical or different  from one another, in this case whether the general substance is identical to the 
specific substance or different from it. Thomas, “Against the Trinity”, 98-100 
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In the Burhān, ‘Ammār’s explanation of the relationship between substance and hypostases 
is much less detailed, possibly as his main approach is likening the Trinity to the Muslim 
teaching that God is ‘living’ and ‘speaking’, as will be discussed further later on. His focus, 
therefore, is much more on God’s ‘Life’ and ‘Word’, and how they relate to the substance or 
essence of God, rather than a more traditional clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
 
 
4.3.4. Biblical Proofs 
Following on from the clarification of the nature of the hypostases in the fourth question of 
the Masā’il, the fifth question then hypothetically asks why the hypostases should be called 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
 
‘Ammār responds that these were the terms used by the Apostles, who were qualified to use 
such names. Beginning with the author of the first gospel, Matthew, ‘Ammār quotes 28:19 
‘Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and 
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of the Son and of the Holy Spirit’. He admits that references were ambiguous early on, but 
that it was necessary so that the people would not assume the Fatherhood and Sonship to 
be like a human fatherhood and sonship, that is to say one associated with physical 
procreation. Quoting John 1:1: ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God’, ‘Ammār explains how John named the Word a son, that God was 
the Son in the attire of the Messiah and that he testified to the Spirit and eternal life, and that 
the Spirit proceeds from the essence of the Father.347 
 
According to ‘Ammār, his opponents find these names shocking as they cannot understand 
the terms fatherhood and sonship except through partnership and intercourse; they cannot 
grasp or comprehend the nature of a being in non-human terms. If this is the case, he 
continues, his Muslim adversaries should also deny that God is compassionate and merciful 
or great and mighty, if they can only understand these attributes in human terms. Once again 
he stresses that even if God shares common names with his creatures, there is absolutely no 
resemblance in the essence of their meanings. 
 
                                                          
347 Cf. John 14 and 17  
245 
 
Returning to the explanation of these names for the three hypostases, ‘Ammār states once 
again that the people of past ages would not have been able to understand that the 
Fatherhood and Sonship of the godhead was not like the human relationship. It was only 
when the Son incarnate appeared that this relationship between the three hypostases 
needed to be explained. Likewise, the names given to God were all inspired from his 
revealed books; God informed people of the names and attributes he had selected for 
himself, it was not for the people to innovate alone. This statement could well be a reproach 
aimed at the likes of Abu al-Hudhayl who was one of the first Mu‘tazilites to analyse the 
Qur’an in terms of the names and attributes of God. What he felt one was able to do was to 
take words and grammatically reform them to derive different parts of speech. This was due 
to the fact that one not only finds names in the Qur’an such as ‘the Knowing’ (al-‘alīm)348, but 
also instances of God having ‘Knowledge’349. Therefore Abū al-Hudhayl appears to have felt 
justified in identifying attributes from various terms and parts of speech related to God, not 
necessarily just His names.350 Unsurprisingly, the Mu‘tazila were condemned as innovators 
by more conservative and literalist scholars for taking this approach. It is possible that 
‘Ammār is also criticising this practice. 
                                                          
348 For example, Qur’ān 2:115 
349 For example Qur’ān 67:26 
350 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, IV, 441-442 
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In the fifth chapter of the Burhān, ‘Ammār’s only set of biblical references are those which 
confirm that God has Word and Spirit. Quotes such as Job 33:4 ‘The spirit of God created 
me…’351 and Psalm 33:6 ‘By the Word of God the heavens were created and by His Spirit the 
totality of their forces (junūdiha)’’352 serve as two references to the Word and Life or Spirit of 
God, and also appear in the Masā’il .  
 
After showing that God’s Word and Spirit are mentioned repeatedly in the Bible, in the 
Masā’il ‘Ammār uses biblical quotations to construct the argument that God refers to Himself 
in all of his books both in the singular and the plural, thus implying the Trinitarian nature of 
his being. Beginning with Gen. 1:26 Ammār explains: 
                                                          
351 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, in the Burhān, ‘The Spirit of God created me’, 48.13-14 and in the Masā’il 
‘The Spirit of the Lord created me’, 161.3 
 
352
 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 48.12-13 and 161.3-4 
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He said: “We create man in our image and likeness. He doesn’t say “my image” or 
“my likeness”, nor in “our images” or “our likenesses”, but in “our image and our 
likeness”: by that He implied His singleness and tripleness in one saying.353  
 
In this passage, ‘Ammār points out, God used the words ‘our image’ and ‘our likeness’, not 
‘my image’ and my likeness’ nor ‘our images’ and ‘our likenesses’. Therefore God indicated 
his simultaneous threeness and oneness by using a plural possessive pronoun (‘our’) with a 
singular noun (‘image’; ‘likeness’). 
 
None of the numerous uses of ‘we’ found in God’s books, ‘Ammār argues, could be used to 
refer to one person, in the sense of what would today be called the ‘royal we’. This is not the 
case in Syriac, Hebrew, Greek, nor indeed Arabic, he states. He continues defending this 
argument, by refuting the potential claim that when God said “Come, let us divide the 
languages”354, he was talking to the angels, for He did not need their help to do this.355 
                                                          
353 ibid., 160.4-6 Ammār uses the verb khalaqa for ‘create’ and basharan for ‘man’.  
354 Gen. 11:7 Abū Rā’iṭa’s version is the same as this and identical in both his works except he uses 
the verb ta‘ālū (‘Come’) and farraqa (to divide) Keating 116.15-118.1 and 202.1; Dakkash, 92.1. 
‘Ammār uses halammū instead of ta‘ālū and the verb qasama instead of farraqa.(Masā’il)160.6 
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Presumably, this was the typical response of Muslims to the use of the first person plural in 
the Qur’an; that either it is the majestic plural, or that God was referring to himself and 
others, for example, his angels. The use of this ‘plural’ argument is one commonly used by 
Arabic-speaking Christian authors of this period, and, as such, will be discussed further in the 
second part of this thesis. 
 
One other biblical reference he includes in order to support the argument that God points to 
His own Trinitarian nature in the Bible is the following: 
And He says at the beginning of the commandments356: “Hear O Israel, the Lord your 
God, the Lord is one.” God is bringing to their attention [that] the threeness in His 
properties are one in substance.’357 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
355 The two biblical passages used here in support of the ‘plural argument’ are also both found 
phrased in a very similar manner in Theodore bar Koni, whose Scholion may have been a source 
upon which ‘Ammār drew.  Bar Konī, Livres des scolies, 208. The plural argument, however, appears 
to be a common one by ‘Ammār’s period, which can also be found in the Jacobite and Melkite 
traditions, and which is explored further in chapter 5.2. 
356 This is a reference to the Shema found in Deuteronomy 6:4 as opposed to the commandments at 
the beginning of Exodus 20. 
357 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 161.1-2 
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‘Ammār suggests that the repetition of the word God/Lord three times at the beginning of the 
passage indicate that God is three, whilst also stating explicitly that God is one.358  
 
These biblical proofs are designed to support ‘Ammār’s argument that God’s Trinitarian 
nature is indicated in scripture and that His Word and Life or Spirit are the most important 
substantial properties, which forms the basis of his central argument concerning the Trinity in 
the Burhān. The use of biblical proofs in the three authors who form this study will be further 
discussed in chapter 5.2.  
 
 
4.4. Response to Muslim questions 
Having likened the divine attributes of ‘living’ and ‘speaking’ to the hypostases of the ‘Son’ 
and ‘Holy Spirit’, ‘Ammār faces a natural subsequent question from his Muslim interlocutor(s) 
as to why he calls God living and speaking, but does not also affirm that God is hearing, 
seeing, wise, knowing, merciful, generous, willing and so on.  
                                                          
358 Abū Rā’iṭa makes a similar argument about Isaiah 6:3 in which the angels praise God by repeating 
the word ‘Holy’ three times. Cf. 183 
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 ‘Ammār initially refers to the separation of the names and attributes of God into divine acts 
and what he terms ‘properties’ (khawāṣṣ) of the essence,359 once again betraying knowledge 
of the progression of the divine attributes debate, as discussed in Chapter One.360 There is 
some debate as to how early this distinction took place; Van Ess suspects that Abū al-
Hudhayl and al-Naẓẓām may have gradually accepted it and that even Ibn Kullāb avoided it 
for a while,361 although Ibn Kullāb’s formulation that all attributes were ‘neither He nor other 
than Him’ would suggest that he would not have needed to make such a distinction. Al-
Ash‘arī uses the term ṣifāt al-dhāt in reference to all three of them, but it is unclear whether 
this is a later categorisation used anachronistically by al-Ash‘arī, or a term actually employed 
by the scholars he is referring to.  
 
Certainly among later generations of the Mu‘tazila the distinction was made, as we are told 
by al-Ash’arī in his Maqālāt that Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī (d.915) did not accept hearing as an 
essential attribute.362 The number of essential attributes, however, varied according to 
different scholars and different times, for example, Bishr al-Marīsī (d. c. 833-842), at an early 
                                                          
359 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 156 
360 Cf. Chapter 1.3. 
361 Van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft V, 436 
362 ibid., 492 
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stage of the attributes debate, only discussed four: volition (mashī’a), knowledge (‘ilm), power 
(qudra) and creativity (takhlīq)363; whereas later on Bāqillānī (d.1013) stated that there were 
fifteen. Most settled on seven or eight as mentioned above.364  
 
‘Ammār’s initial reaction, therefore, is to question the intelligence of bringing up such a point: 
‘why did you bring up the argument with all that it contains of your differences one and 
alike?’365 How are the Muslims able to question him about other attributes when they 
themselves cannot agree on the number of essential attributes? 
 
In response to the question of why the Christians accept three aspects or characteristics but 
not others, ‘Ammār explains that all substances vary in terms of hearing, sight, power and so 
on and yet still remain the same substance, but that life and speech are different, in that they 
distinguish different types of beings.  
 
                                                          
363 Watt, W.M. The formative period of Islamic thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 1998), 199 
364 Van Ess Theologie und Gesellschaft, Band V, 435 
365 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī ,146.10-11 
252 
 
 All animals and humans have life and all humans have speech, even if a human has some 
defect whereby he cannot speak out loud, he still has the substantial nature of speech 
(jawhariyyat al-nutq)366 engraved (al-maṭbū‘a) within his essence. The basis of ‘Ammār’s 
argument here is that there are three types of being: inanimate, animal and human. 
Inanimate things are lifeless; animals are living; humans are living and articulating. This is 
true and constant for each of the three types of being, it is not possible to have animals who 
speak, or rocks that are alive, or humans that do not speak. Other characteristics, or 
attributes, as he goes on to show, differ among those of the same type of being and across 
types of being. With regard to hearing and sight, he continues, they differ in that they are not 
in the quiddity of the substance (māhiyat al-jawhar) and so animals and humans do differ 
amongst themselves in terms of ability to see or hear. In the Burhān, he adds that these 
attributes should be treated metaphorically, as it is clear that these are faculties attributed to 
bodies, and God has no body.367 In reference to God, he says, ‘all-hearing’ and ‘all-seeing’ 
actually mean omniscient, for, as humans, we perceive and comprehend things through our 
hearing and our sight, and so God has spoken to us in a way which we might understand. 368  
                                                          
366 ibid., 157.8 
367 This is something with which the Mu‘tazila would agree. Cf. al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 155.3 and 301-306 
368 The ‘deanthropomorphisation’ of Qur’anic terms was a key Mu‘tazili concern, deemed necessary to 
protect the transcendence of God. Anthropomorhic references to God such as His having body parts 
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Power, strength and capability have two different aspects: one is physical strength, which, 
like hearing and sight, is also common to both humans and animals, and the other spiritual 
(ruḥāniyya) and psychological (nafsāniyya); that is power which requires the wisdom of the 
soul (ḥikmat al-nafs) and reflection of the mind (rawiyyat al-‘aql).369 This type of power 
belongs to the ‘gentle soul’ which has the ability to command and forbid370, subjugate 
animals and govern affairs of the world. God’s power is his word, by which he does all of 
these things.371 Here, ‘Ammār links word to power more directly, in order to explain the status 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
like hands (38:75) and a face (55:27) were to be read metaphorically, as nothing created could 
resemble God. In an article entitled ‘The speech of God’, A.S. Tritton explains that according to some 
Muslims of the time, in sura 9, verse 6 the word ‘‘hear’ is to be explained as “understand”.’ Tritton, A.S. 
‘The speech of God’, Studia Islamica, 36 (1972), 6 
It is also possible here that ‘Ammār is aware of the position of the ‘baghdādiyyīn’ (those of the 
Baghdad branch of the Mu‘tazila) who claimed that to say God is hearing and seeing means that He is 
knowing or knowledgeable of things that can be heard and seen. al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, 168 
369 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī ,157.19. ‘Ammār also takes time in the Burhān to explain that Word has 
four aspects which are: word as heard through the voice; word as seen written on a page; word 
generated in the soul but not yet expressed through the mouth or on paper; and the power to assess 
and manage affairs (49). This description is not unlike one found in John of Damascus’ Exposition, 
who gives similar categories and then explains: ‘God therefore is Word essential and enhypostatic: 
and the other three kinds of word are faculties of the soul and are not contemplated as having a 
proper subsistence of their own.’ John of Damascus, Exposition, 17 
370 This could be a conscious echoing of Islamic language: God’s ability to command and forbid 
formed one of the five central tenets of Mu‘tazilī doctrine.   
371 Once again, this language is reminiscent of Qur’anic teaching concerning God’s power to create by 
simply using His Word, “Be.” Cf. Suras: 16:40, 36:82, 40:68. 
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or position of that attribute without needing to allow it as an added attribute.372 God’s power is 
his word. 
 
Likewise, will and volition have two aspects: one being instinctive will as seen in animals who 
do only what is necessary for their sustenance; the other being the will to choose, as seen in 
humans. The only way in which our human will differs from the will of the animal is by the 
virtue of articulation or rationality which allows us choice, so it cannot be said to be of the 
core of the essence and structure of the substance in the same way that life and speech can. 
 
Attributes such as mercy (al-raḥma), grace (al-rā’fa), justice (al-‘adl), patience (al-ḥilm), 
magnanimity (al-jūd) and grace (al-ni‘ma) are seen to be effects (ma‘lūlāt) of those who 
speak and are able to reflect. You won’t see a merciful donkey or a just camel, ‘Ammār tells 
his reader in the Masā’il. ‘And that is for the lack of the substantiality of the cause (‘illa) from 
                                                          
372 This seems to be a common counter argument made by Muslims who ask why ‘power’ is not 
recognised as an essential attribute along with life, word, knowledge, existence, or whatever 
combination of ‘attributes’ Christians use to describe the hypostases for their Muslim audience. See 
for example: al-Bāqillānī in Thomas, Christian Doctrines, 152ff. 
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which the previously mentioned effects are generated.’373 None of these things can take the 
place of speech in the natural constitution of the substantiality (binyat al-jawhariyya).  In the 
Burhān such attributes are deemed to be created actions, rather than subsisting in God’s 
essence. Moreover, ‘Ammār explains, ‘these actions only related to one who is 
speaking…’374, again showing word or speech is somehow at the basis of other attributes.375 
 
Finally ‘Ammār comes back to wisdom and knowledge, which can only be related to those 
who are rational beings, who are able to speak: ‘…we do not say we saw a “knowing donkey” 
or a “wise ox”…’376 He then cites Aristotle and Galen as examples of men who are regarded 
as being wise and knowing.  Likewise it is clear from the word of God that He is both wise 
                                                          
373 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 158.10 
374 ibid., 53.14-15 
375  As discussed previously, the question of the distinction between what came to be commonly called 
‘attributes of the essence’ (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and ‘attributes of action’ (ṣifāt al-fi‘l) is not a straightforward 
one. Certainly by the time al-Ash’ari was writing his maqālāt in the late ninth or early tenth century, it 
seems there was an accepted distinction and he uses the two terms frequently when referring to 
thinkers before him. However it is not entirely clear whether the thinkers he refers to actually made 
such clear distinctions themselves and it is therefore possible that he uses these terms somewhat 
anachronistically. 
376 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 55.2 
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and knowing, which means that wisdom and knowledge are derived from the word377. 
‘Ammār explains:  
We arrive at this [position] because we find life and speech of the core/natural 
constitution of the essence (sūs al-dhāt) and from the structure of the substance 
(binyat al-jawhar).’378 
 
This argument is quite intriguing, and, whilst it is found in both works, forms a major part of 
his section on the Trinity in the Burhān and the basis of his “attribute apology” as will be 
explored in Chapter 5.5. By showing how life and speech are superior to God’s other 
attributes, ‘Ammār lays the groundwork for the natural step of equating God’s ‘life’ with the 
Holy Spirit and His ‘speech’ with the Son. 
 
                                                          
377 A. S. Tritton tells us that ‘…according to al-Bāqillānī the Mu‘tazila affirmed that God had no names 
or qualities till he created speech with which other parts of His creation could talk about Him’. Tritton, 
‘The speech of God’, 21-22. This provides another interesting line of argument for other attributes 
being derived from speech, although here speech is said to be quite definitely created, which is not 
what ‘Ammār is saying and does not appear to be what his addressee would argue either.   
378 ibid., 52.13. The term ‘binya‘ does not appear in either Abū Qurra or Abū Rā‘iṭa’s writings on the 
Trinity, and the only indication of it being used in a related sense in Muslim writings is found in a work 
by Mu'ammar Ibn Abbād (d. 834), where he refers to ‘burning’ belonging to the ‘structure of fire’ (binyat 
al-narr). Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, III, 240 
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The ninth and final ‘question’ in the third section of the Burhān is unfortunately 
missing from the London manuscript, and also has parts missing from the Charfeh 
manuscript too. However, part of it has been reconstructed by Ibn al-‘Assāl so that 
one might have some idea of its content. The question, according to Hayek, concerns 
each of the members of the Trinity and whether they are living and speaking. If the 
Christians say no, then they make the hypostases lifeless; if they say yes then each 
hypostasis would have life and speech, which would cause multiple attributes and 
destroy the Trinity. This is an argument which the late tenth centrury Mu‘tazilite ‘Abd 
al-Jabbār puts forward, attributing it to ‘our masters’ (shuyūkhunā), that if all the 
hypostases are all divine and the Christians attribute Word and Life to the godhead, 
then each of the hypostases must have Word and Life; and, as the Father has a Son 
and Spirit, so must the Son have a Son and Spirit, if the Son is also divine and 
shares his being or substance with the Father.379 
                                                          
379 Thomas, Christian Doctrines, 240-244. Al-Bāqillānī makes the same argument, ibid., 169 
Interestingly, ‘Abd al-Jabbār likens the Christians to the Kullābiyya in this respect, whose beliefs he 
says are ‘similar in meaning even though they differ in expression’, 244.5-6 and whose teaching he 
actually finds more appalling than the Christians, as the Kullābiyya allow a number of distinct eternal 
attributes as opposed to the Christians who only claim that there are three. 
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The response which follows is one which is used extensively by Theodore Abū Qurra in his 
work on the Trinity.380 Using human analogies such as the eye and the ear, ‘Ammār explains 
that it cannot be said that both man and his ears are hearing or that both man and his eyes 
are seeing, but that he is one hearer and one seer. This, by implication, is the same for the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who are not all three of them living and speaking individually, but 
that they have one Life and one Word. The difficulty for ‘Ammār is, that once again, because 
he appears to have placed the hypostases firmly within the realm of the divine attributes 
debate he is vulnerable to attack on those grounds. As such, it is clear in Muslim thinking that 
an attribute cannot have an attribute of its own and so the Trinity is attacked in these terms. 
 
4.5. Discussion: ‘Ammār’s understanding of the nature of God 
In terms of content, the sections on the question of the Trinity in each of the works are similar 
and give the reader a picture of ‘Ammār’s understanding of the nature of God and his 
presentation of it in a Muslim Arabic context, which might suggest that they were written 
                                                          
380 Cf.: Graf, G. (ed.) Arabischen Schriften des Theodor Abu Qurra, Bishofs von Harran (ca. 740-820): 
literarhistorische Untersuchungen und Ubersetzung. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1910); and 
Lamoreaux, Theodore Abū Qurrah. 
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more closely together than the twenty years which Hayek suggests is between them. 
Beginning from a common starting point in both works, ‘Ammār emphasises that God is one, 
nothing resembles Him. He explains the doctrine of the Trinity, showing how God can be one 
and three without compromising his divine unity, and that the doctrine of the Trinity is the 
most fitting way to describe the nature of God, as can be seen from both the temporal world 
and revealed scriptures. Defending the use of analogy and metaphor to describe God, 
‘Ammār is keen to justify the use of the terms substance and hypostasis as the most perfect 
of what humans know. The hypostases are named Father, Son and Holy Spirit according to 
scripture. 
 
The chapter in the Burhān is structured according to the argument that the Muslim position 
on the unity of God is illogical and that the Trinity makes much more sense, as God’s word 
and life are equivalent to the Son and Holy Spirit of the Trinity. The section in the Masā’il, 
however, is not so much structured along the lines of this single argument, although many of 
the same elements of the argument can be found. Instead it deals with various sub-themes 
surrounding the nature of God as Trinity, and explaining that not only does the Trinity not 
amount to polytheism, but that it is actually the most appropriate way to conceive of God. 
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Whilst the sections on the Trinity in the Masā’il and Burhān are closely related in terms of 
subject matter, they do vary in style, tone and emphasis. The Masā’il is set out like a 
Christian exposition in the style of a book of questions and answers, which has led some 
modern scholars to think of it as a sort Christian manual like the Scholion of Theodore Bar 
Konī.381 ‘Ammār is obviously aware of and responding to the Islamic context in which he finds 
himself, but overall the work is much more explanatory, and the questions he deals with, 
whilst motivated by Muslim concerns, are set up and answered according to his own 
Christian agenda. The fifth chapter of the Burhān, on the other hand, displays a much more 
direct engagement with Muslim thinking and has more of a polemical feeling to it, even 
though both works are fairly similar. ‘Ammār clearly does not feel the need to introduce the 
concepts behind his arguments, which are often specifically related to Islamic theology, 
which may suggest he is writing for Muslims who share the technical logic, language, and 
background knowledge of his argument. In the Masā’il his explanations and arguments are 
no less complex and certainly more detailed in terms of explanation,  and again refer to 
elements of Muslim teaching without much expansion. ‘Ammār’s tone in the Masā’il appears 
to be less polemical, which might be attributed to the structuring of the work as questions put 
                                                          
381 Griffith, ‘ʿAmmār al-Baṣrī’s Kitāb al-Burhān’, 152 n.23 
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to the Christians, and potentially to the likelihood of the work functioning as a manual for 
Christians to use in debates with Muslims. 
 
The Burhān is a more concise work, whereby arguments and supporting proofs are usually 
more succinct. This can be seen particularly in terms of biblical proofs, the only ones which 
appear in the Burhān are five instances which refer to God having a Word and Spirit, 
whereas in the Masā’il he also employs the ‘plural argument’ which relies on biblical 
references that can be interpreted as God indicating His Trinitarian nature. More knowledge 
is assumed in the Burhān, particularly in relation to ‘Ammār’s criticisms of Mu‘tazilī teachings, 
as detailed above.  
 
The Syriac term qunūm is introduced and explained in the Masā’il and then used throughout 
the Burhān, which would seem to corroborate the idea that the Burhān is the later work, or  
perhaps that it is assumed the reader of the Burhān will not need an explanation concerning 
the unsuitable nature of the term shakhṣ. Meanwhile other terms such as māhiya and ‘ayn do 
not appear in the Burhān, and khawāṣṣ is replaced by ma‘ānī. Once again, one might 
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speculate that this suggests the Burhān to be the later work, as terms like māhiya and 
khawāṣṣ may well have been problematic for a Muslim audience and therefore rejected. The 
other likely explanation for the differences noted above, is that the two works are aimed at 
slightly different audiences, though there is not enough solid evidence to put forward either 
theory with confidence. The Masā’il is structured as a detailed manual of Christian doctrines 
and practices explained as a series of answers to the sorts of questions Muslims would have 
been asking, potentially for the use of Christian scholars to defend their faith; whereas the 
Burhān, or certainly the section on the Trinity in the Burhān, is a more polemical piece of 
writing, very much focused on criticising the Muslim mutakallimūn and expressing the 
doctrine of the Trinity in the language of the divine attributes. The question of audience will 
be further addressed in reference to all of the authors included in this study, in part two. 
 
In order to engage with his Muslim readers, ‘Ammār acknowledges that, for them, God is 
‘speaking’ and ‘living’. If the Muslims acknowledge that God is ‘speaking’ and ‘living’ then, 
according to ‘Ammār, they must accept that He has ‘Word’ and ‘Life’ as a logical 
consequence. Furthermore, evidence from God’s created world and Holy Scripture also point 
to God’s having a word and ‘life’ or ‘spirit’, which are the most superior characteristics or 
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attributes, again being inferred from philosophical logic, the natural world or scriptures. The 
Christians, he says, refer to the Son as the ‘Word of God’ and the Holy Spirit as the ‘Life of 
God’, and therefore implies that Christian and Muslim teaching on the unity of God is not 
completely dissimilar.  
 
What is particularly noteworthy about ‘Ammār’s writings on the Trinity, and in particular the 
Burhān, is the fact that not only does he defend Christian doctrine, he actively criticises a 
certain Mu‘tazilī conception of the unity of God, likens the divine attributes debate to the 
Christian conception of the Trinity almost to the point of equating hypostases with attributes, 
and then explains the doctrine in traditional Christian terms in order to show it to be not only 
reasonable, but a preferable alternative to the Muslim conception of God. 
 
‘Ammār’s point, therefore, as close as he comes to equating attributes with hypostases, 
seems to be that the two doctrines are not completely dissimilar and that there are inherent 
problems with Muslim conception of nature of God as well. In this respect, it would appear he 
is successful in achieving this. In terms of persuading his Muslim opponents of the truth of 
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the doctrine, unfortunately ‘Ammār’s use of the attributes debate and his near equation of 
hypostases with attributes meant that he “dipped his toes”, as it were, into the conceptual 
framework of a Muslim debate and therefore would be subjected to the dictates and logic of 
kalām , where his arguments could easily be refuted according to that logic.382 What 
‘Ammār’s efforts highlight, is that Christians and Muslims were working in fundamentally 
different conceptual frameworks, that hypostases could never be attributes, and neither faith 
were likely to be convinced by the other’s arguments. 
 
Nevertheless, it is likely that ‘Ammār was aware of this, his knowledge of Islamic thought 
indicates, as does his biography, that ‘Ammār would have been living at heart of Islamic 
society during the formative period of Islamic intellectual thought. It is clear from available 
sources that Muslims knew Christian doctrines well enough to state them accurately, even if 
they make no effort to understand them. And this may well have informed ‘Ammar’s project: 
he perhaps knew Islamic thought and his opponents well enough to know that he would not 
convince the Muslims, but perhaps felt that he could explain the doctrine to them in a way 
                                                          
382 Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq does exactly this with an argument very similar to ‘Ammār’s central argument 
concerning the reliance of all attributes on ‘Word’ and ‘Life’. Thomas, “Against the Trinity”, 130-132 
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that would demonstrate its reasonableness through terms and concepts that were familiar to 
them. 
 
It would seem that ‘Ammār’s understanding of the nature of God is a traditional Christian 
understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, but that in explaining the doctrine, ‘Ammār is very 
much aware of and responding to the Islamic intellectual context. In both works he is picking 
up on an internal Islamic debate and using it to help him explain the Trinity. In so far as he 
does this it would appear that he is being fairly creative; introducing the doctrine of the Trinity 
through Muslim language and concepts. Whilst ‘Ammār remains fundamentally loyal to his 
Christian beliefs by trying to clarify the doctrine of the Trinity to his audience through the use 
of traditional Christian methods such as analogy and biblical proofs, his employment of 
philosophical and ontological arguments based on the Muslim debate over the divine 
attributes suggests an element of creativity and opportunism, which arose from a deep 
involvement in, and awareness of, Islamic society.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE TOOLS OF CHRISTIAN ARABIC APOLOGETIC AND POLEMIC 
 
In constructing their respective treatises concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, 
Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī each use a variety of tools, 
arguments and proofs in order to persuade their reader, whether Christian or Muslim, 
of the reasonableness of Christian teaching concerning the nature and unity of 
God.383 The arguments used will be explored in more detail here; their employment, 
origins and reactions to them, in order to trace the continuity and originality of 
Christian proofs for the Trinity and subsequently aid the discussion concerning the 
role of Arabic-speaking Christian theologians in Islamic society and their engagement 
with Muslim theology, which will follow in the final chapter of this thesis.
                                                          
383
 As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the question of audience is a peripheral though not 
insignificant topic in relation to the central research question, and, as such will addressed in chapter 
six of the present study. 
268 
 
5.1. Analogy and Metaphor 
The use of analogy and metaphor to speak about the divine being is one which has a 
long history in the Christian tradition. As Humphrey Palmer puts it, ‘some terms which 
religious people apply to God are not to be taken precisely in their ordinary sense, 
nor yet in a totally different sense, but in a special and related sense…’384 Such 
thinking seems to have stemmed from the fusion of the God of the Old Testament, 
who created man 'in His own image'385 and the Platonic conception of the material 
world. In the Christian mind, therefore, the nature of God can be discerned, albeit 
only faintly, as the temporal world is an imperfect and inferior reflection of the perfect 
eternal realm. On the basis of this, that is to say the acceptance of the use of analogy 
in relation to God, natural analogies were considered to be useful in making difficult 
and abstract theological concepts, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, a little more 
intelligible for the human mind. 
 
                                                          
384  Palmer, H. Analogy: A study of qualification and argument in theology (London: Macmillan, 1973), 
15 
385 Cf. Gen 1:27, Gen 9:6 
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All three Christian authors examined in this thesis employ Trinitarian analogies in 
their Arabic works relating to the unity of God. Their aim is to show, in a readily 
understandable manner, how something which is recognised as one can have 
aspects which are distinguishable, in that they can be referred to individually, but 
which do not imply partition within the entity, or that these aspects are separate 
entities alongside it. One specific example which is common to all of the authors is 
the sun, which along with its rays of light and heat, is likened to the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, in that the sun has these three distinguishable features of itself or its disc, 
heat and light, yet is still one and the same sun. Other clearly popular analogies 
include the light of three lamps in a house, three men sharing one common human 
nature, the relationship between Adam, Eve and Abel, and the relationship between 
the human soul with its intellect and speech. 
 
Abu Ra’ita tells his reader: 
‘You see the sun and it is the cause (‘illa) of its rays and its heat. Similarly the fire is 
the cause of its light and heat and has never been without its light and its heat. 
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Similar is the teaching about the Son and the Spirit: they are both from the Father, 
eternal from eternity without [temporal] precedence of the Father over them.’386  
 
Abū Qurra uses the sun analogy (among many others) to stress that although one 
can distinguish between Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three hypostases, it is not 
possible to say that they act independently of each other. 
‘You say that the sun gives light to humans and you are correct in [saying] this. And 
you say that the rays of the sun give light to humans and you are correct. But you do 
not say that the sun and its rays give light to humans because the sun gives light 
through its rays.’387  
 
In a similar manner, he goes on to argue, one could say that the Father created the 
world, or one could say that the Son created the world, but one could not say the 
Father and the Son created the world as this would imply two creators. The Father, 
we are told, created the world through the Son (and Holy Spirit). 
                                                          
386 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 99, sect. 172, lines 4-9. This is a typical and traditional Eastern 
model of the Trinity, whereby the father is the cause of the Son and Holy Spirit, though does not 
precede the Son and Spirit in time. 
387 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 37.20-38.2 
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For ‘Ammār, one of his concerns is to show that Word and Life, which are equated 
with the Son and Holy Spirit, are substantial to God, without which He could not be 
called God.   
 ‘Likewise the sun, with is light and heat is called “sun”, and if it loses its light and heat 
it would darken and become cold and it would not be called “sun”.’388 
 
Another common analogy is that of three men sharing one human nature, which 
appears in all three authors. At the beginning of his section concerning rational 
proofs, Abū Qurra uses the analogy of individual men sharing one human nature, in 
order to show the way in which something can be said to be counted simultaneously 
as one and three.  
‘If you wanted to count Peter and Jacob and John and they are three persons having 
one nature and their nature is ‘man’. Then it is not right if you apply number to ‘man’ 
which is the nature of them, so that you say three ‘mans’. If you do, you cause their 
                                                          
388 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,  49.19-20 
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single nature, to which the name ‘man’ refers, to be different natures and fall into 
ignorance.’389  
 
In both of his works relating to the Trinity, Abū Rā’iṭa employs the analogy of Adam, 
Abel and Eve390 which he seems to feel reflects the relationship of the hypostases in 
a more suitable manner than other analogies, as Adam is the begetter, Abel the 
begotten, and Eve the one who proceeds from Adam’s rib. In the Ithbāt, Abū Rā’iṭa 
speaks of the Son and Holy Spirit as:  
‘…two perfects from a perfect…like the relation of Abel and Eve to Adam, who are both 
from him [Adam], two perfects from a perfect, one substance, three hypostases, each 
one distinguished from the other in its eternal property related to it, I mean, Fatherhood, 
Sonship and Procession, with their perfection and their unity together in the 
substance.’391 
 
                                                          
389 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 34.1-5 
390 Keating, S. Defending the “People of truth”, 114, and Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 79-82, 86, 90  
391  Keating, S. Defending the “People of truth”, 114 
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A similar analogy can be found in the wujūd al-khāliq, where Abū Qurra discusses 
Adam’s virtues resembling God. He points out that, like God, something was 
begotten of him and something proceeded from him.392  
 
‘Ammār does not use this analogy, instead preferring those relating to the sun, fire 
and the soul. In the Burhān he tells his reader: 
‘And you may find that the soul and its word and its life are one soul and the fire and its 
heat and its light one fire, and the sun and its light and its heat make one sun. And 
making it three did not invalidate the unity nor the other way around.’393 
 
Despite their clear partiality to, and ease with, Trinitarian analogies, it is worth noting 
that all three authors are careful to stress the ultimate transcendence of God and the 
inferiority or only partial resemblance of analogy as a tool to help explain the divine 
nature. The notion of the ultimate mystery of God was by no means something novel 
in Christian explanations of the Trinity, but the repeated emphasis of this point may 
                                                          
392 Dick, Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq, sect. 24  
393  Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,  49.20-22 
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well have been for the benefit of their Muslim, and particularly Mu‘tazili audience, 
whom they might have known had a dislike of analogy.  
 
Despite this Muslim distaste for likening God to aspects of the created world, 
Trinitarian metaphors and analogies were, and remained, very much a part of the 
Christian apologetic tradition. They can be found in some of the earliest works of the 
Greek fathers and in those of the generation before our three authors alike. 
Analogies of light and the sun are particularly common in the works of the Church 
Fathers as a tool to clarify their teachings concerning the nature of God and the 
relationship and status of the Son and Holy Spirit. As early as the second century, 
Justin Martyr (100-165 C.E.) described the distinction of the Father from the Son as 
light from the sun, not only in name but in ‘person’ i.e. numerically distinct.394 
Athenagoras (c.133-190) referred to the Holy Spirit as ‘an effluence of God, flowing 
                                                          
394 Goodenough, Erwin R.  The theology of Justin Martyr: an investigation into the conceptions of early 
Christian literature and its Hellenistic and Judaistic influences (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), 146. 
Justin also describes the Holy Spirit as an ‘effluence from God, from whom it emanates and to whom it 
returns like a ray of sun’ or as light from fire’. Barnard, L. W. Justin Martyr: his life and thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 102  
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forth and returning like a ray of the sun’395. Tertullian (c. 160-c. 220) spoke of God 
and His Word as ‘two objects, but only as the root and the tree are two distinct 
objects, or the fountain and the river, or the sun and its ray…’396 Later on, in the 
fourth century, Gregory of Nyssa explains that we are aware of the rays of the sun 
but not the actual sun itself as an analogy of knowing or feeling the power of God but 
not God himself.397 The Greek Fathers were also known to use the analogy of Adam, 
Eve and Abel in their works, which both Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa use.398 
 
John of Damascus, writing his Fount of Knowledge as a compendium of Christian 
beliefs in the early years of Islamic rule, also uses a number of analogies to describe 
the nature of God. In establishing the necessity of the existence of God’s Word and 
Spirit, John likens the situation to the necessity of the human word and spirit, in that, 
for example, the word comes from the mind but is neither identical to the mind nor 
completely separated from it. He does point out, however, concerning the Spirit that, 
                                                          
395 Prestige, G. L. God in Patristic thought (London; Heinemann, 1936), 88 
396 ibid., 104 
397 Ayres, Lewis. Nicaea and its Legacy: An approach to fourth-century Trintarian theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004)  
398 Haddad, La Trinité divine, 122 
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although the human word does have spirit, in the human case the spirit is something 
different from our substance (ousia).399 Later on, John speaks of fire and the light 
which proceeds from it and which exists alongside it as a metaphor for the Father 
and Son, and uses the same analogy that both Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa favour 
concerning Adam, his son (John of Damascus uses Seth, Abū Rā’iṭa uses Abel) and 
Eve, to show the relationship of Father, Son as Holy Spirit as begetter, begotten and 
the one who proceeds.400 
 
Two of the earliest instances of Christian theological engagement in Arabic which are 
known to us today are an anonymous text dated to the latter half of the 8th century 
and a now fairly famous debate between the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I and the 
Caliph al-Mahdi in 792. The anonymous apology was given the title On the triune 
nature of God by its first modern editor, Margaret Dunlop Gibson in the late 
nineteenth century, but is also often referred to as Ms. Sinai 154.401 The debate 
                                                          
399 John of Damascus, Exposition,  
400 ibid., 8 
401 Gibson, Margaret Dunlop. An Arabic version of the Acts of the Apostles and the seven Catholic 
epistles : from an eighth or ninth century ms. in the Convent of St. Catharine on Mount Sinai : with a 
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between al-Mahdi and Timothy was conducted in Arabic, although only remains 
today in Syriac translation. 
 
In On the triune nature the author uses a number of analogies to explain God and His 
Word and Spirit as one God and one Creator. The first example given is that of the 
sun, its rays of light and its heat which is referred to as one sun, rather than three. In 
the same way this author gives a range of examples, much like Abū Qurra, Abū 
Rā’iṭa  and ‘Ammār, such as: the human soul, body and spirit; three men sharing one 
human nature; and three lamps creating an indistinguishable or inseparable light. He 
then goes onto illustrate with a number of other analogies involving the eye, (pupil, 
light); tree root (branch, fruit); fountain (river, lake) and mouth (tongue, word). The 
author, however, is careful to stress the ultimate mystery of God and our inability to 
fully understand His majesty. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
treatise, On the triune nature of God, with translation from the same codex, Studia Sinaitica no. 7, 
(London: C.J. Clay, 1899) 
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Timothy I also uses various metaphors from the very beginning of his debate with the 
Caliph al-Mahdī, whose first question concerns how Jesus can be the son of God, but 
not in the human sense. Timothy responds that it cannot be fully understood as God 
is a mystery, but likens the birth of the Son from the Father to light being born of the 
sun, or word being born of the soul. Christ is the Word born of the Father and man 
born of the Virgin Mary.  
 
The frequency of analogical proofs in Christian works suggests that analogy was, 
and continued to be, a popular apologetic tool in describing the nature of God. It was 
used to explain the nature of God to both Christians and non-Christians alike.  
Moreover it was a tool which those Christians living in the Islamic Empire particularly 
employed, in an attempt to explain the Trinity in language that their Muslim 
counterparts might understand, albeit protecting themselves against reproach by 
repeatedly emphasising the clause that God is ultimately a mystery.  
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Indeed, these analogies were so well known that Muslims such as Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq 
and ‘Abd al-Jabbār  ibn Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī (d.1025) refute them.402 Unfortunately 
for Christians who used such analogies extensively, it would appear that their Muslim 
counterparts neither understood them nor accepted their use in describing God. The 
fundamental problem for Islamic thinkers, and particularly those who put great 
emphasis on the utter difference between God and his creation, is that analogy rests 
on the premise that there is a degree of resemblance between man and God.403  
 
Christians clearly recognised this and although always having accepted the 
imperfection of analogy and the ultimate mystery of God, they appear to lay even 
greater emphasis on this throughout their works. Unfortunately, the use of analogy, 
however inferior it was seen to be, still contradicted the Muslim notion that God is 
                                                          
402 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” , 95 and Thomas, Christian doctrines in Islamic 
theology, 274-276 
403 As Albert Nader puts it ‘il nous est impossible, selon les mu‘tazila, de nous faire une ideé de Dieu, 
pas même par analogie avec les creatures auxquelles Dieu est tout à fait transcendant.’ (According to 
the Mu‘tazila, it is impossible for us to have an idea of God, not even by analogy with creatures, over 
whom God is completely transcendent.’) Nader, Le système philosophique des Mu‘tazila, 52. Nader 
also adds that al-Kindī had similar conception in terms of attributes and negative theology, claiming 
that essentially all we can know of God is that He is one. 
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completely transcendent,  because, taken to the logical extreme, to utter anything 
about God is essentially analogy, as human language simply cannot describe the 
majesty of the transcendent God. In reality, however, it must be acknowledged that 
few Muslims escaped from the use of analogy completely, except maybe the more 
radical Mu‘tazila, or others such as the rather elusive character of Jahm ibn Ṣafwān 
(d.745)404 who, in order to protect God’s transcendence, was said to have only seen 
it as being valid to describe God in terms of what He does (eg. ‘causes’ knowledge, 
life and power), rather than what He is (‘knowing’, ‘living’, ‘powerful’). 
 
The early ninth century mutakallim al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm (785-860) stressed that 
God’s only attribute was His ‘uncomparability’,405 or His distinction from everything 
else406, similarly in order to avoid tashbīh, that is to say likening God to temporal 
things. Strictly speaking, however, even those who made such an effort, like al-
                                                          
 
404 Jahm ibn Safwan is thought to have been the founder of a rival school to the Mu‘tazila, the 
Jahmiyya, who primarily taught absolute predestination and divine omnipotence, but who agreed with 
the Mu‘tazila on certain doctrines including the identical nature of the divine attributes with God’s 
essence. See: Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, II, 493-308 
405 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, IV, 438 
406 Madelung, Wilferd. ‘Al-Qāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm and Christian theology’, Aram 3 (1991), 38 
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Qāsim, to protect the transcendence of God, could not fully avoid compromising their 
position if they were to say anything meaningful about God. For instance, al-Qāsim’s 
proof of the existence of God, like that of ‘Ammār, relies on elements of the created 
world to tell us something about God’s divine nature.407  
 
Therefore, when Timothy uses numerous analogies and metaphors in his debate with 
the Caliph al-Mahdī, al-Mahdī appears to be simply annoyed with them and in most 
cases ignores them, preferring to ask a more direct or logical question regarding the 
matter in hand.408 
 
Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq appears to dismiss analogies in a similar manner. In his ‘Against 
the Trinity’, Abū ‘Īsā responds to a hypothetical Christian, who may claim that the 
relationship of the hypostases to the substance is like that of limbs to a man or heat 
                                                          
407 Abrahamov, B. Al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the proof of God’s existence: kitāb al-dalīl al-kabīr (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1990). Abū Qurra also does this in the wujūd al-khāliq, whereby he deduces that the entity 
or being who is responsible for the creation of the world must be wise and powerful. 
408 Cf. Newman, Early Christian-Muslim Dialogue, 178-9, 184-5 In the former reference Timothy notes 
that al-Maḥdī showed doubt as to the ‘possibility of all the above explanations’ which involved Timothy 
giving a number of analogies concerning the relationship of the hypostases to the substance.  
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and light to fire, with a common sense logical argument designed to show that the 
two statements (concerning a man and his limbs, for example, and concerning God’s 
substance and hypostases) do not resemble each other. 409 For the most part he 
ignores analogy and talks very straightforwardly in terms of the logical problem posed 
by Christian teaching on substance and hypostases; that something can at the same 
time be identical and dissimilar. The Ash‘arite scholar, al-Bāqillānī, writing in the latter 
part of the tenth century, briefly dismisses a similar analogy concerning the 
relationship between a person and his hand, or a line of a poem and the poem itself, 
which he points out refers to parts and wholes, not two wholes, as Christians claim 
both the substance and each hypostasis to be.410 
 
Al-Warrāq also attacks the use of analogy regarding the generation of the Son from 
the Father, on the grounds that the analogies such as light from the sun and heat 
from the fire do not resemble God, who is not a composite body like these temporal 
entities, and who does not undergo change of any kind. This response, emphasising 
                                                          
409 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity”, 94 
410 Thomas, Christian doctrines in Islamic theology, 166 
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God’s transcendence and the futility of temporal comparisons, would have been an 
easy way to dismiss Christian attempts to explain their conception of the unity of 
God.  
 
Most likely aware of the staunch opposition to analogy on the part of the Mu‘tazila, all 
three authors give some indication as to their reason for using of analogy. Abū Qurra 
does not deal directly with the concept of using analogy to describe God, but does 
make sure that his analogies are not taken too literally. In both his Mīmar and the 
section pertaining to the divine attributes in the wujūd al-khāliq, he is careful to stress 
the difference and incomparability of the Godhead each time he uses a temporal 
analogy. Having used the analogy of light, Abū Qurra says: 
The unity of the Divine Being in Father, Son and Holy Spirit is even more pure and 
more elevated and truer than the light of the lamp, and is not analogous. From every 
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[thing] there is nothing more refined than Him amongst created beings, not even the 
most sophisticated among them.’411  
 
In the Burhān, ‘Ammār points out a change in terminology when referring to the 
divine nature as opposed to temporal analogies. Having given various analogies for 
the Word and Spirit of God, ‘Ammār’s hypothetical interlocutor asks why he calls the 
Word and Spirit of God hypostases, but does not call the light and heat of fire 
hypostases, ‘Ammār replies:  
‘We do that for the perfection of the Creator and his exaltedness above having His 
Word and Spirit diminished and made imperfect.’412 
 
Meanwhile, in his Masā’il, he clearly explains what Christians mean when they talk 
about God using human attributes: 
‘…they know that, even if the attributes of created beings may resemble the attributes 
of the Creator in some of their names, there is no resemblance between them in the 
                                                          
411 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 36.11-13. The present author is following 
Lamoreaux’s implied emendation to the text concerning the word ‘mukhāriq’ which is read to be 
‘makhlūq’. 
412 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 49.3-4  
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essence of their original meanings. Additionally, if the attributes of created animals 
resemble the properties of the substance of the Creator (Great and Exalted) in the 
name of fatherhood and sonship, then there is no resemblance between them in 
essence in any way. Rather, if we stretch the mind to the limit of its comprehension, 
then the contradictions and differences between two different opposite things and the 
difference between the Fatherhood of the Eternal one and His Sonship, and the 
fatherhood of created beings and their sonship, then the difference between the two 
‘fatherhoods’ and the two ‘sonships’ is many many times greater and further apart 
than the difference between two different opposite things, [to an extent] that cannot 
even be counted.’413 
  
In the Burhān, ‘Ammār even uses an analogy to clarify the use of analogy and its 
limitations. He explains that it is like if one were asked to create a model or likeness 
of a king for someone, which may resemble the king but would not move or see or 
hear or talk like the king himself does. Likewise: 
                                                          
413 ibid., 166.9-17 
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‘…it is not possible to make a likeness of the Creator from a created being in every 
respect as there is no resemblance between them, and you will not find in created 
things anything as perfect as the Creator…’414 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa gives repeated and detailed explanations for his use of analogy. In both 
works, Abū Rā’iṭa makes direct reference to the use of analogy at several points. 
Before introducing analogical arguments, he points out the need to apply analogy 
carefully and appropriately whilst bearing in mind that the original thing related to 
God, for which an analogy is used, is far greater and above the analogy itself415, and 
again stresses the only partial similarity of an analogy to the thing it describes after 
giving various analogies.416  
 
At the end of the section in which Abū Rā’iṭa uses analogy in the Ithbāt, he tells the 
reader:  
                                                          
414 ibid., 50.21-23 
415 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 104 
416 cf. ibid., 108, 184, 194 
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‘This is a part of the confirmation of our teaching on the unity of God and His trinity, 
(may He be praised) to the extent of what is possible [in terms of] analogy 
[concerning what is] created, seen and limited, I mean light; Adam, Abel and Eve; and 
the sun. For the One who brings an analogy into existence, [so that] the ability of the 
weak created mind can tolerate [it], in order to reach His specific attribute despite [the 
mind] being far from reaching even a part God’s attributes, praise be to him.417 
 
Although their explanation of the use and limited usefulness of analogy in terms of 
the ultimate transcendence of God can be traced back throughout the Christian 
tradition, the repeated emphasis on the limits of analogy suggests a keen awareness 
of the Muslim distaste for it. However, their extensive use of analogies and 
metaphors to clarify the doctrine of the Trinity, in spite of the likely dismissal of any 
such argument as compromising the mystery of the divine being, seems to suggest 
one, or both, of two things. Either Arabic-speaking Christians chose to use this tool 
due to its deep-rooted tradition in Christian explanation of the Trinity, regardless of 
the Muslim response to it, or Muslims were not the predominant or sole audience for 
                                                          
417 Ibid., 114.16-116.3  
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such treatises. The question of purpose of these works and their audience will be 
addressed in chapter six. 
 
As mentioned above, despite their often quite obvious dislike of analogy, few 
Muslims actually fully escaped it. Like their Christian counterparts, Muslims of the 
period laid out a number of proofs for the existence of God and indications of His 
nature, whereby logical arguments about the nature of God are made based on what 
one can infer from witnessing the natural world. 
 
 ‘Ammār, in particular, can be seen to build such an argument which eventually leads 
one to the affirmation of the Trinity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the Son being the 
Word of God and the Holy Spirit His Life.  In his Masā’il, ‘Ammār begins by inferring 
certain attributes of God from his creation of the world, using a form of design 
argument which is similar to that of al-Qāsim whose kitāb al-dalīl al-kabīr  (The book 
of the great proof) is edited by Binyamin  Abrahamov. According to Abrahamov, the 
Mu‘tazila seem to put forward similar arguments to the Christians concerning the 
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nature of God418: he gives al-Jahiz’s kitāb al- ‘ibar wa-l-i‘tibār (The book of advice and 
admonition) as an example, saying ‘[it] aims at proving God’s existence and unity 
through the order of the natural phenomena observed in the universe.’419 
 
Essentially, what the Christian use of analogy makes apparent is that Christians and 
Muslims had two very different approaches to explaining the nature of God. The 
Christians, following in a long established tradition, clearly felt the use of poetical 
analogies and metaphor aided their explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity. The 
Muslims, on the other hand, appear to have been seeking more literal 
correspondence and arguments based on common sense logic, as the idea of 
creatures bearing resemblance to God threatened to compromise His transcendence 
and diminish Him, in their eyes. The Christians took a different view, maintaining that 
one cannot deny something of God that is affirmed of his creatures, as that would 
make Him less able or perfect than His creation. Abū Rā’iṭa sums this position up well 
                                                          
418 Particularly al-Naẓẓām, al-Jāhiz and al-Fuwātī and the Ash’arites. These theologians believed that 
God’s existence is proven by the creation which man could not have created and that the design is the 
proof of God’s knowledge. Abrahamov, B. Al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm, 2-4 
419
 Abrahamov. Al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm, 3 
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when he says: ‘So if this is possible in terms of things created and made, then how 
does one deny this of the Creator, the Maker…?’420 
 
 
5.2. Scriptural Proofs 
Scriptural evidence is perhaps the most natural tool in substantiating a religious 
teaching or claim, yet when faced with a religion which does not accept the scriptures 
of another, or rather which accepts them as being divinely revealed but believes that 
they have been corrupted by those who possess them, the matter becomes quite 
different. The verb ḥarrafa meaning corrupt, alter or distort appears six times in the 
Qur’an and is mostly an accusation levelled at the Jews421. In other verses however, 
the Christians are clearly linked with the Jews422 and are accused of ‘forget[ting] a 
good part of the message that was sent to them’423. As ‘People of the Book’, Jews 
                                                          
420 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 112 
421 Cf. Qur’an 2:75, 4:46, 5:13, 5:41  
422 Cf. Qur’an 2:113, 5:51 
423 Cf. Qur’an 5:14 
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and Christians are also charged with knowingly concealing the truth.424 This 
accusation is one which seems to have increasingly shaped Christian apologetic in 
Arabic, as Muslim authors began to demand arguments based on reason as opposed 
to scripture.425 
 
In general, it appears that Muslim theologians of the period were familiar with the 
Bible as well as Christian history and teachings, but chose particularly to focus on 
doctrines which directly contradicted Islamic thought, namely the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. According to Thomas: ‘…theologians in the third/ninth century appear 
almost to have ignored Christian scripture altogether.’426 Certainly in relation to the 
doctrine of the Trinity scriptural evidence appears to have been largely disregarded; 
Muslim scholars concentrated on showing the illogicality of the doctrine based on 
logical and rational proofs.  
                                                          
424 Cf. Qur’an 3:146, 3:71 
425 An example of this can be found in one of Abū Qurra’s short Greek works whereby a ‘Saracen’ tells 
Abū Qurra, ‘Prove this to me, not from your Isaiah or your Matthew, whom I don’t much care for, but 
from notions that are necessary, shared and universally acknowledged.’ Lamoreaux, Theodore Abū 
Qurra, 221  
426  ‘The Bible and the Kalām’ in D. Thomas (ed.) The Bible in Arab Christianity (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2007), 179 
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Meanwhile, testimony collections, that is collections of biblical passages relating to a 
certain theme or doctrine, had a long tradition in Christian writing and, as Griffith 
points out, ‘…in pre-Islamic times arguments from scripture had always been a 
standard part of theological discourse.’427  
 
One is tempted, therefore to regard the early ninth century as a period of transition or 
overlap, in which one finds examples of apologetic works containing very traditional 
biblical testimonia collections such as the anonymous Melkite apology known as On 
the triune Nature from around the mid-eighth century,428 and those which begin to 
rely less on scriptural evidence and more on reason-based arguments. Indeed, Samir 
traces the development in Christian works in Arabic by categorising works under the 
following headings: ‘Biblical and homiletical approach’, ‘Mixed biblical and 
philosophical approach’, ‘Very philosophical approach’, and  
                                                          
427 Griffith, S. ‘Arguing from scripture: the Bible in the Christian/Muslim encounter in the middle ages, 
in Thomas J. Hefernan and Thomas E. Burman (eds), Scripture and pluralism: reading the Bible in the 
religiously plural worlds of the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Leiden: Boston: Brill, 2005), 35 
428 Gibson, On the triune nature  
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‘Spiritual humanistic approach’. The first phase, according to Samir, is represented 
by those such as the author of on the Triune nature, the second by ‘Abū Rā’iṭa and 
‘Ammār among others, the third by Yaḥyā ibn ‘adī (893-974) and the final phase by 
the likes of Severus ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (905-987) and Elias of Nisibis (975-1043). 429 
What is perhaps noteworthy in terms of the authors studied here, is that Abū Qurra is 
placed in the first phase, whereas his two younger contemporaries are placed in the 
second.  
 
There have been a number of studies undertaken specifically on scriptural proofs in 
the works of our three Christian authors and others, many in reference to the 
translation of the Bible into Arabic,430 as well as the selection and use of certain 
                                                          
429 Samir, Samir Khalil ‘“The Earliest Arab Apology for Christianity (c. 750)’  in S.K. Samir  and J.S. 
Nielsen, (eds) Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period (750-1258) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1994), 57-114 
430 See for example: Griffith, S. "The Gospel in Arabic: an inquiry into its appearance in the first 
Abbasid century", Oriens Christianus 69, (1985), 126-67; and Kachouh, H. ‘The Arabic versions of the 
gospels: a case study of John 1:1 and 1:18’ in D. Thomas (ed.), The Bible in Arab Christianity (Leiden: 
Brill, 2007) 
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passages as proof texts in both the Christian and Islamic context.431 The aim of this 
section is to ascertain how biblical proofs fit into the Trinitarian treatises of Theodore 
Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār, that is to say how and where they are used, 
particularly in relation to the apologetic aspect of these works and their engagement 
with Muslim thinking. 
 
All three authors use a variety of biblical quotations to show that God has referred to 
Himself either in the third person or in the plural, thus indicating his Trinitarian nature. 
As seen in Chapter Two, Abū Qurra gives a long list of instances where God appears 
to refer to Himself or is referred to more than once, though He is only one God.432 In 
some instances, we are told, God is referring to his eternal Son:  
                                                          
431 See for example: Swanson, M. ‘Apologetics, catechesis, and the question of audience in “On the 
Triune Nature of God” (Sinai Arabic 154) and three treatises of Theodore Abu Qurrah’, in Tamcke, M. 
(ed) Christians and Muslims in dialogue in the Islamic Orient of the middle ages (Beirut: Ergon Verlag 
Wurzburg, 2007); and ________. 'Beyond Prooftexting(2): The use of the Bible in some early Arabic 
Christian apologies', D. Thomas (ed.) The Bible in Arab Christianity; Keating, S. ‘The use and 
translation of Scripture in the apologetic writings of Abū Rāʾiṭa l-Takrītī’, in D. Thomas (ed.), The Bible 
in Arab Christianity   
432 Cf. Chapter 2, 106 
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‘Your throne, Oh God, is forever and ever. Your righteous scepter is a scepter of Your 
dominion: you love righteousness and hate injustice. Therefore, God, your God, has 
anointed you with the oil of joy more than your companions.’ (Ps 45:6-7)433 
 
The apparent reference to two gods, the one addressed in the opening line and the 
one anointed Him. Abū Qurra tells us, is actually a reference to the Son and the 
Father, who are both eternal and only one God. This type of references seems to 
represent a somewhat creative interpretation of biblical passages, in order to support 
the concept of a Trinitarian God. ‘Ammār, as seen in Chapter Four,434 quotes the 
beginning of the Shema and the use of the word ‘God’ or ‘Lord’ three times, to come 
to the same conclusion. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa does something similar of the story found in Genesis 18:1-3 whereby God 
appeared to Abraham in the form of three men standing before him, to whom he said 
                                                          
433 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 29.5-7 
434 Cf. Chapter 4, 264 
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‘Lord, if you regard me with  merciful eye, then do not pass by your servant.’435 . The 
three men Abraham saw represent the three hypostases of the godhead and his 
addressing of them as a single ‘Lord’, signifies that God is one.  Abū Rā’iṭa repeats 
this story in both his Ithbāt and his al-Risāla al-ūlā. In the latter, Abū Rā’iṭa also 
points to another biblical indication of the three hypostases in Isaiah 6:3 when the 
angels said ‘Holy, holy, holy is the Lord’, repeating the word ‘holy’ three times.  
 
Abū Rā’iṭa, in his al-Risāla al-ūlā  and his Ithbāt, and ‘Ammār, in his Masā’il, both 
open their sections on biblical proofs with the use of what we have previously termed 
the ‘plural argument’, that is to say that God often refers to Himself in the first person 
plural. Both authors give almost identical examples including Genesis 1:26,436 
Genesis 11:7,437 and Daniel 4:31, ‘We speak to you, O Bukhtanaṣir!’438 Their 
                                                          
435 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 94.12-13 
436 ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’. 
437 English Standard Version. Abū Rā’iṭa’s version is the same as this and identical in both his works 
except he uses the verb farraqa (to divide) Keating 116.15-118.1 and 202.1; Dakkash, 92.1. ‘Ammār 
uses halammū instead of ta‘ālū for ‘Come!’ and the verb qasama instead of farraqa.(Masā’il)160.6 
438 This how both Abū Rā’iṭa (al-risālā al-ūlā) and ‘Ammār phrase it, except that the name is spelt 
Bukhtanassir in the latter’s version. Most English bibles tend to name the individual in question 
Nebuchadnazzar and use a passive construction ‘to thee it is spoken’, thus avoiding the need for an 
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argument is that in such passages God is pointing to the Trinitarian nature of his 
being, an argument which can also be found in On the triune nature. However, both 
expand upon this argument in different ways: Abū Rā’iṭa by pointing out similar 
occurrences in the Qur’an, whilst ‘Ammār goes into a little more detail concerning 
Genesis 1:26, pointing out the use of the plural possessive pronoun (‘our’) with a 
singular noun (‘image’; likeness) to indicate both ‘threeness’ and oneness. Having 
put forward their respective arguments, both authors then deal with Muslim objection 
concerning the first person plural as a ‘plural of majesty’.439  
 
Abū Qurra does not employ this argument, but says something similar as part of a 
long response in his Mīmār to the question of whether it was three or one who 
created the world. The objection is that if the Christians say three, then they are 
implying that there are three gods, and if they say one, then the other two hypostases 
are unnecessary. Abū Qurra responds with a number of analogies, as discussed in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
active subject ‘We’ or ‘I’. Whether Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār are taking their reference from a common 
version of the Bible or possibly from a common list of proof texts for this argument which have been 
developed and potentially moulded to support the plural argument, merits further investigation. 
439 Cf. Chapter 3, 186 and Chapter 4, 261ff. 
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the previous section, which ultimately show how one can say ‘the Father created the 
world’ or ‘the Son created the world’ or ‘the Holy Spirit created (sg. khalaqa) the 
world’, but not that ‘the Father and the Son and the Spirit created (pl. khalaqū) the 
world’. In a similar way, the Church, Abū Qurra tells us, says ‘Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit have mercy (sg. arḥamnī) on me’, but not ‘Father, Son and Holy Spirit have 
mercy (pl. arḥamūnī) on me’.  
 
Other more direct references supporting the notion of God as Trinity are also 
employed by the three authors. One which all three perhaps unsurprisingly quote is 
the baptismal formula found in Matthew 28:19, ‘Go therefore and make disciples of 
all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Spirit.'440 In the case of Abū Qurra’s Mīmar and Abū Rā’iṭa’s Ithbāt, this is found 
towards the end of each of their sections concerning biblical proofs441 and seems to 
be a way to almost conclude the section. ‘Ammār uses the reference in answer to the 
                                                          
440 English Standard Version 
441 In Abū Qurra cf. Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 32. In Abū Rā’ita cf. Keating, 
Defending the “people of truth”, 118. In ‘Ammār cf. Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 164   
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fifth question of the section on the Trinity in the Masā’il concerning why the three 
hypostases are named Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  
 
The third type of biblical reference used by Arabic-speaking Christian authors is a 
range of references which speak of God’s Word and Spirit. As such, John 1:1 
features in all three authors’ writings.442 Abū Qurra and 'Ammār, in both of his works, 
quote Job 33:4  and Abū Rā'iṭa, and ‘Ammār both make reference to Psalm 33:6443, 
Psalm 119:89.444  
 
As has been established, all three of the Christian authors examined in this study use 
biblical proofs to aid or support their clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity. Their 
use is similar in that most often the three authors choose similar quotations which 
point to the Trinitarian nature of God as both one and three simultaneously, as seen 
above. The emphasis placed on scriptural evidence, however, in terms of the extent 
                                                          
442 ‘In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God.’ (English 
Standard Version) 
443 ‘By the Word of God the heavens were created and by the Spirit in Him all of their forces 
(quwātiha)’ Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 95.3-4.  
444 ‘Forever O Lord, your word, is firmly fixed in the heavens’ (English Standard Version)  
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to which each author uses such references and their placement of them within their 
respective works, does vary. 
 
In al-risālat al-ūlā, it is significant that Abū Rā’iṭa does not introduce biblical proofs 
until roughly the final quarter of his treatise. Up until this point, his arguments are 
based on logical and rational grounds, in order to show how something can be said 
to be both one and three, and thus lead his reader to the rational acceptance of God 
as one ousia and three hypostases. Biblical proofs are then introduced afterwards, 
possibly as a means of adding to or strengthening his previous arguments, or simply 
for the Christian element of his audience. 
 
This approach would suggest that Abū Rā’iṭa was acutely aware that the Muslim 
element of his audience would not accept biblical proofs, which they claimed had 
been corrupted in the hands of the Jews and the Christians. Indeed, Abū Rā’iṭa 
dedicates a short section towards the end of al-Risāla al-ūlā to the accusation of 
taḥrīf, in which he responds to the two possible claims of the Muslims that either the 
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Christians themselves have altered the biblical passages, or that the Jews have 
altered them and deceived the Christians in doing so. 
 
 To the first claim Abū Rā’iṭa replies that the Christians cannot have corrupted their 
own scriptures, as their adversaries the Jews have the same scriptures in their 
possession which do not differ from what the Christians have. If it suggested that the 
Jews have corrupted the texts in order to deceive the Christians, then Abū Rā’iṭa 
argues that there must then be original copies of genuine scripture in Jewish hands, 
as the Jews themselves would not wish to stray from God’s path.  
 
Sandra Keating argues that Abū Rā’iṭa’s whole apologetic enterprise is dominated by 
the accusation of taḥrīf, a position which is based on the apparent use of 
‘uncontroversial’ New Testament proofs and a marked preference for Old Testament 
proofs which are shared by both Jews and Christians and therefore cannot have 
been altered.445 Whether there is enough evidence to draw such a conclusion is 
                                                          
445 Keating, ‘The use and translation of scripture’, 258-274. 
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debatable. In any case, Abū Rā’iṭa is clearly aware of the Muslim rejection of 
Christian scriptures, and so is careful not to make biblical evidence the cornerstone 
of his argument.  
 
Abū Qurra, by contrast, does not appear to be as concerned by the accusation of  
taḥrīf, as his whole argument for the doctrine of the Trinity is firmly rooted in his wider 
argument that Christianity can be shown to be the ‘true religion’ by rational criteria, 
and therefore Christian scriptures should be accepted on that basis. As a result, it 
would appear, and in contrast to his contemporaries, Abū Qurra places scriptural 
evidence first after his introduction to the treatise, followed by rational proofs. He 
continues to use biblical proofs freely throughout the treatise, although he adds some 
rational arguments for those who may not accept Christian scriptures. His 
subordination of rational proofs for the Trinity to biblical evidence, despite his 
potential Muslim readership is something which sets him apart from his two 
contemporaries.  
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In terms of selection of references, Abū Qurra's main concern appears to be 
defending the truth of what is said in the Bible. As such, almost all the biblical 
quotations he uses are to show how apparent contradictions are not contradictions 
and that God is shown to have more than one aspect but not be counted as more 
than one God.   
 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s organisation of his material is more like Abū Rā’iṭa than Abū Qurra, 
in that the biblical proofs he gives in both of his treatises play a secondary role to his 
reason based arguments. In the fifth chapter of his Burhān, biblical references are 
only used to illustrate the fact that God has Word and Spirit, which forms the basis of 
his entire argument: that God must logically be articulating and living and therefore 
have Word and Life, which are equated with the Son and Holy Spirit. He uses similar 
quotations in the Masā’il,  as well as Matthew 28:19 to explaining why the three 
hypostases should be called Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the references which 
form the ‘plural argument’ which he and Abū Rā’iṭa both put forward.  
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Like Abu Rā’iṭa, ‘Ammār does mention the accusation of taḥrīf, but only very briefly in 
his sections concerning the Trinity, just before introducing the plural argument446. 
This, however, is most likely due to the fact that in the Burhān, his entire preceding 
chapter is dedicated to the question of taḥrīf and so it would be fair to assume that he 
is aware of Muslim responses to proofs based on Christian scripture, and addresses 
the subject accordingly.  
 
Knowing, from both Muslim and Christian works of the period, that biblical proofs 
tended to be largely dismissed as corrupted, it is natural to consider the significance 
of scriptural proofs in Arabic explanations of the Trinity. Most modern scholars 
suggest that the primary audience for these works were Christian, and such 
traditional proofs were designed to strengthen their faith alongside rational 
arguments, but also had another purpose of providing a defence against Muslims, 
whether directly or indirectly, that is to say by equipping Christians with tools to 
counteract Muslim arguments.  Keating suggests that this secondary purpose 
                                                          
446 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 159.22-160.3 
305 
 
 can be detected through the careful selection and use of biblical texts, specifically to 
engage with Muslim objections.447 
 
Like Samir, Swanson, who treats Abū Qurra’s biblical proofs alongside those found in 
On the triune nature, would appear to place Abū Qurra in this first phase of 
apologetic and, on the basis the centrality accorded to scriptural evidence, this 
conclusion seems fair. The differences between the three authors should not be over 
exaggerated, however:  the biblical proofs they employ do not vary hugely in terms of 
actual content, that is to say which proofs are selected to explain or defend the 
doctrine of the Trinity, many of which would have been traditional proof texts for the 
doctrine which predated Islam. Where there is a subtle difference, is in the volume of 
biblical references and the priority or lack of priority they are given in each of the 
author’s treatises.  
 
                                                          
447
 Keating, ‘The use and translation of scripture’ in D. Thomas (ed.) The Bible in Arab Christianity 
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Biblical proofs, it would seem, although somewhat tailored for a Muslim audience, 
actually represent part of a well-established Christian tradition which indicates the 
Trinitarian nature of God. As such, they found a place in Christian Arabic writings, 
and presumably would have been useful and significant for the Christian element of 
their readership. The accusation of corruption certainly appears to have had an effect 
on the works of our three authors, particularly Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār, who place 
much less emphasis on the biblical proofs they provide by using them sparingly and 
placing them after their reason based arguments. Even Abū Qurra, who insists 
repeatedly that the Bible should be accepted as a logical result of the proof of 
Christianity as the true religion, also recognises that rational proofs are required to 
clarify the doctrine of the Trinity.  
 
 
5.3. Terminology 
The question of language, although not the main focus of this study, nevertheless 
forms a strong undercurrent to the questions of place, purpose and significance of 
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early Christian Arabic texts. The explanation of Christian doctrine in Arabic, a 
language whose theological vocabulary came to be co-opted by Islam, and one 
which did not have the words to express many of the abstract concepts found in 
Greek philosophical and subsequently Christian theological thinking, would 
undoubtedly have been a daunting task. The translation movement of the early 
‘Abbasid period meant that the challenge of rendering the sense of Greek terms, via 
Syriac, into Arabic began to be faced head on. It also meant, however, that the 
period during which Abū Qurra and his contemporaries were writing was a period of 
transition; of varying influences, with translators and scholars of different 
specialisations and preoccupations looking to translate difficult concepts, conceived 
in different intellectual frameworks, from one language to another. The fact that the 
language they were trying to find was to talk about God, considering Neoplatonic 
influences on both Christianity and Islam, added to the problem significantly. 
 
A number of modern scholars have dealt with aspects of terminology in Christian 
Arabic texts concerning the Trinity. Rachid Haddad, in addition to discussing 
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Trinitarian analogies, also investigated the use of terminology relating to the Trinity, 
which he usefully placed into a table showing which terms are used by which 
authors.448 His study includes Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa, but not ‘Ammār. Other 
scholars have looked at isolated terms as used by individual authors; Sidney Griffith’s 
seminal paper on the use of the term ‘uqnūm’ in ‘Ammār’s writings and Harold 
Suermann’s examination of Abū Rā’iṭa’s use of the term ‘ṣifa’ come to mind here.449 
In this section we will examine various terms relating to the nature and unity of God 
which are used by the three Christian authors at the centre of this study. 
 
Terminology relating to the Trinity falls broadly into two categories: terms relating to 
the ousia of God and terms relating to His hypostases.  As seen from Part One of this 
study, all three authors clearly seek to clarify the traditional Christian expression of 
the Godhead as one ousia and three hypostases, in Arabic. There are, however, 
variations in the terminology they use to achieve this. The main terms used relating 
to God’s ousia are jawhar, ṭabī‘a, dhāt and māhiya. Those denoting His hypostases 
                                                          
448 Haddad, La Trinité divine, 182-183 
449
 Griffith, ‘The concept of al-uqnūm; Suermann, ‘Der Begriff Ṣifah bei Abū Rāʾiṭa’. 
309 
 
include uqnūm or qunūm, shakhṣ, wajh and khaṣṣa, as well as a few other less 
frequently used terms. The word ‘ayn appears to refer to both God’s ousia and 
hypostases in different places. 
 
In Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār, the word jawhar is the most common translation of ousia. 
A word of Persian origin from the root ‘johr’, the term already had the sense of 
‘substance’ in Middle Persian,450 but also developed connotations of ‘jewel’ or 
‘precious stone’ in Arabic at a certain point. In Mu‘tazilī circles the term came to refer 
to a single atom or a conglomeration of atoms or substance as part of the substance-
accident duo which formed the basis of Atomistic thinking.451  The term jawhar, 
whether it meant atom or substance, was linked to the temporal categories of 
accidents (‘arāḍ) and bodies (ajsām), and as such, had nothing directly to do with 
                                                          
450 Afnan, S. Philosophical terminology in Arabic and Persian (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), 99 
451 Ibn Mattawayh (d. early eleventh century), pupil of the famous Mu‘tazilite ‘Abd al-Jabbār, gives his 
definition of jawhar (meaning ‘atom’) as that of something which occupies space and is characterised 
by an attribute through which it either: forms a larger unit with other atoms, fills a portion of space, 
measures space by occupying it, or prevents another atom from being in that space. Dhanani, A. The 
physical theory of Kalām: Atoms, space and void in Basrian Mu‘tazilī Cosmology, (London; New York; 
Köln, 1994), 61 
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God.452  In al-Ash‘arī’s Maqālāt one also often finds the use of the plural jawāhir 
instead of ajsām (bodies).453 As such, the connotations of the term in both its singular 
and plural form were very much linked to an atomistic view of the world.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, as van Ess puts it: ‘Der islamische 
Atomismus ist kein Materialismus.454 The Mu‘tazila, although they opted for atomistic 
thinking in order to describe the world around them, were deeply religious men who 
placed God at the centre of everything, and, as such, their scientific thinking could 
never be fully divorced from their theological thinking. Their partiality towards 
atomistic thinking was more of an attempt to trace created reality back to a single 
kind of substance,455 but within a system that was undoubtedly linked to God, the 
‘Creator of all things’.456   
 
                                                          
452 Abū al-Hudhayl refers to the atom as al-juz’ al-wāḥid more often than jawhar, and in his thinking 
there are six atoms which make up a body. The simple substance does not inhere accidents, Al-
Ash‘arī, Maqālāt 311.11 ff and Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, V, 367-457 
453 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, II, 39 
454 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, IV, 479 ‘Islamic Atomism is no Materialism’ 
455 ibid. 
456 Qur’an 6:102, 13:16, 39:62 etc. 
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It is also worth noting that the term jawhar did exist in a philosophical sense. As Ess 
points out, the Caliph al-Walīd II (r. 743-44) referred to the ‘substance of wine’ in the 
Aristotelian sense.457 Moreover, the philosophers of the early ninth century, men 
such as Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, would also have been acquainted with the Aristotelian 
sense of the term.458 Certainly, by the tenth century, Muslim scholars were aware of 
the Christian sense of the term. Al-Ash‘arī, in a section in his Maqālāt concerning 
substance and accidents, acknowledges that the Christians consider substance to be 
something which: 
‘subsists in itself and so each self-subsistent [thing] is a jawhar and each jawhar 
subsists in itself.’459   
 
The question remains, however, that if the Mu‘tazila were the main school to engage 
in theological debate with Christians in this period, as would appear to be the case, 
                                                          
457  Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, IV, 465 
458  In his refutation of the Trinity preserved by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, al-Kindī spends time discussing terms 
such as the Aristotelian categories in detail, and yet makes no comment on the term jawhar, except to 
use it in describing what the Christians teach. Périer, A. ‘Un traité de Yaḥyā ben ‘Adī’. 
459
  al-Ash‘ari, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn,  306  
312 
 
then why would Christians use a term so loaded with material and temporal 
connotations to describe the very being of God?  
 
Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār use the term throughout their works relating to the Trinity, 
often placing it either in relation to God’s hypostases or in close proximity to 
synonyms denoting God’s being or essence. ‘Ammār gives the most direct 
explanation of jawhar when speaking of the ancient leaders of the Christian 
community, who, he tells the reader:  
‘…could not find in perceivable things anything more perfect in its essence (dhāt) or 
higher in its quiddity (māhiya) or as self-sufficient from needing others or substantial 
(qiwām) in its essence than the substance (jawhar), so for that reason they called 
Him a substance.’460 
 
Meanwhile, in his work on the Trinity, Abū Qurra employs the term jawhar only once 
when referring to the ‘refinement of the divine substance’ in terms of its relation to the 
hypostases, as opposed to temporal analogies such as the sun and its rays. He also 
                                                          
460 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 162.20-163.2 
313 
 
uses the more abstract form jawhariyya twice, but each time in reference to the 
substantial nature of an analogous example. When he refers to the divine being or 
substance, Abū Qurra prefers the term ṭabī‘a (nature), although when he first 
introduces the subject of his treatise concerning the Trinity, Abū Qurra does not use 
a term describing God’s being at all, instead referring to the Godhead simply as 
‘three hypostases and one God’461. Abū Qurra also uses ṭabī‘a to talk about the 
‘natures’ of beings as opposed their individual ‘persons’ in employing Aristotle’s unity 
of species as an argument to show that something can be said to be one and more 
than one simultaneously. 
 
Ṭabī‘a is not used by Abū Rā’iṭa with reference to God’s nature, but he does use the 
term in connection with the Incarnation and the divine and human natures of Christ. 
‘Ammār uses ṭabī‘a relating to God’s nature on a few occasions, where he places it 
                                                          
461 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 27. Interestingly, the anonymous Melkite author 
On the triune nature, does not use any terms for the being of God, nor does he talk about God’s 
hypostases. Instead he prefers to say that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God or, more often, 
that God and His Word and Spirit are one god. Cf. Gibson, On the triune nature, 74.1, 74.21-75.2, 
.75.22, 78.3-4 
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after a phrase including the word jawhar, which makes ṭabī‘a appear to be a loose 
synonym of ‘substance’ or ousia. To give a few examples, in his Masā’il, ‘Ammār 
refers to God as ‘one in substance (jawhar), unique in nature (ṭabī‘a)’462; ‘one in 
essence (dhāt), unique in nature and eternity’463, and refers to life and speech as 
being the ‘quiddity of the essence and the nature’464. He also uses the term twice in 
the Burhān, again referring to life and speech being of the ‘essence of the nature’.465 
Such usages would support the idea that, to an extent, jawhar, ṭabī‘a and dhāt were 
largely interchangeable, in as much as they referred to the ‘being’ or ‘essence’ of 
God.  
 
According to Rachid Haddad, some theologians appear to distinguish between the 
divine nature, as in God, and the nature of Christ before his Incarnation, preferring 
jawhar for the former and ṭabī‘a for the latter. In terms of preferring jawhar to refer to 
the nature of God, this would certainly seem to fit for Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār.  
                                                          
462 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,  153.2 
463 Ibid., 149 
464 ibid., 157 
465 ibid., 55 
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As seen from the few brief examples thus far, the term dhāt appears frequently in 
close proximity to jawhar and ṭabī‘a in the Arabic Christian works examined here. For 
Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār, it seems to be a general, all-encompassing term for the 
‘being’ or ‘essence’ of God. In his Ithbāt, Abū Rā’iṭa makes the statement that God’s 
dhāt is described by His existence as living and speaking’466, whilst ‘Ammār tells his 
reader towards the end of the third section of his Masā’il: ‘it is proper to say that the 
divine substance (al-jawhar al-ilāhī) is existent, living [and] speaking…’467 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa refers to each of God’s hypostases as a ‘property (khaṣṣa) of His 
essence’ and also refers to the ‘essence of a hypostasis’468, whilst speaking of Eve 
and Abel as ‘two perfect essences from a perfect essence.’469  
 
In the Burhān, ‘Ammār uses forms of the word dhāt repeatedly at the beginning of the 
chapter when asking his hypothetical (Muslim) interlocutor about God being living 
                                                          
466 Keating, Defending the “People of truth”, 112.17 
467 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 177.7 
468 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 98.169.3 
469 ibid., 101.178.3 
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and speaking, before introducing the presumably more specific term jawhar. In his 
Masā’il, ‘Ammār gives an insight into the relationship between substance and 
essence:  
‘Because the reason for which this essence was named a substance is because God 
willed this with the necessity of His existence and the proof/constancy of His 
quiddity…’470 
 
Dhāt  would appear to mean ‘actuality’ or ‘being’ in a more general sense whilst 
jawhar  seems to mean ‘being’ or ‘substance’ in a more technical sense. As seen 
from the examples above, however, the difference in meaning appears to be a subtle 
one. 
 
In Abū Qurra's main writing on the Trinity, the term dhāt appears only once in the 
phrase, '…[John and Paul] denied… that change was to be found in the essence of 
                                                          
470 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 173.11-13 
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each of its hypostases’471 though Lamoureaux translates it as ‘[John and Paul] 
denied…that change was to be found with regard to each of its hypostases’, and so it 
could be argued that he does not use the term at all in his works pertaining to the 
Trinity.  
 
The tenth century Christian scholars, Severus Ibn al-Muqaffa and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, are 
said to have considered ṭabī‘a, dhāt and jawhar as synonyms in their usage.472 In 
Muslim circles one does find dhāt used in relation to God, although it is not a 
Qur’anic word. The gradual categorisation of the divine attributes into attributes of 
essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and attributes of action (ṣifāt al-f‘il) is testament to this. 
However, van Ess makes the suggestion that some of the early Mu‘tazila, including 
Abū al-Hudhayl and al-Naẓẓām, may not have used the term dhāt 473 as they do not 
appear to distinguish between two types of attribute. As established in chapter one of 
the present study, for Abū al-Hudhayl, God is knowing, living and so on through ‘a 
                                                          
471 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 40.8-9 ( ‘bi-tasmītihā…an tūjid al-ghayriyya fī dhāt 
kul uqnūm minhā’)  
472 Haddad, La trinité divine, 162-3 
473 Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, III, 278 
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knowledge that is He’, whilst al-Naẓẓām holds that He is knowing and living through 
His eternity. A certain Farrazādī claims that Abū al-Hudhayl said that God is knowing 
through an act of knowledge which is identical to Him and the rest of Mu‘tazila 
interpreted it as through Himself or His essence using the phrase bi-dhātihi.474  
According, to Abrahamov, al-Qāsim did not distinguish between attributes of essence 
or action either.475 
  
In an appendix to his book entitled Philosophical terminology in Arabic and 
Persian,476 Soheil Afnan also groups the term ‘ayn with jawhar and dhāt, as ‘their 
Greek equivalents have become confused.’477 The Persian translator, Ibn al-
Muqaffa‘(d. 756) rendered the Aristotelian category of substance (ousia) into Arabic 
as ‘ayn, although he also used jawhar and jawāhīr for the primary and secondary 
substances mentioned in both the Metaphysics and Categories and even uses the 
                                                          
474 Ibid., V, 367ff . Ess gives the reference of this author as follows: Farrazāzdī, Ta‘līq sharḥ al-Uṣūl ak-
khamsa, in Abū Rashīd al Naisābūrī, Sa‘īd ibn Muḥammad(?) fī al-tawḥīd, (Muḥammad ‘Abdalhādī Abū 
Rīda (Cairo, 1969), 573 
475 Abrahamov, B. Al-Ḳāsim b. Ibrāhīm 
476Afnan, Philosophical terminology. 
477  Ibid., 99  
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abstract form ‘jawhariyya’ in his translation of the Metaphysics. ‘Ayn is also given as 
the translation of ‘to hoto’ in many cases, as is dhāt .478  
 
Māhiya, meaning ‘quiddity’ or ‘essential nature’, is another term which sometimes 
appears in Christian Arabic texts on the Trinity, often in close proximity to jawhar, 
ṭabī‘a, and dhāt. It appears that the use of the suffix ‘iyya’ was introduced early on by 
Christian translators attempting to convey abstract philosophical notions.479 Abū 
Rā’iṭa uses the term four times in his Ithbāt and once in Al-risāla al-ula. In each 
instance in the former treatise he refers to the ‘substance and quiddity’ of the 
                                                          
478 The term ‘ayn is a tricky term to define. Michel Hayek, in his glossary to ‘Ammār’s writings, 
translates the word simply as ‘identity’. It seems more likely, however, that the term means different 
things in different places. In some places it appears to be equivalent to nafs meaning ‘self’ and in other 
places ‘source’ would appear to be the most fitting term. According to Edward Lane’s Arabic-English 
Lexicon the ‘‘ayn’ of something is synonymous with its nafs and its dhāt ‘which means the same’ and 
its shakhṣ478 ‘which means nearly, or rather exactly’, the same as its dhāt ‘….and the material 
substance of a thing’ and its aṣl ‘as meaning its essence or constituent substance’. See: Lane, 
Edward. Arabic-English Lexicon. On the basis of this, it would seem entirely plausible that the word 
might have been used to mean different things in different places and/or rather generically as having 
to do with the essence of God. Interestingly, the term is nowhere to be found in ‘Ammār’s later writing 
on the Trinity in the kitāb al-burhān. This might suggest that either it was confusing for the reader or 
that ‘Ammār abandoned it as he later refined his terminology, possibly following a Muslim response to 
his work. 
479 As such one also frequently finds the terms ‘jawhariyya’, dhātiyya and uqnūmiyya in Christian 
Arabic works of the period. For instances in the three authors studied here see Appendix 1. 
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hypostases480 and in the latter he speaks of ‘their quiddity and their existence’481. 
Similarly, the term is found in ‘Ammār’s Masā’il. ‘Ammār explains that life and speech 
are characteristics ‘from the structure of the substance and quiddity of the essence 
and nature’482 and also speaks of the ‘quiddity of the substance and essence of the 
nature’483. Like Abū Rā’iṭa, ‘Ammār refers to the quiddity of individual hypostases. 
Both use ‘quiddity’ in reference to God and created beings as an analogy for the 
divine nature. Like dhāt, it would seem that māhiya was used as a fairly generic 
synonym for the very being or essence of God. 
 
In Islamic thought, it would appear that, at one time at least, māhiya was a term that 
could be used in relation to God. Abū Ḥanīfa (699-767) claimed that God has a 
māhiya, a sort of individual reality which man could not recognise on earth, but would 
be able to in the afterlife.484 Van Ess tells us that Ḍirār b. ‘Amr (c.728-815) and al-
                                                          
480 Cf. Keating, Defending the “People of truth”, 102, 106, 108, 114. The usage on p.106 is in 
reference to the analogy of lights in a house. 
481 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 89 
482 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 157.11-12 
483 ibid. 157.12-13 
484  Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, I,  211 
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Najjār (d.c.835) were the last to use the word in terms of kalām as it became felt that 
man was not in a position to recognise God’s māhiya485, al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm seems 
to have replaced the term māhiya with dhāt.486 Once half of the ‘alte 
Gegensatzpaar’487 opposite anniya (‘existence’ or ‘being’), māhiya seems to have 
transformed, from being a more abstract word signifying the opposite of ‘existence’, 
into a synonym of anniya, having the connotation of ‘individuelle Wirklichkeit’488, 
which is why it was gradually abandoned by those concerned with the strict 
transcendence of God. For the Mu‘tazila, God appears to have a māhiya which 
humans are not able to recognise. 
 
What have become known as the Aristotelian categories appear in two almost 
identical lists of ten such categories or predications; one in Book One of his Topics489 
                                                          
485  ibid., IV, 425 
486  ibid. al-Qasim appears to have been particularly strict in terms of stressing the transcendence of 
God, only recognising one attribute: the incomparability of God. 
487 ibid., 438 ‘opposing pair’- i.e. the two terms had opposite meanings. 
488 ibid. ‘individual reality’ 
489 Pickard-Cambridge, W.A. ‘Aristotle: Topics Book I’, available from: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/topics.1.i.html; accessed 8/3/11 
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and the other in Chapter Four of the Categories490. The only difference between the 
two lists is that one begins with the term ‘ti esti’, the equivalent of ‘māhiya’ in Arabic, 
and the other begins with ‘ousia’ (jawhar). Both terms can be found in Christian 
works of the early ninth century, although jawhar is clearly the preferred term. In 
Aristotle it is likely that they signified different things.491 In translation into Arabic, (and 
perhaps before that into Syriac) it seems, the two terms both become something 
which referred to the very being or essential nature of God. 
 
As one might appreciate from this brief survey so far, there are quite a number of 
terms used to convey the sense of God as one ousia and three hypostases. Whilst 
there is not enough evidence to draw definitive conclusions, what the seemingly 
haphazard use of terminology by these three authors might suggest is that, faced 
with the challenge of expressing their beliefs in Arabic, the Christian theologians of 
                                                          
490 Ackrill, J.L. (trans.) ‘Aristotle’s Categories’ (Chapters 1-5), available from: 
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/520/Cats1-5.pdf; accessed on 8/3/11 
491 Robin Smith notes that in Aristotle, ousia is likely to be an entity and ti-esti  a predication, a ‘what-it-
is’ which can apply to a number of the other categories. See: Smith, R. ‘Aristotle’s Logic’, Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/#Def; 
accessed 01/03/11, sect. 7.3 
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the early ninth century were trying to find the best way to describe the nature of God 
in a language where precise technical terms were not readily available.  
 
This theory would explain their use of a number of synonyms, many of which are also 
found in other Christian works of the period.492 Most of the terms they use in their 
works would have come from mainly Christian translations of works by Aristotle and 
the Greek Fathers. To denote ousia, Abū Qurra preferred the term ṭabī‘a, whilst his 
Syriac-speaking counterparts favoured the originally Persian word ‘jawhar’. Although 
jawhar had very concrete connotations amongst the Mu‘tazila, it did have a 
philosophical sense which was used by Muslims like al-Kindī and which was certainly 
understood by Ash’arite mutakallimūn of later generations such as al-Bāqillānī. 
Perhaps realising the difficulty of trying to persuade Muslims of the truth and viability 
of the doctrine of the Trinity, our Christian authors also employed a number of 
synonymous terms such as dhāt, māhiyya and ‘ayn, presumably in order to be as 
clear as possible, or at least in the hope of finding something that will be acceptable 
                                                          
492 Cf. Haddad, La Trinité divine , 161-185  
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to their Muslim audience. As pointed out here, they all appear to have slightly 
different preferences, although their use of terminology does not appear to be 
significantly different from one another in general terms.   
 
With the hypostases, it appears that the transliterated Syriac term ‘uqnūm’ was 
preferred by all three authors as no suitable Arabic word existed. However, uqnūm, 
being a loan word, would require some explanation, which lead Abū Qurra to also 
use wajh, Abū Rā’iṭa to choose shakhṣ (which appears to be the most common 
equivalent substitute of uqnūm) and ‘Ammār to firmly oppose the use of shakhṣ 
according to its concrete connotations, preferring to use uqnūm instead,493 with 
khaṣṣa (property) and ma‘na (entity) as more vague synonyms. The other two 
authors also employ the term khaṣṣa, which they seem to find useful as an 
introductory concept to uqnūm, but one which cannot be equated with uqnūm directly 
as it must be a property of something else, and therefore cannot stand alone as a 
hypostasis can. 
                                                          
493 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 162.1-3 
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It is perhaps curious that Christians like ‘Ammār would avoid shakhṣ due to its bodily 
connotations and yet would persist with the use of a term like jawhar which would 
clearly have been unacceptable to the most dominant Muslim theological school of 
the time. Haddad tests the theory that Christians were attempting to circulate a new 
philosophical lexicon. His conclusion is that Arabic speaking Christians recognised 
that there was no suitable terminology to explain Christian theology and so attempted 
to make the best situation of what was available to them, trying to focus on getting 
the sense and meaning of their doctrines across without dwelling too much on 
particular terminology. Haddad feels that ultimately: 
‘Malgré un effort sérieux d’adaptation au langage, les théologiens ont maintenu la 
priorité aux dogmes de la foi… L’élaboration du vocabulaire trinitaire par les chrétiens 
arabes, souvent polyglottes, ne semble pas avoir subi l’influence des écrivains 
musulmans, autant que-celle des auteurs grecs et syriaques…les théologiens arabes 
avaient conscience d’appartenir à une tradition patristique, à laquelle ils tenaient à 
rester fidèles.’494 
                                                          
494 ‘Despite a serious effort to adapt to the language, the theologians maintained as their priority the 
dogmas of the faith…the elaboration of a Trinitarian vocabulary by the Arab Christians, often polyglots, 
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This conclusion might explain the use of a term like jawhar , which although 
unacceptable to a Mu‘tazilī audience, had become the established Arabic translation 
of the term ousia within the Christian community, who were largely responsible for 
translations of Greek works into Arabic. The Nestorian Metropolitan Elias of Nisibis 
(d.c.1027), writing about fifty years after ‘Ammār, suggests that the translators of 
Syriac into Arabic wanted an Arabic word to render the exact meaning of ‘kiyān’ but 
they couldn’t find one so they used jawhar because they had no more suitable 
option.495 Jawhar, it would appear, had become the standard rendering of the Greek 
term ousia, as translated by Christian translators before ‘Ammār. It is possible then, 
that ‘Ammār and others, whilst clearly engaging with Muslim concerns, were also 
writing for a Christian audience and, as Haddad also concludes, were ultimately not 
willing to compromise their Christian beliefs by confusing terminology which already 
had a place in the Christian Arabic tradition. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
does not seem to have come under the influence of the Muslim writers as much as the Greek and 
Syriac authors…the Arab [Christian] theologians consciously shared in a Patristic tradition, to which 
they remained faithful.’ Haddad, La Trinité divine, 184-5 
495 Al-Isfahānī, Épître sur l’unité et la trinité, p. XVIII 
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A final and related point to Haddad’s may be made in reference to terminology used 
in Christian Arabic works. From Muslim works of the period it would appear that 
Muslims were aware of Christian doctrines to the extent that they understood that the 
differences in terminology did not necessarily indicate a difference in meaning.  Abū 
‘Īsā al-Warrāq, writing at a similar time to our three authors, sums up the situation as 
he saw it:  
‘These distinctions over terminology are really only an attempt to find what is most 
apt, for each sect prefers the form of explanation it considers more eloquent than any 
other as a means of elucidating its intention. But despite their differences over 
explanation and terminology they keep more or less the same meaning as they 
themselves admit.’496 
 
Around a century later, the Coptic theologian, Severus Ibn Muqaffa‘ (d.987), 
confirmed al-Warrāq’s impression: 
                                                          
496 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” , 69 
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If someone expresses it by saying “individuals” (ashkhāṣ) or “properties” (khawāṣṣ) or 
“entities” (ma‘ānī) or “attributes” (ṣifāt) as the Ancients did… the meaning of their 
expressions is singular, despite the terminology being different.’497 
 
Aside from both passages supporting the notion that Christians were trying out 
different terms in order to convey their single and united meaning as effectively as 
possible, the former passage also implies that there was a great deal of awareness 
of this on the Muslim side. If this is the case, then it seems that actually, the 
terminology itself would not necessarily have been particularly confusing to a Muslim 
audience beyond the immediate connotations of particular terms, but more likely that 
it was the concepts themselves with which the Muslim theologians disagreed. This 
might therefore explain the number of varying terms employed by Christian authors, 
none of which could ever be perfectly suitable, as the barrier to understanding 
between the two faiths was not about terminological differences but about conceptual 
ones. 
                                                          
497 Samir, S. K. (ed.) Severus Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ Miṣbaḥ al-‘aql (Cairo: Dār al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī, 1978), 31.8-
32.2 and Ebied, R. and Young, M.J.L. (eds) The Lamp of the Intellect of Severus ibn al-Muqaffa‘, 
Bishop of al-Ashmūnain, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, vol. 365, (1975), 7.10-12  
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5.4 Rational and Logical Proofs 
Reason-based, or logical, arguments form a large part of the three authors’ 
explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity. In fact, for ‘Ammār and Abū Rā’iṭa, logical 
proofs form the basis of their arguments in all of their writings concerning the Trinity. 
Abū Qurra, although he wrote a number of rational treatises, seems to rely more on 
scriptural evidence than the other two in terms of his specific work on the doctrine of 
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. For all three authors, arguments from reason 
tend either to be drawn from philosophical reasoning, most often Aristotelian thinking, 
or from common sense deductive logic, as will be explored below. 
 
 
 
5.4.1. ‘The unity of species’ 
The major ‘rational’ argument or tool used by all three authors, relies on the 
employment of the Aristotelian categories and particularly the often termed ‘unity of 
species’. The use of Aristotelian logic to explain and defend doctrines such as the 
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Trinity has a long tradition in Christian history, one which can be traced particularly 
through the Syriac speaking churches in the century prior to the rise of Islam.498 
Renewed interest in Greek thinking among Christian communities at this time led to 
the development of a Syriac translation movement499  which is often overshadowed 
by the later Greco-Arabic translation movement of the early ‘Abbāsid period500, but 
which was responsible for a revived Christian use of the sorts of philosophical 
arguments which can traced back through the writings of the Greek Fathers.  In his 
Third theological oration, Gregory Nazianzus states:  
                                                          
498 Wallace-Hadrill speaks of Antioch Christians as being only loosely Aristotelian, but says that Syriac 
speaking churches to the East of Antioch ‘adopted Aristotelian logical method wholeheartedly for 
reasons which are not in all respects clear…’ Wallace-Hadrill, Christian Antioch, 97  
499 For details of Syriac interest in Greek learning prior to Islam, see: Griffith, The church in the 
shadow of the mosque, 110-113. 
500
 In Islamic circles, Aristotelian thinking was espoused by philosophically minded individuals such as 
Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī, who was a contemporary of our Christian theologians, and who saw an important 
role for philosophy in supporting Islamic revelation. The likes of Abū al-Hudhayl and other Mu‘tazila, 
however, who involved themselves in Atomistic thinking to varying degrees, sought to affirm the 
existence and nature of God within in a universe made up of atoms and bodies, something for which 
Aristotle criticised some of his predecessors in books IV and VI of his Physics, as essentially he felt 
that the concept of a ‘void’ violated physical law. Waterfield, R. (trans.) Aristotle: Physics (with 
introduction and notes by D. Bostock) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) As a result, this meant 
that, for the Mu‘tazila, God must be conceived as being far removed in His transcendence from this 
concrete temporal world and that human categories of thought and speech could describe anything 
which resembled the Creator in any way. 
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Our position…is, that as in the case of a horse, or an ox, or a man, the same 
definition applies to all the individuals of the same species, and whatever shares the 
definition has also a right to the Name; so in the very same way there is One Essence 
of God, and One Nature, and One Name; although in accordance with a distinction in 
our thoughts we use distinct Names and that whatever is properly called by this 
Name really is God…’501 
 
Abū Rā'iṭa's treatise, al-Risāla al-ūlā, centres on the differing Christian and Muslim 
understandings of the term 'one'. In fact, Abū Rā'iṭa opens the main body of the 
treatise by asking his perhaps hypothetical interlocutor, what he means by 'one', 
before laying out the possible categories of one in genus, species or number, 
according to Aristotelian teaching, and then moulding the unity of species into a more 
Christian unity of substance (jawhar), whilst chastising the 'People of the South' for 
calling God one in 'number'. His logic is that one in genus would mean that God 
would encompass various species making him differentiated and composite within 
                                                          
501 Nazianzus, Gregory. ‘Third theological oration: (Oration 29)’, available from: 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/310229.htm; last accessed 7/3/11 
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Himself which neither Christians nor Muslims would accept; and that one in number 
would negate the Muslim statement that nothing is comparable to God, as one is a 
number which is found in the world, and moreover is the start of a series and a part 
of a number, which itself can be divided, according to Abū Rā'iṭa. One in species 
therefore is the only way to describe God, which Abū Rā'iṭa expresses in Christian 
terms, as ‘one in substance’ (ousia). 
 
Abū Qurra also indicates his support for the explanation of the unity of species by 
mentioning two types of names, those which refer to 'natures’ and those which refer 
to 'persons’. He gives the example of Peter, James and John being three ‘persons’ 
but having the common name of ‘man’, which refers to a single nature that the three 
‘persons’ all share.  
 
In terms of explaining the relationship between the two types of name, as it were, 
Abū Rā'iṭa speaks of two kinds of statements one can make about things; one being 
more general and referring to their substance, such as ‘living’ or ‘human being’; the 
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other being more specific and describing an individual such as ‘Sa‘d’ or ‘Khālid’, 
whereby the ‘Sa‘d’ could be said to be a ‘human being’, but ‘human being’ could not 
be said to be ‘Sa‘d’. As discussed in Part One of this study, both Abū Qurra and Abū 
Rā’iṭa employ Arabic grammatical concepts to help clarify their point.502 
 
‘Ammār does not refer directly to the unity of species in the fifth chapter of the 
Burhān, probably due to the fact that the chapter is largely based on his “attribute-
apology”, which will be discussed below. In his Masā’il, however, ‘Ammār puts the 
unity of species in more technical and Christian terms than in Abū Rā’iṭa’s Ithbāt, by 
referring to one general comprehensive substance alongside specific substances or 
hypostases in some detail, particularly towards the end of the section on the Trinity. 
‘Ammār explains:  
‘We could say that the Father is a perfect God, I mean that He is an eternal, specific, 
perfect substance. And the Son is a perfect God, I mean that He is an eternal, 
                                                          
502 Cf. Chapter 2, 125-126 and Chapter 3, 169-171 
334 
 
specific, perfect substance. Then all of this in totality is one perfect God, i.e. one 
eternal general comprehensive substance.’503 
 
Aristotle distinguished between primary and secondary substances, though the 
primary referred to the particular and individual whilst the secondary referred to the 
universal and generic. In the sixth century the Alexandrian philosopher, John 
Philoponus applied this logic to the Trinity: making God the generic secondary 
substance and the Father, Son and Holy Spirit particular primary substances, a 
teaching for which he was denounced by the Church. Severus of Antioch led this 
attack, which drew upon earlier Church Fathers including John Chrysostom (347-
407), who speaks of the ‘particular’ or ‘specific’ substance of the incarnate Word.504 
What Severus essentially did, was to turn Philoponus’ (and therefore Aristotle’s) 
categorisations upside down, by beginning with the general substance as the primary 
                                                          
503 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 171.8-10. There appears to be no mention of the Holy Spirit at this point, 
which could possibly be an accidental omission, as the copyist would have been copying an almost 
identical phrase, and the plural phrase ‘jamīa‘ha’ is used rather than dual, which refers to ‘all of them’ 
as opposed to ‘both of them’. 
504 Wallace Hadrill, D.S. Christian Antioch: A study of early Christian thought in the East (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 94 
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substance which refers to the unity of God, and making the hypostases specific 
secondary substances, a teaching which ‘Ammār appears to be drawing upon.  St. 
Basil, according to G.L. Prestige, held that the ‘common unvaried substance, being 
incomposite, is identical with the whole unvaried being of each Person'505, and also 
states, in his Letter 236 that: 
‘The distinction between οὐσία [ousia] and ὑπόστασις [hypostasis] is the same as 
that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and 
the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one essence 
or substance so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a 
particular hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may 
be without confusion and clear.’506  
 
The unity of species would have been troublesome for most Muslims who simply 
were not able accept or understand how one can be three or three can be one, 
without introducing division or composition in the Godhead. Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq, for 
                                                          
505 Prestige, God in Patristic thought, 243 
506 St. Basil, Letter 236, available from: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3202236.htm; accessed 
8/3/11 
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instance, takes issue with the idea of ‘one in substance’ rather than numerical 
oneness,507 an argument which is most clearly laid out by Abū Rā’iṭa. Although al-
Warrāq’s treatise is fairly detailed, it centres on the basic impossibility of the 
hypostases being both differentiated from the substance and identical with it, which 
he refers to as ‘the clearest contradiction’508. Al-Warrāq most often uses common 
sense or simple mathematical logic in refuting the claims of the Christians (which he 
sets out in some detail).  
‘A further aspect is that they claim that the substance is a thing, and that each one of 
the hypostases is a thing. It is not possible for them to say the ‘one substance’ [in 
terms of being] a thing and not [in terms of ] number, just as they cannot claim that it 
is one in substantiality and not in number. And if it is one thing and the hypostases 
three things in number, then three things in number and one thing in number are 
without a doubt four things.’509 
 
                                                          
507 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” , 104  
508 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” , 76.20  
509 ibid., 106.24-108.1 
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As with the use of other proofs and tools discussed thus far, the fundamental 
conceptual impasse regarding the Christian and Muslim conceptions of God 
becomes apparent once again. Ultimately for Muslims, the Aristotelian categories, 
which Christians use to help make the doctrine of the Trinity intelligible to human 
minds, simply cannot be used to describe the divine Being. 
 
 
5.4.2. ‘A Question for the Muslims’ 
Another form of ‘rational’ or ‘logical’ proof worth mentioning briefly, can be seen in 
instances where Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī ask questions of their 
Muslim counterparts, phrased in the dialectical style which became a trademark of 
kalām treatises. Here we will only address one particular question which is common 
to all three authors, as the questions each individual author puts to His Muslim 
adversaries are dealt with in detail in Part One of this thesis and discussed 
comparatively in the following chapter. 
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The question which all three theologians direct at their Muslim counterparts is 
whether God has a Word. If they say ‘yes’, then they are in agreement with the 
Christians, and if they say ‘no’, then they make God mute and inferior to human 
beings. Having said ‘yes’, the Christian author asks whether that Word is a ‘part’ of 
God’, or, as Abū Rā’iṭa puts it, ‘something perfect from something perfect’, knowing 
that his opponent will not allow God to be subject to composition and therefore 
forcing him to accept the alternative, which in this case leads to an expression of the 
relationship of God’s hypostases to His substance. 
Each of the three authors takes this argument to different extents, as will be seen in 
Chapter Six, but use of kalām style argumentation which would have been very 
familiar to their Muslim counterparts, is a tool which should be noted. 
 
 
5.4.3. ‘The Headship of God’  
In his short work given the title 'That God has a Son' by John Lamoreaux, Abū Qurra 
poses a succession of questions which forces the respondent to follow his deductive 
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logic to accept the Christian conception of the nature of God as one who must have 
headship over one like himself, i.e. the divine Son, as the suggestion that He were 
‘head’ over creatures alone would undermine his majesty and exaltedness. These 
questions then lead to biblical proofs for the Eternal Son.   
 
In the wujūd al-khāliq ,510 one also finds this argument concerning God's attribute of 
headship and the logic that He must be head over one like Himself, however this 
treatise is set out differently in that it does not contain the dialectical questions and 
dilemmas laid out for an opponent, which were a trademark feature of kalām writings, 
and the arguments for God being head over one like Himself come from the fact that 
Adam is head over one like himself and that he resembles God in his virtues. Once 
again, if God were to be head merely over creatures whilst Adam were head over 
humans like himself, then God would be inferior to Adam in some way, which is 
clearly absurd, Abū Qurra tells his reader.  
 
                                                          
510 Dick, Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq, 221-228 
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5.4.4. ‘Three is the perfect number’ 
In Abū Rā’iṭa’s al-Risālā al-ūlā, towards the end of his opening discussion concerning 
the meaning of ‘oneness’, one finds a brief little argument concerning the perfection 
of the number three, which he repeats almost as briefly later on in the same treatise, 
almost as a way to furnish his description of God’s unity.511 Abū Rā’iṭa’s reasoning 
appears to be that three is the perfect number, as it encompasses both categories of 
‘odd’ and ‘even’ in their simplest forms. The same argument appears in his younger 
relative, Nonnus of Nisibis’ Syriac apology512, and in the al-Hāshimī/al-Kindī debate513 
of the late ninth or early tenth century, part of which appears to be directly quoted 
from Abū Rā’iṭa’s work.  
 
Although this particular argument does not appear to be common to patristic works, it 
can be found earlier than Abū Rā’iṭa, in Timothy I’s debate with al-Mahdī.514 Muslim 
responses to this argument also appear in Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s Against the trinity 
                                                          
511 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 70.13-18 and 89.11-15 
512 Griffith, ‘The apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis’, 124 
513 Newman, Early Christian-Muslim dialogue, 381-545 
514
 ibid., 163-267 
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and later in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s Mughnī, which seems to be an almost direct quotation of 
al-Warrāq.515 Al-Warrāq logically rebuts this argument by asking whether the Father 
alone combines the two types of number. An affirmative answer would make Him 
three hypostases along with the Son and Spirit being three hypostases each, 
bringing the total to nine. A negative answer implies that the each of the hypostases 
is imperfect, because none of them combine the perfect number individually.516  
 
This little proof, therefore, was certainly known to at least one Muslim polemicist of the early ninth 
century and was also acknowledged in later generations. It is not employed in the 
extant works of either Abū Qurra or ‘Ammār. For his part, Abū Rā’iṭa does not appear 
to put much emphasis on it, only alluding to it very briefly, in comparison with 
Nonnus, at the end of his discussion of oneness in the sense of ‘one in species’. He 
then summarises: 
‘Then you know, we describe God as one but not in the way that you describe him.’517 
 
                                                          
515 Thomas, Christian doctrines in Islamic theology, 272-275 
516 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” , 148-9 
517 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa, 70.16-18 
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5.5 The “Attribute-Apology” 
Perhaps the most fascinating argument, and certainly most original and creative one, 
employed by Christian authors such as Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī 
and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, involved the likening of the doctrine of the Trinity to the divine 
attributes of God, as conceived in Islamic thought. The phrase “attribute-apology” 
was coined by Mark Swanson in a paper entitled ‘Are hypostases attributes?’518, 
where he highlights the main features of the apology, which are worth restating here. 
1. The assimilation of the Trinitarian hypostases to the attributes of God, in particular 
attributes that are given in, or deducible from, the qur’ān  
2. The claim that the point of the doctrine of the Trinity is the affirmation that (1) God 
is (2) living and (3) speaking (knowing, wise etc.); or, in other versions, that God is 
(1) an essence, or existing, (2) living, and (3) speaking (knowing, wise etc.) 
3. When necessary, the affirmation that each “adjectival” attribute (e.g. existing, 
living, speaking) corresponds to a nominal form (existence, life, speech) which is 
a reality in God 
                                                          
518 Swanson, M. ‘Are Hypostases Attributes? An investigation into the modern Egyptian Christian 
appropriation of the medieval Arabic apologetic heritage’, Parole de l’Orient, no. 16, (1990-1991), 239-
250 
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4. The correlation of the biblical names “Father”, “Son” and “Holy Spirit with the 
attributes discussed, e.g. the Father is the Existence (al-wuğūd), the Son is the 
Speech (an-nuṭq), and the Holy Spirit is the Life (al-ḥayāt) 
5. An argument as to why the hypostases are only three in number519 
 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, who appears to fit the above schema most closely of our three 
authors, presents himself as a useful starting point. As mentioned in Chapter Four, in 
the fifth section of his Burhān, ‘Ammār begins by attacking his (perhaps hypothetical) 
Mu‘tazilī opponents concerning their saying that God is ‘living’ (ḥayy) and ‘speaking’ 
(nātiq) without affirming that God has ‘Life’ (al-ḥayāt) and ‘Speech’ (al-nuṭq.) In doing 
so, ‘Ammār is puts his finger precisely on a key debate taking place within Muslim 
circles at the time, criticising the position of those such as Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf 
and Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām.520  
 
                                                          
519 ibid., 239-40  
520 cf. chapter 1, 57-62 for detail on the teachings of these two Mu‘tazilī thinkers concerning the dicing 
attributes of God. 
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God must have Life and Word, he tells his reader, as the word ‘living’ is derived from 
‘life’ and one can only tell what something is called from what it has, not what it does 
not have. If that were the case then one could call inanimate objects such as earth, 
water and air ‘living’ without having ‘life’. As can be seen, here ‘Ammār uses 
grammatical and logical reasoning which would not be unfamiliar to his Mu‘tazilī 
counterparts. 
 
Having established that God must be living and speaking, and therefore must have 
Life and Word, ‘Ammār concludes that this is only same as what the Christians say: 
that God is living and speaking and that the Son is His Word, and the Holy Spirit is 
His Life. In this manner, ‘Ammār comes the closest to directly equating Christian 
hypostases with Muslim attributes.  
 
As highlighted in point five of Swanson’s schema, ‘Ammār comes face to face with 
the natural Muslim response to his equation of hypostases with attributes; that is the 
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question of why are there only three hypostases and not more. The remainder of 
‘Ammār’s argument, as shown in Chapter Four is that the two hypostases of ‘Word’ 
and ‘Life’ are somehow at the basis of all other attributes such as power, wisdom, 
knowledge and so on. One of the supplementary ways in which he supports this 
argument is to borrow from the internal Muslim debate in categorising attributes into 
attributes of essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and attributes of action (ṣifāt al-f’il), and to point 
out that the Muslims themselves disagree over the attributes of essence and 
action.521  
 
This argument, is, in part, almost identical to one which ‘Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq attributes 
to ‘one of the Trinitarian theologians’ in his Against the Trinity, although he adds the 
distinction between ‘those who are capable of generation and those who are not’ so 
that God is ‘generating’ (Father), ‘speaking’ (Son) and ‘living’ (Holy Spirit). Al-Warrāq 
refutes the argument with his characteristic use of common sense logic, by 
questioning whether the substance is specified by Life or Speech due to it being a 
                                                          
521Cf. Chapter 4, 263-265 
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substance or for a different reason. If the former, al-Warrāq argues, then all 
substances must be specified by Life and Speech; and if the latter, then Life and 
speech must be caused by something else which introduces plurality into the 
godhead.522  
 
As can be seen, ‘Ammār’s “attribute-apology” precisely fits the criteria highlighted by 
Swanson. One cannot say the same, or at least not speak with the same conviction, 
about Theodore Abū Qurra’s “attribute-apology”.  
 
In his wujūd al-khāliq, Abū Qurra gives a list of the attributes of God which could 
easily be a Muslim list, referring to: existence, life, knowledge, wisdom, seeing, 
hearing, power, goodness, favour, righteousness, patience, mercy, tolerance, 
forgiving, and justness. Like Abū Rā’iṭa, as will be seen, and, in some places, 
                                                          
522 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity”, 130-134 
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‘Ammār,523 Abū Qurra appears to then subtly isolate the three attributes of existence, 
life and knowledge by explaining them in full. For instance, Abū Qurra says that if 
Adam exists, then surely the one who caused him to exist must also exist; but that 
God’s existence is not the same as Adam’s.  
 
The isolation of three attributes is also something which Abū Rā’iṭa does, in order to 
tentatively liken the three attributes to the three hypostases of God. Abū Qurra, 
however does not do this. Instead, after giving existence, life and knowledge as 
examples of Godly attributes which can be deduced from Adam’s virtues, and 
explaining that other attributes such as wisdom, hearing, strength etc. can also be 
inferred in a similar manner, he suddenly turns to the three distinctly Christian 
concepts of headship, begetting and procession, which he deems to be the ‘noblest 
of all virtues’, thus quickly shattering any preconceived notion that his aim is to liken 
‘existence’, ‘life’ and ‘knowledge’ to the three hypostases. Unlike Abū Rā’iṭa and 
                                                          
523 ‘Ammār appears to do this once towards the end of his section on the Trinity in question nine of the 
Masā’il, where he refers to the substance having the properties of ‘existence, life and speech’ 176.18-
20 
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‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, therefore, Abū Qurra never comes close to likening or equating the 
three hypostases with divine attributes, as conceived by Muslim minds. He does refer 
to Word and Spirit of God briefly and provides scriptural references which point to the 
Word and Spirit of God, but very much as part of a traditional Christian explanation of 
the Son and Spirit as hypostases, not in order to engage with the Muslim question of 
the divine attributes. 
 
Even more significantly, as touched upon in Chapter Two, Abū Qurra’s entire 
argument is based on Adam’s resemblance to God, something which would have 
been fundamentally unacceptable to his Muslim and particularly Mu‘tazilī 
counterparts, who are told repeatedly in the Qur’an that ‘nothing is like God’524.  
 
It can be seen therefore, that although Abū Qurra shows an awareness of the names 
and attributes which Muslims use in relation to God, he either has no understanding 
of, or no concern for, the intricate and complex debate concerning the ontological 
                                                          
524 cf.Qur’ān 42:11  
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and semantic status of such attributes or their relationship to the essence of God. 
Instead he puts forward a clearly traditional Christian exposition, arguing that humans 
can know something meaningful about God by observing Adam’s virtues, and that 
the three most noble virtues, headship, begetting and procession, reflect the three 
hypostases and thus God’s Trinitarian nature.  
 
His argument is logical and rational; he argues that God must be head over someone 
like himself, because to only be head over angels and humans, who are further from 
God than are pigs and insects from us as human beings, would take away from his 
majesty, therefore he must have begotten an eternal Son. The argument is inventive, 
logically thought out, and does not rely on Christian scripture, yet unfortunately it is 
based on a premise which his Muslim, and particularly Mu‘tazilī, reader would simply 
not accept: the resemblance between man and God.  
 
In terms of the criteria outlined by Swanson, Abū Qurra’s writings relating to the 
Trinity do show aspects of the features described above, but to a far lesser extent 
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than his Nestorian contemporary. Abū Qurra does make mention of the Muslim 
attributes typically ascribed to God, and speaks of God as being existent (mawjūd), 
living (ḥayy) and knowing (‘ālim) but does not specifically correlate the Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit with these attributes and does not go deep enough into the attributes 
debate to discuss the grammatical issue of the relationship between ‘living’ and ‘life’, 
or to explain why there should not be more than three hypostases, which seems to 
have been a common question asked by Muslims. 
 
Like Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa also talks about godly attributes, but in a way much more 
fitting to a Muslim mind. He begins by distinguishing between absolute and relative 
attributes, an Aristotelian concept, but one which may have been comprehensible to 
his Mu‘tazilī audience, as Abū al–Hudhayl and his colleagues spoke about the 
meaning of God’s attributes in relation to other things; for example, God does not 
have an attribute of knowledge which is distinct from his attribute of power, but the 
way in which we can distinguish between the two godly attributes is through their 
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objects, that is to say between what is known and what is the object of God’s 
power.525   
 
Once Abū Rā’iṭa has established that attributes such as life and knowledge must be 
linked to God’s essence, he asks the question central to the divine attributes debate, 
that is to say how they are related.  Once again, he lays down two possibilities: either 
they are parts of something perfect or something perfect from something perfect; 
knowing that the Muslims must dismiss the former option as it would imply 
composition and division in the Godhead. Abū Rāi’ṭa leads the reader to this point in 
a logical and detailed manner and continues to explore the relationship between the 
attributes: whether they are separate and dissimilar; connected and continuous; or 
both simultaneously.  
 
Naturally Abū Rā’iṭa opts for the third possibility and thus leads reader smoothly to 
concept of Trinity, using kalām-style logic and without having mentioned the Trinity 
                                                          
525 Cf. Chapter One 
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itself. Abū Rā’iṭa’s switch from the attributes debate to the Trinity is marked by a 
sudden change in terminology, whereby he moves from talking about ‘attributes’ 
(ṣifāt) of life, knowledge and wisdom, to speaking of one substance (jawhar) and 
three hypostases (aqānīm).  This would imply that Abū Rā’iṭa sees the two 
conceptions of the nature of God as almost parallel but not linked. In this way, Abū 
Rā’iṭa suggests a comparison between attribute and hypostasis but never goes as far 
as to equate them entirely. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s “attribute-apology” demonstrates most of the features identified by 
Swanson: he tentatively assimilates Trinitarian hypostases to the attributes of God; 
highlights the attributes of life, knowledge and wisdom; touches upon the question of 
adjectival attributes and nominal forms by referring to the relationship between 
‘absolute names’ and ‘relative names’. He does not correlate Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit directly with the attributes discussed; however, he does respond to the question 
of why there should not be more than three hypostases, which he finds difficult to 
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answer other than to reiterate that God’s knowledge and Spirit are essential to 
Him.526  
 
The likening of the Trinitarian hypostases to the divine attributes of Islam is possibly 
the most original aspect of these Christian Arabic works, both in the sense of using 
Muslim concepts to explain the doctrine, and in that this forms most polemical aspect 
of their writings on the Trinity. These Christian theologians, particularly ‘Ammār and 
Abū Rā’iṭa, actually question and criticise Muslim teachings, rather than simply 
defending themselves, and their conception of God, in response to Muslim 
pressures. Whether this employment of concepts and idiom central to the ‘ilm al-
kalām amount to a development in Christian theology, is the subject of the next, and 
final, chapter of this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
526 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa , 86.17-87.10 
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CHAPTER 6: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS EMPLOYING MUSLIM THEOLOGY 
 
6.1. Priorities, emphases and the engagement with Islamic thought 
Having examined the works of Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī 
concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, and investigated the tools and arguments they 
employ, this final chapter will consider some of the broader questions and themes 
surrounding the raison d'être of Christian works on the Trinity in Arabic. 
 
As has and will be seen, though each author’s writings on the Trinity appear similar in 
many ways, there are subtle differences in emphasis, priority and organisation of 
their material which creates an appreciable difference in overall effect. In the first part 
of this chapter, therefore, each author will be discussed individually in order to: 
assess their respective levels of engagement with Islamic thought; consider their 
potential audience and purposes for their writings on the Trinity; and identify some of 
the potential reasons for the subtle variations in presentations of the doctrine. A final 
evaluation will then be made assessing the extent to which the three Christian 
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theologians at the heart of this study are responsible for the development of a new 
form of Christian theology, and the related question of how far they can be 
considered Christian mutakallimūn, in order to shed further light on Christian-Muslim 
engagement in early ninth century Islamic society. 
 
 
6.1.1. Abū Qurra  
As established in chapter two, Abū Qurra bases his explanation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity on the three themes of what can be known about God, the relationship 
between faith and reason, and Christianity as the true religion. Through the use of 
these themes, his intention is to show that, rationally speaking, only Christianity can 
claim to have the correct balance between faith and reason and, through various 
criteria, be the true religion. This prelude to his defence of the doctrine of the Trinity 
is important, as it informs his subordination of reason-based proofs to scriptural ones, 
on the basis that he has already rationally proven Christianity to be the true religion. 
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Therefore, his reader should automatically accept Christian scriptures, which indicate 
God’s Trinitarian nature.  
 
In approaching the matter from this angle, Abū Qurra appears not to be trying to 
prove the truth of the doctrine, but explaining it in a way which makes it less obscure. 
The proofs and arguments he uses are largely based on biblical quotations and 
analogical or metaphorical illustrations, which adopt Aristotle’s unity of species in 
order to demonstrate the possibility, and indeed reasonableness, of the doctrine of 
God as one ousia and three hypostases. 
 
In actual fact, it would seem that Abū Qurra’s employment of rational criteria in order 
to determine Christianity as the true religion is the most creative and reason-based 
aspect of his writings pertaining to the Trinity. Other Christians do use a similar set of 
criteria, as seen in both Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār, as well as the predominantly Syriac 
writer Nonnus of Nisibis,527 but the theme is one which seems to be more 
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 Griffith, ‘The apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis’. 
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emphasised in the extant works of Abū Qurra. The Melkite bishop goes into detail on 
this theme in his wujūd al-khāliq, and uses it as in introduction to his Trinity specific 
treatise, which has been referred to in this study as his Mīmar. He outlines a set of 
rational criteria by which the true religion can be determined and, in both cases, the 
concept of the true religion is closely related to the Trinity in that it these criteria 
prove the veracity of Christianity, and therefore the truth of the description of God as 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which is duly stressed by Abū Qurra.  
 
As Griffith insightfully notes, the concept of the ‘true religion’ is based on: 
‘the philosophical premise that human reason can discover the existence of the 
creator God, and then conclude that mankind is the highest expression of created 
values’528. 
 
This is interesting as it is something with which Abū Qurra’s Muslim and perhaps 
Mu‘tazilī contemporaries would not fundamentally disagree. Indeed, the Mu‘tazila 
                                                          
528 Griffith, ‘Comparative religion’, 66 
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placed a great deal of emphasis on reason as a god-given faculty,529 as opposed to 
the Christian tradition which tended to consider reason or intellect as a more worldly 
trait.530 What the Mu‘tazila would certainly have rejected, however, is the notion that 
these ‘created values’ could in any way resemble the divine being, which is what Abū 
Qurra goes on to argue, that God’s qualities are reflected in the virtues of mankind. 
Nevertheless, Abū Qurra may well have felt that emphasis on a set of rational criteria 
for the true religion was the best point of entry into discussion with his Muslim 
counterparts over the doctrine of the Trinity, as it relied on the sort of common sense 
logic which was central to the thinking of the Muslim mutakallimūn. 
 
An undisputable awareness of Islam can be seen throughout Abū Qurra’s writings 
concerning the nature and unity of God, though perhaps not as direct or deep an 
engagement, when compared with his younger contemporaries, Abū Rā’iṭa and 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. Three broad examples can be used to demonstrate the varying 
                                                          
529 However, it should be noted that this god given reason was only considered to be given to the elite 
few, a view also held by Ibn Kullāb, although he was less elitist in the sense that he allowed that one 
could be a believer through faith, even if they were sinning through not using reason. See: Ess, The 
flowering of Muslim theology, 153-4; 184-5 
530 ibid. 
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extent of Abū Qurra’s engagement with Islamic thought. These are: scriptural 
evidence; logical proofs based on the Aristotelian unity of species and illustrative 
analogies; and his discussion of the attributes of God. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapters Two and Five, Abū Qurra’s primary concern in his 
treatise dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity is scriptural evidence, which he feels 
should be automatically accepted on the basis that Christianity can be rationally 
shown to be the true religion. As such, scriptural proofs form a central part of Abū 
Qurra’s explanation of the Trinity, whereas they appear to be used in a more 
supplementary manner by the other two authors, who do not rely as much on their 
previous demonstration of the true religion, or who at least seem to feel that the 
doctrine of the Trinity in itself should be explained as rationally as possible, most 
likely in response to the Muslim accusation of tahrīf.  
 
The biblical references Abū Qurra selects are a combination of proof texts which 
support the Trinitarian nature of God, such as Matthew 28:19 or passages referring 
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to the Son or Word or Spirit as God, as well as those which can be creatively 
interpreted to suggest an indication of the Trinitarian nature of God, when more than 
one God or Lord appears to be speaking or being addressed.  Many of these proofs 
would be traditional in the sense of being used before the coming of Islam, and 
particularly in debates with the Jews. There is, therefore, engagement with his 
Islamic context to a point, but Abū Qurra is essentially still using a tool which would 
be fundamentally unrecognised by his Muslim counterparts. 
 
After concentrating on scriptural proofs, Abū Qurra launches into an explanation of 
the distinction between two types of ‘name’ or ‘noun’, using Aristotle’s unity of 
species as a tool for explaining how the Trinity can be both three and one. This must 
be deemed, at least partially, a response to the apparent contradiction of something 
being simultaneously singular and plural, which was the very crux of the Muslim 
problem with the Christian description of God. As demonstrated in Chapter Five, 
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however, the use of Aristotelian categories to help clarify the Trinity in logical terms 
goes back further than Christian encounters with Muslim objections.531  
 
Abū Qurra illustrates the unity of species using the common analogy of three men 
sharing one human nature. Recognising the imperfection of this analogy, primarily as 
three men are individual beings separated in terms of place and distinct in form, he 
then adds analogies of light, a poem recited by three voices, three gold coins sharing 
gold as their common underlying substance, and other examples, all to elaborate 
upon his point that the doctrine of the Trinity is logically conceivable, in as far as 
human minds can conceive things about the divine nature. Although careful to 
repeatedly mention the ultimate transcendence of God, Abū Qurra does not really 
acknowledge his opponents’ distaste for analogy. In this respect he is much like the 
other two theologians whom we are examining and theologians of previous 
generations such as John of Damascus (c.675-c.754), the anonymous author of ‘On 
                                                          
531 Cf. Chapter 5.4.1. 
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the Triune Nature of God’, Theodore bar Konī (d. late 8th/early 9th century) and the 
Patriarch Timothy I (d. 823), who in turn drew upon the Church Fathers. 
 
Perhaps the best example of Abū Qurra’s seemingly ‘lesser’ engagement with 
Islamic thinking in comparison to his Christian colleagues concerns the divine 
attributes of God. As discussed in the previous chapter, Abū Qurra does make an 
attempt to explain the Trinitarian nature of God by beginning with the Muslim concept 
of the divine attributes, giving a Muslim-sounding list which he agrees can be 
attributed to God. However, he then claims the two ‘most noble’ attributes are the 
markedly Christian attributes of Headship and Begetting, which allow for the Christian 
conception of the Godhead as Begetter, Begotten and one who Proceeds. Moreover, 
he infers the existence of such attributes from the virtues of Adam, thus implying the 
resemblance of man to God, something which his Mu‘tazilī counterparts very much 
strove to avoid.  
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During the course of his treatise on the Trinity, Abū Qurra does ask one question 
which appears to be specifically directed towards his Muslim audience, and 
particularly his Mu‘tazilī audience, which is whether God has a Word. His Muslim 
reader, he feels, must say yes because otherwise God would be mute and inferior to 
human beings who do have a word, that is to say are able to articulate. He then 
continues by asking whether the Word of God is a part of God, and, knowing that the 
Muslims will not accept composition in the Godhead, concludes that His Word must 
be a full hypostasis. This argument is incredibly brief, a brevity which becomes more 
apparent when compared to his contemporaries.  
 
The first part of his question, as to whether God has a Word, is a question also asked 
by ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī in his Book of Proof. For ‘Ammār, this is the opening question of 
his fifth chapter on the Trinity, and is one which sets the tone for the whole chapter, 
as he begins by questioning his Mu‘tazilī counterparts directly about their doctrine of 
the divine attributes. The second question, as to whether the Word of God is a part of 
God, can be found in Abū Rā’iṭa’s al-Risālā al-ūlā. For Abū Rā’iṭa, however, this 
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question forms part of a whole series of logical questions used to force his reader 
along his line of thinking, which ultimately leads to the reasonableness of the doctrine 
of the Trinity.  
 
Meanwhile, Abū Qurra simply concludes that God must have a Word as He cannot 
be considered mute; His Word cannot be a part of Him as He cannot be composite; 
and then jumps to the conclusion that His Word must be a hypostasis, without truly 
engaging with the intricacies of Islamic thought on the nature of God in the way that 
someone like ‘Ammār does in his Burhān, whereby he asks about God’s Word in the 
context of a Mu‘tazilī teaching that God is ‘speaking’. There is no doubt that Abū 
Qurra is engaging with Islamic thought in terms of adopting some of its language and 
style of argumentation, perhaps just not as much as his two colleagues studied here. 
 
There are a number of possibilities as to why Abū Qurra’s work does not appear to 
engage with Islamic thinking as much as his younger contemporaries, which are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive and can only really be tentatively inferred from the 
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limited sources available. One possibility is that he was as aware of Mu‘tazilī thinking 
as his two contemporaries, but saw more benefit or potential success in proving 
Christianity as the true religion through rational criteria and therefore felt that this was 
the best way to prove the truth of Christian doctrines such as the Trinity, whose truth 
could only ultimately come from the Bible. Certainly from his extant works we know 
he wrote three specific treatises on the true religion532 and refers to miracles 
indicating the true religion in a treatise on the holy law, the prophets and the 
confirmation of Chalecedonian orthodoxy533, as well as outlining his criteria as a 
prelude to his explanation of the Trinity. He also spends time discussing the question 
of what the human mind can know about God on the basis of reason, as found 
particularly in his wujūd al-khāliq, and his Treatise on the way of knowing God and 
the confirmation of the eternal son534. Whilst his two Christian contemporaries both 
treat similar topics, they would not appear to link them to the doctrine of the Trinity in 
                                                          
532 Cf. ‘On the Existence of God and the true religion’ in Dick, Maymar fī wujūd al-khāliq;  ‘The treatise 
on the confirmation of the gospel’ in  Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 71-75 and ‘On 
the characteristics of the true religion’ in Dick, I (ed. and trans.), ‘Deux écrits inédits de Théodore Abu-
qurra’, Le Muséon, 72, (1959), 53-67 
533 Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, vol. 1, 460ff. 
534 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 75-82 
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quite the same way. That might explain the difference in emphasis of his writings 
from Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār.  
 
On the basis of our knowledge, it is difficult to go further, but one may speculate that 
the prioritisation and extensive use of biblical proofs indicates that Abū Qurra is not 
as concerned about the charge of taḥrīf as the other two authors; or perhaps that 
because he relies on his rational criteria for the true religion to prove veracity of 
Christianity and therefore its scriptures, taḥrīf is less of an issue in his eyes. As a 
Melkite who would have been particularly indebted to the works of John of Damascus 
and fairly far removed from the Muslim seat of power during his lifetime, one might 
also speculate that his impression of Islam may have been slightly influenced by the 
Palestinian Father, who appeared to view Islam as little more than a Christian 
heresy. By Theodore’s time, of course, Islam would have been an ever more present 
reality as a fully fledged faith in its own right, and the contents of Abū Qurra’s works 
themselves attest to this, but it is certainly possible that he felt the pressure of his 
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Muslim counterparts a little less keenly than his two contemporaries, and therefore 
was inclined to take Islam a little less seriously. 
 
A final important and interrelated factor to consider when looking at the nature of 
these works is the intended audience for Christian Arabic works on the Trinity. In 
terms of internal evidence, Abū Qurra does not generally make overt references to 
his audience in his Arabic works, though the often subtle use of Qur’anic allusions 
and content of his writings show that his readers may well be Muslims, whilst he also 
provides a number of arguments and biblical proofs which suggest an intention to 
equip other Christians with tools to defend themselves and to strengthen their own 
faith in the face of Islam. In his Mīmar, Abū Qurra himself speaks of the Holy Spirit 
strengthening those who are weak in faith, and ‘stoning’ the reader with a ‘valid 
argument, as if with a rock, to keep you from disturbing the Church’s children…’535  
 
                                                          
535 Bacha, Oeuvres arabes de Théodore Aboucara, 28.13-15 
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This would suggest a double audience; that what will follow in Abū Qurra’s treatise is 
designed both to keep Muslims at bay (who seem to be the ‘you’) and to strengthen 
Christians in order to stop them from being ‘disturbed’, that is to say being led astray 
and thus converting to Islam. Mark Swanson, in his assessment of ‘On the Triune 
Nature’ and the ‘Three Treatises’ of Abū Qurra, concludes of Abū Qurra that: ‘he 
writes for a Christian audience- but always seems to imagine Muslims reading over 
their shoulders or listening in the background.’536 This conclusion certainly has merit, 
and gives a plausible explanation for Abū Qurra’s blend of traditional Christian 
arguments and proofs with Qur’anic allusions and response to Muslim concerns. For 
the likes of Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār therefore, the question may well be how much 
closer to their shoulders their Muslim contemporaries were.  
 
Abū Qurra is asking some of the same broad questions as his Muslim, and most 
likely Mu‘tazilī, counterparts concerning the relationship between faith and reason, 
and what can be known about God in the context of competing religious traditions. 
                                                          
536 Swanson, ‘Apologetics, catechesis, and the question of audience’, 132 
369 
 
His writings certainly betray his Islamic context in terms of topics, language, and style 
but he is answering these questions in a fundamentally Christian way, using 
traditional proofs from both the Bible and analogies with nature, deriving knowledge 
of God from the attributes of Adam, and referring to the three hypostases as 
‘Begetter, Begotten and Proceeding’ in a similar way to John of Damascus and the 
Fathers before him.537 Theodore Abū Qurra, therefore, clearly has an awareness of 
Islam but appears to engage less with Islamic thought than his younger 
contemporaries, as will be seen further in due course.  
 
 
6.1.2. Abū Rā’iṭa 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s emphasis and focus in terms of explaining the nature and unity of God is 
different to that of Abū Qurra. The theme which dominates his al-Risāla al-ūlā is that 
of the oneness of God, and specifically an attempt to explain the difference between 
the Muslim and Christian conception of ‘one’. Whilst his two contemporaries naturally 
                                                          
537 Cf. John of Damascus, Exposition, 6, 8, 11 etc. 
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also dedicate time to how God may be one and three, as it is the mystery at the heart 
of the doctrine of the Trinity, neither of them spend as much time considering the 
meaning of the term ‘one’ in itself. Abū Qurra responds to questions by rejecting the 
claim that the Christians worship three gods, and ‘Ammār addresses the question of 
God being one and three in the first question of his Masā’il, but both begin from the 
already established notion that God is one and three and then attempt to show how 
their position is not inherently contradictory; whereas Abū Rā’iṭa recognises the need 
to address the concept of oneness specifically. His claim is that the Muslims have 
misunderstood the Christian unity of species as a numerical unity, which is at the 
base of their disagreement. The difference in approach is only very slight, but does 
suggest that Abū Rā’iṭa not only understands the position of his Muslim adversaries, 
but seriously attempts to address their issue directly. 
 
Like Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa, discusses similar criteria for the true religion, after which 
he also concludes that miracles are the only positive indicator of the true religion and 
that negative criteria such as ‘desire for the Hereafter’, ‘conversion by the sword’ and 
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‘the allowance of what is forbidden’ are some indicators of ‘untrue’ religions, criteria 
which he clearly feels apply to Islam. However, he does not specifically introduce the 
doctrine of the Trinity through this discussion of the true religion in the same way as 
Abū Qurra. Abū Rā’iṭa’s rational criteria for the true religion appears in his more 
general work on the Christian religion almost as a separate section, finished off with 
supporting biblical proofs, before moving onto the Trinity as one of the major doctrinal 
differences between Christianity and Islam.  
 
In his more Trinity specific treatise, and the one generally thought to be aimed more 
at the Muslim mutakallimūn538, specifically the Mu‘tazila, the topic of the true religion 
is not mentioned. The difference is extremely subtle, but might suggest that Abū 
Rā’iṭa did not make as direct a link or rely on the criteria for the true religion in quite 
the same way that Abū Qurra appears to have, in terms of proving the credibility of 
the doctrine of the Trinity.  
 
                                                          
538
 Cf. Chapter 3.5 
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In Abū Rā’iṭa’s writings, particularly the al-risāla al-ūlā, rational and logical proofs  
take centre stage, as he recognises that scriptural evidence would not be accepted 
by his Mu‘tazilī counterparts. The accusation of taḥrīf is topic which is mentioned in 
al-risāla al-ūlā 539, and appears to exert an influence over Abū Rā’iṭa’s explanation of 
the Trinity in as much as he prioritises logical and rational proofs over scriptural ones.  
It is patently clear then, from even the most superficial reading of his works, that the 
Monophysite theologian of Takrīt is taking heed of Muslim concerns. 
 
 Abū Rā’iṭa’s engagement with Islamic thought can be seen from the very outset in 
his al-Risāla al-ūla, in which he is clearly seeking common ground or at least a 
common starting point between Christians and Muslims. As discussed more fully in 
Chapter Three, Abu Rā’iṭa’s inclusion of a statement of belief which sounds like a 
Mu‘tazilī one serves to show basic points of agreement and to engage with his 
Mu‘tazilī opponents in terms which would be familiar to them. His starting premise is 
that both faiths agree that God is one, but that their respective concepts of oneness 
                                                          
539 Dakkash, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī, 91, 96-97 
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differ. He then sets out to clarify the Christian conception of oneness in a way that 
might be more acceptable to a Muslim audience.  
 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s creative use of Islamic concepts and language can be detected through 
his Mu‘tazilī sounding statement, in which he echoes Qur’anic phrases such as ‘First 
and Last’ (57:3) and ‘Knower of the seen and unseen’ (6:73, 23:92), but then also 
subtly appears to change phrases to prepare the reader for the Christian viewpoint 
and subsequent explanation of the nature of God. The most significant example of 
this is when Abū Rā’iṭa mirrors Qur’anic language by saying of God that He ‘has no 
partner in his dominion’ (17:111, 25:2), but with the significant insertion of the term 
‘jawhariyya’, so that he actually speaks of God ‘having no companion in his 
substantial nature or his dominion’.540   
 
As seen in Chapters Three and Five, the term jawhar, which many Christians writing 
in Arabic used to render the Greek term ousia, was a term which for the Mu‘tazila, 
                                                          
540 ibid., 64.7 
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who made use of atomistic thinking to aid their definitions of the material world, had 
very concrete and worldly connotations. If accepted that Abū Rā’iṭa is responsible for 
inserting the term jawhariyya as opposed to quoting a Muslim source, then this would 
suggest not only a deep awareness of and engagement with Islamic thought, but also 
shows Abū Rā’iṭa to be a clever and creative apologist, who gives an insight into a 
Christian worldview using Qur’anic allusions and Mu‘tazilī concepts, in a manner not 
unlike Abū Qurra. 
 
The Aristotelian categories, to which Abū Qurra also refers, form a large part of Abū 
Rā’iṭa’s treatise on the Trinity, and the analogous examples he gives in both of his 
treatises are numerous. More than any of the three Christian authors studied here, 
Abū Rā’iṭa defines his terms most precisely, and leads his reader carefully through 
his arguments and terminology in order to clarify the doctrine of the Trinity. Again, it 
would appear that his very use of the categories shows a level of awareness of 
Islam, as reason-based proofs were required in order to explain the doctrine of the 
Trinity to a Muslim audience. The use of Aristotle to clarify the relationship between 
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the members of the Trinity was by no means inspired by the challenge of Islam, of 
course, but the need to use logical and philosophical arguments, set against the 
backdrop of the thriving translation movement, appears to have forced Christians 
back to their Hellenistic heritage in order to re-employ such arguments.541  
 
Like Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa also makes use of the concept of divine attributes. Here 
Abū Rā’iṭa questions his reader as to what they mean by God is ‘living’ or ‘knowing’ 
or ‘powerful’ and recognises the distinction between attributes of essence and 
attributes of action, in order to ask about the relation of the essential attributes to 
God’s essence, concluding that they must be something perfect from something 
perfect and that they must be simultaneously connected and dissimilar. It is at this 
point that the Jacobite theologian introduces doctrine of the Trinity.  
 
As noted in Chapter Three, Abū Rā’iṭa’s switch from the attributes debate to the 
Trinity is marked by a sudden change in terminology, whereby he moves from talking 
                                                          
541 Cf. Chapter 5.4.1. 
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about ‘attributes’ (ṣifāt) of life, knowledge and wisdom, to speaking of one substance 
(jawhar) and three hypostases (aqānīm).  This would imply that Abū Rā’iṭa sees the 
two conceptions of the nature of God as almost parallel but not linked.542 In this way, 
Abū Rā’iṭa suggests a comparison between attribute and hypostasis but never goes 
as far as to equate them entirely.  
 
Abū Rā’iṭa , in a similar manner to his Christian contemporaries, also employs more 
traditional Christian arguments such as biblical proofs and Trinitarian analogies, often 
moulded to fit the Islamic context in which he found himself. These types of argument 
have been explored in detail throughout this study. For Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār, 
scriptural evidence is used in a more supplementary fashion than for Abū Qurra, and, 
according to Keating, is carefully selected in order to remain as uncontroversial and 
                                                          
542 Suermann agrees, noting: ‘Die ganze Darstellung des Problems der Attribute Gottes scheint also 
eine Hinführung auf das Problem der Trinität als eines Gottes in drei Personen zu sein…Für Abū 
Rā’iṭah ist der Begriff Attribut nicht mit Hypostase und Person gleichzusetzen. Er setzt nirgends diese 
drei Begriffe gleich, indem er etwa sagte, die Attribute Gottes sind die Hypostasen oder die Personen. 
Er ist aber nur ein kleiner Schritt bis dahin.’ (‘The whole presentation of the attributes of God seems 
therefore to be an introduction to the problem of the Trinity as one God in three persons…For Abū 
Rā’iṭa, the concept ‘attribute’ is not to be equated with hypostasis or person. He does not equate the 
three concepts anywhere, in that he almost says that the attributes of God are hypostases or persons. 
It is, however, only a small step towards this.’)  Suermann, ‘Der Begriff ṣifah bei Abū Rā’iṭah’,163  
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as acceptable as possible for his Muslim audience; the Jacobite theologian generally 
preferring Old Testament references which are less subjected to the accusation of 
falsification or corruption, and those which refer to God’s Word and Spirit, as the 
Qur’an also makes reference to these things.543 Whether one subscribes to Keating’s 
theory or not, it is evident that biblical proofs are not heavily relied upon in Abū 
Rāiṭa’s works on the Trinity. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa’s writings on the Trinity, like Abū Qurra’s, are clearly a Christian response 
to a Muslim rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity, but at the same time show a deep 
awareness of and engagement with the actual problem that Muslims have with the 
doctrine of the Trinity. In a certain respect, he actually is engaging the most directly 
of the three theologians with his Muslim counterparts, as he addresses the basic or 
fundamental problem at the heart of the whole issue for the Muslims, which is the 
difference in the two faiths’ respective understanding of the term ‘one’. Abū Qurra, as 
we have seen, for the most part demonstrated the explanation of the Trinity in 
                                                          
543 Keating, S. ‘The use and translation of scripture in the apologetic writings of Abu Ra’ita al-Takriti’, 
257-274.   
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traditional Christian terms, relying heavily on biblical proofs. ‘Ammār, as we have 
seen and will see, engaged even more deeply by entering the Muslim attributes 
debate and criticising Mu‘tazilī teachings in a more direct way than Abū Rā’iṭa, but in 
doing so perhaps risked losing sight of the fundamental problem of the doctrine as 
Muslims saw it. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa, therefore, clearly took the concerns of his Muslim counterparts seriously, 
and attempted to address those concerns in a more involved way than his Melkite 
contemporary. Whilst Abū Qurra shows less engagement and interest in Mu‘tazilī 
thought, Abū Rā’iṭa, in his al-risāla al-ūlā , takes the time to examine Muslim 
concerns, address the crux of the problem that Muslims have with the doctrine of the 
Trinity and responds by using their language and moulding his arguments to be more 
fitting for a Muslim mind.  
 
Abū Rā’iṭa therefore uses both traditional arguments moulded to fit his Islamic 
context, and responds creatively to Muslim objections to the Trinity.  His arguments 
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were later to be quoted by the author of the al-Kindī/ al-Hashimi correspondence,544 
and Christians such as Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī would use similar arguments later around half 
a century later. 
 
The main aim of his writings, as he says himself in both of his works concerning the 
Trinity, is to lay out the teachings of the “People of the Truth” (that is to say the 
Jacobite Church) at the request of a fellow Christian or Christians, presumably to be 
able to defend themselves and perhaps strengthen their own faith. In al-Risāla al-ūlā, 
an unnamed Christian appears to be looking for advice on how to respond to 'the 
People of the South'. From the level of engagement with Muslim, and particularly 
Mu‘tazilī, thought however, it is clear that the work is also aimed at the Muslim 
mutakallimūn, whom he most likely expected to read his works. Indeed, we know that 
at least one of his works was written to a contemporary Muslim mutakallim by the 
name of Thumāma ibn Ashras al-Baṣrī.545 
 
                                                          
544 Newman, N.A.  Early Christian-Muslim dialogue, 355-545 
545 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 335-345 
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Why Abū Rā’iṭa writes in this manner is difficult to say with any conviction. 
Geographically speaking, it is likely that Jacobite theologian of Takrit lived in close 
contact with Islamic intellectual thought from where he may have gained his clearly 
deep awareness of Islamic thought. His emphasis on the ‘oneness’ of God may have 
something to do with his Monophysite persuasion; we know he was keen to 
distinguish himself from his Melkite and Nestorian colleagues, as amongst his extant 
works we find several interdenominational refutations.546 
 
 
6.1.3. ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī 
‘Ammār deals with many similar topics and questions to his two contemporaries 
within his writings on the Trinity.  Like his contemporaries, he lays down a criteria for 
the true religion before dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity, but not in the same 
sections as his writings on the Trinity. As is the case with Abū Rā’iṭa, ‘Ammār is 
concerned with taḥrīf: in both of his works, the whole section preceding the chapter 
                                                          
546 Thomas and Roggema, Christian-Muslim relations, 568 
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on the Trinity is dedicated to the authenticity of the Christian gospels.547 As with both 
of his Christian colleagues, ‘Ammār also makes use of Aristotelian thinking, as well 
as Trinitarian analogies and scriptural proofs, to bolster his explanation of the Trinity. 
 
 Once again, however, his central focus, emphasis, and method of explaining the 
doctrine are different to that of his Melkite and Jacobite contemporaries. In both 
works, ‘Ammār develops a line of argument which comes the closest to directly 
equating the divine attributes debate with the doctrine of the Trinity, and shows deep 
engagement with Mu‘tazilī ideas. The groundwork for this argument is laid from the 
opening ‘question’ of the Masā’il. Using common sense logic, Ammār establishes 
from the natural order of the world that it must have a Creator who has certain 
characteristics, such as will: ‘It will not be possible to imagine volition and will and 
judgement except in those who have a ‘word’ (kalima). And ‘speech’ or ‘articulation’ 
(nutq) cannot be imagined except in those who have a life’548.  
                                                          
547 Indeed, Mark Beaumont refers to ‘Ammar’s section in the ‘Questions and Answers’ as ‘the most 
thorough apologetic treatment of the authenticity of the Gospels from an early 9th-century Christian 
theologian writing in Arabic…’, Thomas and Roggema, Christian Muslim relations, vol. 1, 605 
548 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 149.19-20 
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 ‘Ammār’s overall argument is that God can be shown to have two essential attributes 
which are somehow at the base of all others; that all others derive from them in a 
sense. The two attributes are ‘Word’ and ‘Life’, which can be equated with the Son 
and Holy Spirit in Christian thinking, according to the Nestorian theologian. 
 
In the fifth chapter of the Burhān, this argument is found once again, and indeed 
dominates the whole chapter, after a discussion of whether God has ‘Life’ and ‘Word’ 
according to his Mu‘tazilī counterparts. This opening discussion is also worth 
mentioning, as it shows ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī engaging directly in the divine attributes 
debate by asking whether God is said to be living, and shows the difference in depth 
of engagement between ‘Ammār and someone like Abū Qurra, for example. Abū 
Qurra did ask the question of whether his opponents say that God has a Word, which 
he appears to assume his reader will accept, before asking whether that Word is a 
‘part’ of God or not, without concerning himself too much as to the Muslim 
understanding of God’s Word.  
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‘Ammār, on the other hand, forms a line of questioning in such a way that it is 
apparent he is engaging with a Mu‘tazilī opponent such as Abū al-Hudhayl. ‘Ammār 
recognises that his opponent will call God ‘living’ in order to deny ‘death’ of him, but 
will not positively attribute ‘Life’ to God, as in his opponent’s eyes that would 
compromise God’s transcendence. In their attempt to protect God’s transcendence, 
‘Ammār tells his reader, his Muslim opponents have stripped God of His attributes 
and majesty.  As such, he shows awareness of all the intricacies of the divine 
attributes debate, and criticises it in a similar way to Muslim opponents of the 
teaching of Abū al-Hudhayl and his colleagues. Elsewhere in the Masā’il, ‘Ammār 
questions the sense of saying that all attributes are identical to God’s essence, as 
that would make them identical to each other and therefore indistinguishable.549 This 
again is a criticism which was levelled at Abū al-Hudhayl and his followers by their 
own Muslim opponents. 
 
                                                          
549 Cf. 250 
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The argument, which categorises substances according to whether they are living 
and speaking in order to show the essential nature of the two attributes, appears to 
be particular to ‘Ammār in terms of extant Christian Arabic works of the period. As 
seen in Chapter 5.5. neither Abū Qurra nor Abu Rā'iṭa employ the “attribute-apology” 
in quite the same way, although both write about the existence of God and consider 
the Son to be the ‘Word’ and Holy Spirit to be His ‘Life’. Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq 
summarises an argument which he attributes to ‘one of the people of the Trinity’, 550 
and which very closely resembles ‘Ammār’s explanation using the divine attributes, 
particularly in his Masā’il. 
 
There can be no doubt that ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s explanation of the Trinity is the most 
creative and displays the deepest engagement with Islamic thought of the three 
authors, whether or not he had a particularly greater awareness or not.  This is not to 
suggest that his explanation of the doctrine of the doctrine differs drastically in terms 
of content: as established previously, he uses a number of similar arguments, 
                                                          
550 Thomas, Abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq’s “Against the Trinity” ,130 
385 
 
responds to similar Muslim questions and concerns, and adopts similar language and 
style as his fellow theologians.  
 
On closer reading, however, it can be seen that, in approach, he does differ. His, 
more than any of his Christian contemporaries, is an attempt to tackle nature and 
unity of God within an Islamic, and specifically Mu‘tazilī, conceptual framework, and 
the only one to really attack a Mu‘tazilī conception of the nature of God. As a result, 
‘Ammār goes furthest in likening the doctrine of the Trinity to the divine attributes 
debate, by making a statement which appears to be directly equating hypostases 
with attributes. 
 
In equating the divine attributes of Life and Word with hypostases as seen in the 
Burhān,551 ‘Ammār appears to cross the line into the Muslim conceptual framework of 
the divine attributes debate, not only using linguistically and stylistically, but 
conceptually too, to a greater extent than both Abū Qurra and Abū Rā’ita. In doing 
                                                          
551 Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, 48.18-20 
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so, ‘Ammār sets himself up for a Mu‘tazilī counterattack based on the dictates of the 
Islamic framework which he has apparently entered. It soon becomes clear that 
‘Ammār does not consider hypostases to be attributes; however, the implication of 
his comparison of the divine attributes to hypostases is significant. If he were to 
commit fully to the Islamic conception of the nature of God by following the implied 
logic of his correlation of hypostases to attributes, then he would effectively destroy 
the doctrine of the Trinity, by making the Son and Holy Spirit mere attributes of the 
Father.  
 
Ammār’s deep engagement with Mu‘tazilī thinking is most likely to be a result of his 
living in Basra, right at the very heart of Islamic intellectual thought. Belonging to the 
Church of the East as the majority of Christians in the areas around Basra and 
Baghdad did, ‘Ammar continued in an intellectual tradition of contact and debate with 
Muslim thinkers, particularly the mutakallimūn, who enjoyed the patronage of the 
early ‘Abbasid caliphs. Many Nestorian scholars were responsible for translations of 
Greek works into Arabic during this period and individuals such as the Patriarch 
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Timothy I, who famously debated with the Caliph al-Mahdi in 782, was Patriarch of 
the Church of the East in Baghdad. Before him, one finds the Syriac writer Theodore 
bar Konī, thought to live somewhere between Kufa and Basra in the second half of 
the eighth century, who also engaged with Islamic thought. ‘Ammār seems to have 
continued in this tradition but with what appears to be a great degree of intellectual 
ease and confidence in his Islamic surroundings. 
 
As with all of the authors studied here, the question of audience is a potentially 
significant factor influencing the tone and emphasis of such writings. The only 
indication of an addressee in ‘Ammār’s writings is someone he refers to as the 
‘mu’min bi-l-wāhid’, ‘believer in the one’, which would certainly seem to be a 
reference to a Muslim, and may well be an opaque reference to someone who 
particularly stresses the unity of God, namely someone of Mu‘tazilī persuasion.  
 
Although it is likely that ‘Ammār’s writings were partly aimed at Christians looking to 
defend their beliefs, there appears to be a stronger Muslim element to his audience 
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than for either Abū Qurra or Abū Rā’iṭa. This is reflected by the level of engagement 
with Islamic thought as detailed above and the much more proactive nature of his 
works in questioning and challenging his Mu‘tazilī counterparts directly rather than 
merely responding to their concerns. Here one might speculate that ‘Ammār was 
better positioned and therefore better equipped than his Melkite and Jacobite 
contemporaries to challenge Muslim teachings, or perhaps he was no more aware, 
but simply more concerned to engage with Islamic thought, primarily through being in 
Basra, at the cutting edge of the development of Islamic thinking. 
 
 ‘Ammār is evidently serious about Islam in the sense that he has clearly taken time 
to understand the intricacies of the development of Islamic thought, in this case 
particularly concerning the nature and unity of God. His engagement would certainly 
seem to imply that he has more respect for Islamic thought, or perhaps a greater 
sense of the reality of Islam as a complex religious tradition in its own right, than 
does his Melkite contemporary.  
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With his writings, ‘Ammār is, at the very least, clearly holding the doctrine of the 
Trinity and the debate over the divine attributes of God up side by side in order to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of Christian doctrine and, indeed, the absurdity of 
the Muslim position. Whether he is making a serious bid to show how the difficulties 
of the divine attributes debate can be solved through the acceptance of the doctrine 
of the Trinity however, is unlikely, despite his apparent equation of hypostases with 
attributes. His expression of the Trinity in most places is a traditional Christian one, 
and, from the clear depth of knowledge the Nestorian theologian has about Islam,  
one might speculate that it is unlikely that he would have thought a true comparison 
of the two conceptions of God were possible.  
 
In addition, ‘Ammār certainly goes the furthest into Islamic intellectual territory, but 
like his Christian contemporaries, also includes traditional arguments and proofs that 
would be unacceptable to a Muslim reader. This might suggest both a Christian and 
Muslim audience of his works, though with a stronger Muslim element than the works 
of his contemporaries, with the exception perhaps of Abū Rā’iṭa’s al-Risāla al-ūlā. 
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‘Ammār certainly appears to have been a creative theologian, one with the 
knowledge and tools at his disposal, in order to express Christian doctrine in a 
manner suited to the Islamic context in which he lived. 
 
 
6.2. The role of Christian Arabic works 
6.2.1. Audience and purpose  
A pertinent theme which underpins the whole of this study, and has been considered 
briefly in terms of each individual author, is the question of audience. The works of 
Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Rā'iṭa al-Takrītī, and 'Ammār al-Baṣrī are written in Arabic, 
contain very overt to very subtle Qur’anic allusions and language, and often make 
reference to Muslim opponents and Islamic thought, particularly Mu‘tazilī thought; but 
also contain various proofs and terminology which would be unacceptable to a 
Muslim reader, and more so a Mu‘tazilī reader. Such issues have thrown up 
numerous questions concerning audience, purpose and intentions of such works. 
Many scholars have come to the conclusion that the works of Arabic-speaking 
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Christian authors, such as the ones studied here, are primarily aimed at a Christian 
audience with the intention of both strengthening their faith in the face of pressure to 
convert to Islam and equipping them with the tools to defend Christianity in an 
Arabic-Islamic context. These conclusions are based on both internal and external 
evidence.  
 
Internal evidence has been discussed above in relation to each individual author. In 
terms of external evidence, scholars highlight Christian texts of the same period 
which point to the supplanting of Greek, Aramaic and Syriac by Arabic; the gradual 
integration of Christians into Islamic society; and the subsequent conversion of a 
large number of Christians.552 In this way, it is felt by a number of modern scholars 
that our three authors aimed their works at a primarily Christian audience who would 
face Muslim opposition, but with some indirect engagement with a Muslim audience, 
or the secondary intention of Muslims reading their works.  
                                                          
552 See: Griffith, The church in the shadow of the mosque; and Swanson, ‘Arabic as a Christian 
language?’  
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Thus, Sidney Griffith suggests that the main purpose of Christian writings was to stop 
Christians from converting,553 but that those such as Abū Qurra made an ‘obvious 
appeal’554 to the Musim mutakallimūn. Of ‘Ammār’s Masā’il, he says: ‘[it] was a 
serious bid to dialogue with Muslim intellectuals, composed realistically, no doubt, 
with a view to a largely Christian readership.’555 Keating supports this view, believing 
that: ‘Christian theologians sought to ameliorate the circumstances through writings 
designed to give answers to common theological questions posed by Muslims that at 
the same time encouraged Christians in their faith.’556 Swanson paints the 
metaphorical picture of works being intended for a Christian audience, with Muslims 
‘reading over their shoulder’.557 
 
In terms of the writings of Abū Qurra on the Trinity, and perhaps Abū Rā’iṭa’s more 
general work, the Ithbāt, this conclusion would seem to make the most sense. For 
                                                          
553 Griffith, ‘Faith and reason in Christian kalām’, in Samir and Nielsen (eds), Christian Arab 
apologetics, 5 
554 Ibid., 38 
555 ’’Ammār al-Baṣrī’s kitāb al-burhān’ in Griffith (ed.) The beginnings of Christian theology in Arabic, 
154; 
556 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 32 
557 Swanson, ‘Apologetics, catechesis, and the question of audience’, 131-134   
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Abū Rā’iṭa’s specific treatise on the Trinity and ‘Ammār’s works however,  a more 
direct intention of writing for a Muslim audience would seem more likely given the 
depth of engagement with Mu‘tazilī thinking shown at times in each of the authors’ 
works.  
 
‘Ammār's works are clearly aimed at a Muslim, and more specifically, a Mu‘tazilī 
reader in certain places. From the beginning of the fifth chapter of the Burhān, 
'Ammār directly questions his (perhaps hypothetical) reader about his own teaching 
that God is 'living' and 'speaking' but does not have Life or Word, and goes on to use 
the notion of the divine attribute to clarify the concept of hypostasis. His whole 
discussion is set on a Mu'tazilī premise and his logical arguments which lead to the 
doctrine of the Trinity are clearly aimed at a Muslim audience, whether directly or 
indirectly.  
 
Meanwhile lists of Muslim works include titles of writings addressed to Christians; 
Abū al-Hudhayl wrote a refutation against 'Ammār, whilst one of Ibn al-Murdār's 
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targets was Abū Qurra. Evidence of the existence of such works raises the possibility 
that Christians also wrote works addressed to their Muslim counterparts; indeed we 
know of one instance of Abū Rā’iṭa writing a short piece on the credibility of 
Christianity for the Mu‘tazilī Thumāma ibn al-Ashras al-Baṣrī.558  In addition, evidence 
of Christian participation in munāzarāt at the Caliph's Court,559 shows that there was 
direct engagement between members of the two faiths who were living side by side 
in many places. It is likely, therefore, that the Muslim audience for such works would 
have been fairly prominent, even if they were an indirect audience in some cases. 
Indeed the few extant examples of anti-Christian polemic from the ninth century show 
that Muslims knew the teachings of their opponents in some detail, which would 
suggest that Muslims were familiar with Christian works in Arabic. 
 
                                                          
558 Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 336-7 
559 See: Ess, J van, ‘Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie. Eine vorläufige Skizze’, Revue 
des Étues Islamiques, 44 (1976). Many reports of such debates appear to be invented as a fictional 
literary device, mainly due to them being written long after the event, by unknown authors who are 
often quite disparaging towards Islam. However, it is likely that they are based on some truth. See: 
Griffith,  The church in the shadow of the mosque, 102ff  
395 
 
Positing a more direct Muslim audience for some of these works does not necessarily 
mean that Christian authors were intending to convince Muslims to accept the truth of 
their doctrines. Despite engagement with Islamic thought to varying extents, and the 
use of logical and rational proofs to make the doctrine of the Trinity more palatable 
for Muslims, Christian authors continued to use more traditional biblical and 
analogical arguments, and none of the authors studied here can be said to have 
participated fully in the conceptual framework of kalām, beyond using elements of its 
logic to help potentially clarify their expressions for a Muslim audience.  
 
Indeed, it is clear that Christians could not participate fully in the distinctly Islamic 
enterprise of kalām without destroying their own doctrine, as ‘Ammār could almost be 
seen to do.  Conversely then, it is perhaps likely that Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and 
‘Ammār would not have wanted to persuade their Muslim counterparts, or at least 
that they were in no way prepared to compromise their theological integrity in order to 
do so. The common intention of the Christians studied here, despite their differences 
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in the extent of engagement with Islamic thinking, was to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the doctrine rather than prove its truth.  
 
Abū Qurra, despite the creative use of rational arguments concerning other topics, 
actually presents a very traditional explanation of the Trinity; Abū Rā’iṭa engages 
further with Islamic thought in his explanation but it is clear to him that Christians and 
Muslims have fundamentally different conceptions of oneness, and is careful to 
change the terminology he uses when leading from the context of the divine 
attributes to that of the Trinity. Even ‘Ammār, who goes the furthest in setting the 
doctrine of the Trinity into the conceptual framework of the divine attributes, appears 
to be laying out an argument for demonstrating the similarities between the two 
realms of thought, rather than actively trying to persuade his Mu‘tazilī counterparts. In 
line with this, one sees that although his argument is creative, he never fully commits 
to the conceptual framework of the Muslims. After equating the attributes with 
hypostases he then attempts to protect the perfection of the hypostases, presumably 
because his Mu‘tazilī opponent would then be able to refute his explanation on the 
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basis of the divine attributes, which the Muslims clearly did anyway, by asking 
questions such as why there are not more than three hypostases: a natural question 
when one begins to conceive of hypostases as attributes. Meanwhile ‘Ammār’s 
model, if set against a more traditional model of the Trinity would raise questions as 
to the co-eternity, equality and relationship of the hypostases as he presents them.  
 
There can be little doubt that Christians living in the Islamic Empire and writing in 
Arabic on the doctrine of the Trinity in the early ninth century were responding to 
Muslim concerns. This can be seen from the very topics they address, as well as the 
specific questions they answer in order to clarify and defend their doctrine on the 
nature and unity of God. The responses of Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’ita and ‘Ammār al-
Baṣrī all contain traditional Christian arguments and proofs, most often moulded to 
suit the language, style and concerns of the Muslim mutakallimūn; whilst also 
incorporating renewed arguments based on Greek philosophical, and particularly 
Aristotelian, thought, again adapted for the task at hand; and finally more original 
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arguments based on common-sense logic typical of kalām and the principles of the 
internal Muslim debate concerning the nature and unity of God. 
 
 The levels of originality and creativity vary from author to author as has been seen 
throughout this study. Yet it would seem fair to conclude that, in general, all three 
authors were responding creatively to the context in which they found themselves, 
some, like ‘Ammār, going as far as to openly counterattack and criticise Muslim 
teaching on the unity of God, rather than simply to defend his own conception of the 
divine nature. 
 
 
6.2.2. The place of Christian theology in Arabic and the question of the “Christian 
mutakallim” 
Discussing Theodore Abū Qurra’s ‘Discerning the True Religion’ Sidney Griffith 
makes the thought-provoking observation that: 
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‘In this milieu Christian religious thinking found an opportunity for a development of 
doctrine that went beyond the initially apologetic mode in which it was rooted. 
Christian mutakallimūn actually adopted a way of presenting the traditional teachings 
of the church in an Arabic idiom conditioned by the Islamic frame of reference in the 
midst of which they lived.’560  
 
The concern of this thesis has been to assess to what extent this way of presenting 
traditional teachings represents a development in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity 
and to what extent it represents more of an apologetic enterprise, a creative 
response to the context in which Christians found themselves. 
 
By the time that Abū Qurra and his two younger contemporaries began to compose 
their works, Islam was clearly an established reality which was not going to fade 
away. All three authors therefore, composed works aimed at equipping their fellow 
                                                          
560 Griffith, S. ‘Faith and reason in Christian kalam. Theodore Abū Qurrah on discerning the true 
religion’, in S.K. Samir and J. Nielsen (eds), Christian Arabic apologetics during the Abbasid period 
(750-1258), Leiden, 1994, 5 
. 
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Christians with tools and arguments to defend their faith in a new Arabic-Islamic 
context and rebutting the charges of the Muslim mutakallimūn.  
 
For ‘Ammār in particular, living in one of the major political and intellectual centres of 
the Islamic Empire would have meant that he felt this reality most keenly. Indeed, he 
obviously caused problems and was taken seriously by his Muslim counterparts, as 
the great Mu‘tazilī leader Abū al-Hudhayl himself saw need to respond to ‘Ammār’s 
writings.  
 
It is not difficult to see why. ‘Ammār engaged with Islamic thought to a greater extent 
than his Christian colleagues, concerning himself with the intricacies of the divine 
attributes debate and relating it to the doctrine of the Trinity in a way which might 
logically be accepted by his Muslim counterparts. He criticised a particular Mu‘tazilī 
teaching of the divine nature of God, accused his opponents of stripping God of any 
entitative attributes and pointed out the flaws in his opponents’ conception of God, in 
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order to argue that the Christian conception of God is logically and rationally a better 
representation of the ultimately transcendent nature of the divine being.  
 
Indeed, in the section on the Trinity of his Burhān, ‘Ammār spends the first part 
attacking Muslim doctrine, introduces the Trinity using the Muslim conception of 
God’s attributes and then defends his explanation using an innovative and logical 
argument designed to show how all attributes depend on the two attributes of ‘Word’ 
and ‘Life’, furnishing his explanation with only a few biblical proofs and Trinitarian 
analogies.  The natural question which arises is of how seriously ‘Ammār took the 
claims and teachings of Islam. One is tempted to ask whether his use of the 
language and logic of the Mu‘tazila is indicative of a clever opportunist, versed in the 
rhetoric and concepts through his position as an intellectual thinker in Basra and so 
attempting to use the Mu‘tazilites’ own logic to defeat them; or whether it is indicative 
of a theologian shaped by his Islamic context, engaging seriously with Muslim, and 
specifically Mu‘tazilī, language and logic in order to rearticulate Christian thought in 
these terms, that is to say to develop new form of Christian theology.  
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Certainly Christian authors writing in Arabic engaged with Islamic theological thought, 
albeit to varying extents, which has led modern scholars such as Griffith, Swanson, 
Keating, Suermann and many others to refer to them as Christian mutakallimūn, 
literally, those involved in the practice of kalām.561 The nature and concerns of kalām 
have been introduced theoretically in chapter one, and the question is very much one 
which relies on definition, and definitions which have certainly changed over time. 
Here, however, we will attempt to approach the question of whether these Christians 
can be called mutakallimūn in a more practical way, by asking whether they were 
essentially engaged in the same enterprise as, or at least a parallel enterprise to, the 
Muslim mutakallimūn.  
 
For the sake of a more meaningful discussion, ‘Ammār and Abū al-Hudhayl will form 
the focus here: ‘Ammār as the Christian author who engages most with Islamic 
theological thought of the three studied here; and Abū al-Hudhayl as not only one of 
                                                          
561 Keating refers to Abū Rā’iṭa as ‘a mutakallim in his own right, the Christian counterpart to those 
Islamic scholars at the turn of the ninth century who sought to defend their faith through rational 
arguments.’ Keating, Defending the “People of Truth”, 34 
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the early great proponents of kalām, but also someone who potentially actually 
engaged in debate with ‘Ammār. 
 
Abū Hudhayl and his colleagues were undoubtedly defenders of the faith. Numerous 
sources attest to their engagement in polemic and apologetic on behalf of rulers such 
as al-Mahdi and al-Ma‘mūn, and lists of works show a high proportion of works 
written against those of other faiths.562 However, the mutakallimūn were also very 
much engaged with notion of truth, seeking to show the truth of a doctrine almost 
independently of revelation, by making use of aspects of Greek thought, such as 
atomistic thinking in the case of some of the Mu‘tazila, and using common sense 
logic based on the world around them.563  
 
They were, therefore, often criticised for subsuming revelation to reason, but their 
endeavours were all in service of promoting the truth of Islam and strengthening and 
defending their religion. At the same time, the mutakallimūn were attempting a 
                                                          
562 Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist. 
563 Frank, R. M. ‘The science of kalām’, Arabic sciences and philosophy, 2, 1992, 18 
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rationalisation of the world beyond the immediate needs of the Islamic faith, asking 
ontological questions about the nature of God, and trying to find language to express 
that nature without compromising His divine transcendence.564 
 
The question to ask, perhaps, is whether ‘Ammār would be happy to be considered 
to be doing the same thing for the Christian faith. In other words, in his writings on 
the Trinity, is he searching to articulate the truth of Christian doctrine through a 
Mu‘tazilite system of thought? Is he posing serious ontological questions? Is he 
testing Christian doctrines against rational criteria or did he merely see the 
opportunity to explain the doctrine of the Trinity creatively in kalām terms?   
 
One would perhaps have to conclude the latter: the tools he uses to defend the 
Trinity are generally traditional Christian proofs expressed in an Arabic idiom, which 
failed to convince his Muslim counterparts as the conceptual differences between the 
                                                          
564 Frank points out that ‘conceptual language is often strained to its limits when the theologian 
undertakes to formulate propositions about God and His attributes.’ Ibid., 30  
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two conceptions of the nature of God could not be overcome565. His concern does 
not appear to be to test his own Christian faith or to ask fundamental questions about 
the nature of the divine being, which had been established in Christian thought for 
centuries. Where he does engage the furthest with an Islamic conception of God, 
‘Ammār is almost forced to compromise his Christian model of the Trinity for one 
whereby the Son and Holy Spirit are reduced to attributes of the Father. For all his 
creativity, it would seem that ‘Ammār is doing essentially the same thing as Abū 
Qurra and Abū Rā’iṭa, only to a different extent, and that all three authors are 
primarily acting as apologists for Christianity, moulding their writings to the context in 
which they live. 
 
Looking at Abū Qurra’s explanation of the Trinity, on the other end of the scale, it 
would be very difficult to argue that he is involved in a parallel enterprise to the 
Muslim mutakallimūn, in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity at least. Where Abū Qurra 
                                                          
565 See: Thomas, D. ‘A Mu’tazili response to Christianity: Abu ‘Ali al-Jubba’ī’s attack on the Trinity and 
Incarnation’, Studies on the Christian Arabic heritage, R. Ebied and H. Teule, Leuven; Paris; Dudley, 
2004; and _______., ‘Christian theologians and new questions’ in E. Grypeou, M. Swanson and D. 
Thomas (eds) The encounter of eastern Christianity with early Islam, Leiden; Boston, 2006. 
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does engage with Islamic theological thought, his engagement is a definite response 
to the Muslim challenge, at times showing little interest in the intricacies of Muslim 
doctrines, and he presents a very traditional Christian model of the Trinity. Abū Rā’iṭa 
would seem to be placed somewhere in between ‘Ammār and Abū Qurra, though 
closer to Nestorian theologian than the Melkite. What all three of the Christian 
authors appear to be doing, in their writings on the Trinity, is holding the doctrine up 
next to the Muslim debate over the divine attributes, in order to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of Christian doctrine, for both Muslims and Christians. Although 
there are differences between the three authors, the reliance of all three on traditional 
scriptural proofs and analogical arguments amongst others, despite the apparent 
Mu‘tazilī distaste for such arguments, would suggest that these authors could not 
really hope to convince their Muslim counterparts of the truth of the Trinity. 
 
Ultimately, it would perhaps be naïve to hope that one could provide a definitive 
answer to this challenging question, fundamentally as kalām is such an elusive 
concept, and yet it is a fascinating issue which is raised as a result of this thesis. On 
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the basis of this brief consideration, one might suggest that the Arabic-speaking 
Christian authors of the early ninth century may be referred to as ‘Christian 
mutakallimūn’ in some respects: they are defenders of their faith in response to Islam 
and use logical and rational criteria to support the truth of Christianity. Indeed, Kalām 
has been identified as a ‘procedure’ in one ‘restricted sense’.566 However, the 
question to ask is perhaps whether they are doing this as a service for Christianity in 
itself, perhaps prompted by the development of Islamic thought around them and 
their immersion in Islamic culture, or whether they are more simply explaining their 
traditional doctrines in response to Muslim concerns and pressures. The difficulty 
perhaps lies in the fact that, whatever its roots, kalām, at some point, developed into 
a distinctly Islamic discipline which came to comprise much more than purely 
apologetics. 
 
Yet, if we phrase the question a little differently, and ask it in terms of a parallel 
exercise, and the seriousness with which Christians might have taken their own 
                                                          
566 Ess, Josef van. ‘The beginnings of Islamic theology’, 105 
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kalām-based arguments, the picture begins to look a little different. Under these 
circumstances one would be hard pressed to consider Abū Qurra a mutakallim, and 
even Abū Rā’iṭa, who very much conforms to common sense logic in leading to his 
explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity and addresses the specific Muslim problem 
with the Trinity, still presents a very traditional picture of doctrine overall, which does 
not fully conform to the accepted logic of the ‘ilm al-kalām. 
 
 ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī is the theologian who engages the most fully with the Islamic 
intellectual environment and attempts a logical system which demonstrates that the 
divine attributes of Word and Life can be shown to be inherent to the essence of God 
in a way that other attributes are not, before showing the likeness to the Christian 
hypostases of Son and Holy Spirit.  He also goes the furthest in questioning Muslim 
doctrines rather than purely defending his own, and in almost offering the Trinity as a 
solution to internal Muslim issues concerning the nature of God. In this context, one 
can well imagine ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī moving in similar intellectual circles to the Muslim 
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schools and sects of Basra, participating in debate with them. And yet, whether one 
can call truly him a mutakallim in the fullest sense, remains open to question. 
  
Essentially, Christians continued to use arguments with roots in traditional Christian 
doctrines, and all three authors studied here defended the traditional Christian 
doctrine of one substance and three hypostases. This, however, is not to belittle their 
achievements in any way. Christian theology certain took on a new form in Arabic: 
the language and concepts employed in order to explain Christian doctrine, in a 
language increasingly co-opted by Islamic concepts, make works from this period 
distinct from the outset. Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī all 
appear to have engaged with Islamic theological thought in a bid to be taken 
seriously in their attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, for both Muslims and other Christians faced with the challenges of Islam.  
 
Moreover, through the use of reason based arguments it would seem that these 
Christian authors posed a real threat to Muslims, as they were not merely basing 
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arguments on scripture, which could have been simply rejected by their opponents, 
but were identifying common rational starting points and producing logical arguments 
in the dialectical style of kalām, and were therefore challenging their adversaries to 
respond in turn. Whether considered successful or not, their writings were certainly 
significant enough to be addressed by the likes of Abū al-Hudhayl and ibn al-Murdār 
and it is likely that they all would have been involved in debates at the caliph’s court 
at some point during their respective careers. Moreover, in terms of their theological 
legacy, their arguments can be found, often almost completely unchanged, for 
centuries afterwards, used by those such as Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d.974), Severus Ibn al-
Mu’qaffa (d.987), and Muḥyī al-dīn al-Isfahani (fl.11th or 12th century). This, in itself, is 
a significant achievement. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Sources from the Islamic Empire in the early ninth century provide a fascinating 
insight into Christian-Muslim engagement, which is as enlightening as it is equivocal. 
What is evident is that, by this time, Christians living under Islamic rule were 
composing theological works in Arabic, explaining and defending their beliefs and 
practices within the Islamic milieu. These Christians, of whom Theodore Abū Qurra, 
Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī are representative, employed Muslim 
terminology and concepts in order to clarify doctrine of the Trinity, by tapping into a 
Muslim debate concerning the nature of God and His divine attributes. 
 
From their writings on the doctrine of the Trinity it is clear that these three authors are 
involved in a similar enterprise, using very similar arguments and tools in order to 
explain and demonstrate the reasonableness of the doctrine for the purposes of both 
Christian and Muslim readers. What a close analysis of these texts also reveals, 
however, is that the three authors differed in terms of their subtle priorities and 
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emphases within their treatises, and in terms of the extent to which each engaged 
with Islamic thought and participated in the development of a Muslim activity. This 
can be seen from both the individual discussions of each author in Part One of the 
thesis and the comparative discussions in Part Two.  
 
Abū Qurra’s writings on the Trinity, to a greater extent than his contemporaries, are 
linked to his project of discerning the ‘true religion’. Christian scripture, which clearly 
indicates the Trinitarian nature of the divine being, should be accepted on the basis 
of Christianity having been proven to be the only religion to have come from God, as 
Abū Qurra sees it. The Melkite Bishop, therefore, appears to put less emphasis on 
‘rational proofs’ in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity and engages least in terms of 
likening the doctrine of the Trinity to the divine attributes debate. 
 
Abū Rā’iṭa, meanwhile, especially in his al-Risāla al-ūlā, takes a different approach. 
His concern is very much to engage with his Muslim counterparts by beginning from 
the agreement that God is one and very much focusing on rational proof in the 
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ensuing discussion, only using traditional Christian analogies and biblical proofs 
towards the end of his treatise in a sort of supplementary fashion. The Jacobite 
theologian of Takrit clearly uses terms and concepts from the Muslim debate about 
the divine attributes in order to lead his reader logically to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Moreover, his emphasis from the very beginning on the two faiths’ differing 
conceptions of the term ‘one’ betrays not only a remarkable depth of understanding 
of his opponents’ position, but also a willingness to engage with the problem 
specifically as Muslims saw it. Although texts are very impersonal and judging them 
is not easy, there is the impression of Abū Rā’iṭa of a more direct grasp with the key 
issue that is causing the Muslims problems. 
 
Whilst the Jacobite theologian might be said to recognise the crux of the Muslim 
issue with the doctrine most clearly, his Nestorian contemporary undoubtedly goes 
the furthest in engaging with their Muslim counterparts, both in terms of likening the 
two conceptions of the unity of God, and in asking direct questions of his Muslim 
adversaries, pointing out a number of inherent contradictions within a particular 
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Mu‘tazilī conception of God’s relationship to His attributes. In this way ‘Ammār al-
Baṣrī shows himself to not only be a well-informed apologist, but also an 
accomplished polemicist. 
 
 Chapter Five examined tools and proofs which each of the authors used to aid their 
explanation of the Trinity. Generally speaking, it would appear that in terms of the 
tools Christian authors employed, most would appear to be traditional Christian 
proofs for the doctrine with a creative Islamic twist. Biblical proofs and Trinitarian 
analogies are the most traditional aspect of their arguments, whilst the employment 
of rational proofs based on Greek philosophy and logic, although most often having 
roots in the apologetic tradition before Islam, were adopted to suit the Muslim 
context. The most original aspect of their works is undoubtedly the variations of the 
“attribute-apology” they each develop, based on the Muslim conception of the nature 
and unity of God. What this chapter also highlights, however, is the fundamental 
conceptual difference between the Christian and Muslim understanding of God, 
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which ultimately prevents any of these proofs from being persuasive to a Muslim 
audience. 
 
 Despite their differences in approach, it is clear that each of the three theologians at 
the heart of this study adapted their works to suit their particular Islamic context, by 
using religiously nuanced Arabic idiom and Muslim modes of thought to lead their 
reader to a Christian conception of God. Undeniably, the borrowing and utilisation of 
Muslim language and concepts has the effect that Christian theological works in 
Arabic would be unrecognisable in other contexts. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that what one finds in these works is a new expression of the doctrine of the 
Trinity, or indeed a parallel exercise alongside their Muslim counterparts in 
considering and therefore articulating their Christian faith in a new way.  
 
Certainly, being immersed in Islamic culture and being regularly asked questions 
about their faith framed in a distinctly Islamic mode of discourse, Christians had to 
address these questions and find ways to explain doctrines such as the Trinity in a 
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way that their Muslim counterparts might understand. Ultimately, however, despite 
engaging with Islamic thought and likening the doctrine of the Trinity to the Islamic 
concept of the divine attributes to varying degrees, each author presents a 
fundamentally Christian apology. Their continued use of traditional arguments such 
as biblical proofs and Trinitarian analogies, along with terminology they felt best 
conveyed the Christian conception of God’s substance, without apparent concern for 
Muslim objections, points to this conclusion. Moreover, the fact that Abū Qurra and 
Abū Rā’iṭa, although they effectively hold up the doctrine of the Trinity alongside the 
divine attributes debate in a very tentative comparison, the latter more so than the 
former, never actually go as far as to equate Christian hypostases with divine 
attributes, suggests that they do not conceive of their doctrine in Muslim terms. Even 
‘Ammār, who goes the furthest in likening the two conceptions of the nature of God, 
and could be accused of equating hypostases with attributes, still goes on to present 
a very Christian model of the Trinity in which hypostases could never be considered 
attributes. 
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Equally, this is not to suggest that Christians were not thinking about similar sorts of 
questions as their Muslim counterparts, as they lived in a society that was coming to 
be dominated by Islamic theological concepts and techniques, and were therefore 
pushed to respond to those who were directly posing questions about the nature of 
God, framed in an Islamic manner.  
 
Therefore it would be unfair to go as far as to suggest that Christians were simply 
using empty apologetic devices for the sake of their Muslim counterparts; and the 
fact that a large element of their audience would have been Christians seeking to 
strengthen and defend their faith in the face of Islam meant that Abū Qurra, Abū 
Rā’iṭa‘ and Ammār were required to think about their doctrines in relation to Muslim 
objections, in order to respond to Islamic accusations accordingly. 
 
It would appear that Abū Qurra and his contemporaries, in their writings, are 
attempting to hold up the Muslim and Christian conceptions of the nature of God side 
by side, in order to indicate a tentative comparability or likeness, but never actually 
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suggest that the two conceptions of God can be likened. This can be seen most 
clearly in Abū Qurra who mentions divine attributes such as ‘existence’, ‘life’, 
‘knowledge’ and so on, but then explains that the most noble attributes of God are 
the distinctly Christian attributes of Headship and Begetting.  
 
Abū Rā’iṭa, who begins from the common notion that God is one, discusses God in 
terms of the attributes of ‘life’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’ and then changes his 
terminology to talk about the Trinity in Christian terms, furnishing his Christian 
expression of God with Trinitarian analogies and biblical proofs.  
 
‘Ammār, particularly in the Burhān, dives into the particulars of the divine attributes 
debate to the point where he appears to directly equate the attributes of ‘word’ and 
‘life’ with the Son and Holy Spirit, before stressing the perfection and distinction of the 
hypostases as self-subsistent entities.  
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In this way, all three authors, to differing extents, are clearly making use of the logic 
and concepts of kalām but always maintain a certain distance. For if they were to 
follow through with the implications of attributes being equated with hypostases, as 
potentially seen in relation to ‘Ammār, then they would have been forced to present a 
very unorthodox model of the Trinity, or indeed one which would destroy the doctrine 
completely.  
 
All three authors, therefore, come to offer a traditional Christian view of God, 
presented, where possible, in terms that their Muslim opponents might understand.  
To this end, they all refer to God having divine attributes, Abū Rā’iṭa and ‘Ammār 
seek common starting points, that is to say the agreement that God is one and the 
agreement that He is ‘living’ and ‘speaking’. Both authors give priority to reason 
based arguments over scriptural ones, especially in the works that appear more 
directed at a Muslim audience. All three authors use a number of terms relating to 
God’s nature in order to clarify their expression of one substance (jawhar) and three 
hypostases (aqānīm). 
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Perhaps the best way to describe Christian works on the doctrine of the Trinity in 
Arabic is to echo Keating’s words that they formed a ‘creative response’. Our three 
Christian authors, and particularly ‘Ammār, certainly show creativity and originality in 
taking on Muslim concepts and likening them to the Trinity, but at the same time 
appear very much to be responding to Muslim concerns rather than actually 
understanding the doctrine of the Trinity in new terms. In this way they appear to be 
demonstrating the reasonableness of the doctrine, rather than trying to persuade 
their reader of its truth.  
 
The related question of whether these three authors can properly be called Christian 
mutakallimūn is a challenging one, and essentially very much depends on one’s 
understanding of kalām. If simply considered to be apologetic using a certain form of 
logical reasoning and language, then there may be grounds to refer to these three 
Christian authors as such. If understood to require deep engagement with Islam as a 
distinctly Islamic discipline, then really only ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī can be seen to engage 
with Islamic thought to such an extent, and even he is unable to conform fully to the 
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dictates of an Islamic theological framework in terms of his explanation of the Trinity. 
The question can be approached in a slightly different manner, by asking whether 
‘Ammār and his Christian contemporaries were engaged in a parallel exercise to that 
of the Muslim mutakallimūn, that is to ask whether they were seeking to explain 
Christian revelation through rational means and therefore perhaps testing their 
established Christian doctrines against new criteria. A definitive answer is difficult to 
provide, as the question is one of intentions and how far Christian authors actually 
believed in their adapted explanations of the Trinity.  
 
Ultimately, it would appear that, for all their efforts, Christians and Muslims were 
working in different conceptual frameworks which would not allow for the comparison 
of their respective doctrines on the nature and unity of God. Nevertheless, Christian 
attempts to clarify their doctrines in the context of Muslim theology are impressive. 
 
Theodore Abū Qurra, Abū Rā’iṭa al-Takrītī and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī clearly felt the need 
to respond to Muslim questions and objections concerning their doctrines; and their 
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responses, although varied in degree, all display remarkable elements of creativity 
and originality, and a keen awareness of Islamic thought. They thus adapted their 
explanations of the doctrine of the Trinity to fit the Islamic context in which they lived, 
in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of the doctrine, as their context required. 
Whilst perhaps not a development in Christian doctrine, as such, their 
accomplishments and legacy in translating their doctrines into the Arabic Islamic 
context are undeniable. 
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